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Linda S. Mullenix*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the well-known Greek myth, Prometheus stole fire from the
Greek god Zeus and gave it to humanity. In return for this
arrogance, Zeus had Prometheus chained to a rock in the Caucasus
Mountains where Prometheus was punished by an eagle eating
away at his liver, which regenerated every night. Because
Prometheus was immortal, he was condemned to eternal torture by
the voracious eagle's pecking. After 30 years of this punishment,
however, Hercules appeared, killed the eagle, and liberated
Prometheus from his unending torment. In return for freeing him,
Prometheus rewarded Hercules with the secret to completing the
11th of his famous Herculean labors.'
On April 20, 2010, an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon rig
killed 11 workers and unleashed the worst oil spill in American
history. Less than two months later, on June 16th, 2010, BP
Oil-after meeting with President Barack Obama-agreed to set
up a $20 billion fund to compensate victims of the disaster. Shortly
thereafter, BP selected Kenneth Feinberg to oversee the
compensation fund and claims process.
In the morality play of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP
assumed the Promethean role of modem energy-bringer to
mankind. In its arrogance for attempting to expropriate energy
from miles below the ocean floor and bring oil to mankind, BP
precipitated a massive calamity. As a consequence, BP faced the
eternal punishment of being lashed to the American Caucasus of
never-ending civil litigation, perpetually to be pecked away by
claimants. Rather than endure this interminable retribution, BP
instead chose to terminate its own agony as quickly as possible by
creating a fund. And, Hercules-in the form of the heroic Ken
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1. Prometheus gave Hercules the secret to stealing the golden apples from
the Hesperides. PIERRE GRIMAL, THE DICTIONARY OF CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY
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Feinberg-appeared to BP just in time to slay the civil litigators
and liberate BP. For his efforts at enabling the BP rescue, BP
rewarded Feinberg. 2
The appearance of Feinberg as the heroic savior in the Gulf oil
calamity was, in no small measure, a consequence of a persona
whose reputation has indeed assumed mythic proportions in the
public consciousness.3 As is well known, Feinberg served as the
special master administering the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund (the "Fund") in the aftermath of the terrorist
attack of September 11, 2001.4 As is equally well known, Feinberg
has also had an extended career serving as a mediator, special
master, settlement negotiator, claims administrator, and more
recently, as President Barack Obama's Wall Street executive
compensation czar.5
The selection of Feinberg to administer the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility (GCCF) immediately commanded comparison to the
September 1 Ith Victim Compensation Fund. Indeed, Feinberg
2. By the author's somewhat inexpert count, Feinberg might well be
performing approximately his seventh Herculean labor, with his preceding feats
consisting of his participation as a special master in: (1) negotiating the Agent
Orange class action settlement, (2) as a trustee charged with disbursing Dalkon
Shield settlement payments, (3) assisting Judge Jack Weinstein of the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the Brooklyn Navy Yard
asbestos cases, (4) managing the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
(5) determining Wall Street executive salary compensation under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program, (6) supervising the Hokie Spirit Memorial Fund after the
Virginia Tech campus shootings, and (7) administering the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility. See Terry Carter, The Master ofDisasters: Is It Just Him, or Is Kenneth
Feinberg Changing the Course of Mass Tort Resolution?, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011;
Jeff McDermott, Kenneth R. Feinberg: A Profile in Public Service, FED. LAW.,
May 2008, at 38.
3. See Steven Brill, What's a Bailed-Out Banker Really Worth?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Jan. 2010, at 32 (profile of Feinberg's role as executive pay czar under the
federal Troubled Asset Relief Program); Carter, supra note 2, at 33; Kimberley A.
Strassel, Mr. Fairness: The Pay Czar, BP Claims Administrator, and 9/11 Victims
Fund Manager Talks About How He Makes Decisions That Alter Lives, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 7, 2010, at All, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748703309704575413404274531476.html (comparing Feinberg to King
Solomon).
4. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001,
VOLUME 1 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf
5. Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 627, 667 (2003); Martha Chamallas, The
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Rethinking the Damages Element
in Injury Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 51, 56 (2003); Charles J. Faruki, Book Review,
FED. LAW., Oct. 2005, at 52 (reviewing KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE
WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11
(2005)); McDermott, supra note 2; Strassel, supra note 3.
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himself announced that in administering the GCCF, he would be
drawing on his vast knowledge and experience in administering the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.6 Many of Feinberg's
initial initiatives-such as town hall meetings and outreach
programs to Gulf fishermen and other claimants-duplicated
techniques that Feinberg had developed during his supervision of
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
But, the BP Gulf Coast Claims Facility-apart from its
superficial designation as a compensation fund-bears little
resemblance to the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
Although these two "fund" mechanisms have in common the same
all-powerful administrator, the two funds are entirely unlike one
another. This comparison bears scrutiny and debate for several
compelling reasons.
First, the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was
widely acknowledged as a sui generis, one-time endeavor to
compensate victims of a national terrorist disaster.8 Indeed, special
6. See Strassel, supra note 3.
7. See Kenneth Feinberg, Transparency and Civil Justice: The Internal and
External Value ofSunlight, 58 DEPAuL L. REv. 473 (2003); Feinberg Says BP Fund
Will Be Generous, Better than Lawsuits, BUS. WK. (July 15, 2010), http://
businessweek.com/news/2010-07-15/feinberg-says-bp-fund-will-be-generous-better-
than-lawsuits.html [hereinafter BP Fund Will Be Generous] (local meeting in
Jefferson Parish, Louisiana); Wendy Kaufman, Feinberg Vows Quick Response on
Gulf Oil Spill Claims, NPR (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyld=129293800 (Feinberg meeting in Houma, Louisiana).
8. See, e.g., FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 83-84; Robert M.
Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An Effective
Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 135,
205 (2005) ("Because the Fund is sui generis, it is unlikely to have a profound
impact on developments in the law of torts."); Chamallas, supra note 5, at 53
("Perhaps the most repeated observation made about the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, like the horrible events which brought it into being, is that
it is unique and has no close parallel in the history of United States injury and
compensation law."); Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Bornfrom a Unique Confluence ofEvents Not Likely to Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L.
REv. 209 (2003) (comparing the World Trade Center events to the attack on
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941); Robert L. Rabin, The September llth
Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed Response or an Auspicious
Model?, 53 DEPAuL L. REv. 769, 771 (2003); Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D.
Sugarman, The Case for Specially Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Acts:
An Assessment, 35 HOFSTRA L. REv. 901, 907 (2007) ("9/11 was the
quintessential once-in-a-lifetime disaster."); Erin G. Holt, Note, The September
11th Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U.
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 513, 535 (2004). But see Michele Landis Dauber, The War
of 1812, September 11th, and the Politics of Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
289 (2003) (arguing that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was
not unprecedented; the federal government historically has been involved in
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master Feinberg repeatedly stressed in numerous speeches and
writings that the Fund was neither a model for tort reform, nor a
model for any future terrorist or other disaster.9 Feinberg was fairly
and consistently insistent that the Fund was not a model for
anything.10 And many, if not most, academic commentators agreed
with this assessment." And yet, the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 12 in its implementation and desip, is now
touted as the model for the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. It should
give us some pause that the special master who repeatedly
compensating victims of various types of calamities, including other victims of
terror).
9. FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 178 ("It would be a mistake for Congress or
the public to take the 9/11 fund as ... a model in the event of future attacks.");
FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 83-84; Kenneth R. Feinberg, Negotiating the
September 11 Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Mass Tort Resolution
Without Litigation, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 21, 29 (2005) [hereinafter
Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund] ("9/11 was unique and
gave rise to a unique response. That is the only way, I think, to explain it.");
Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Building Blocks of Successful Victim Compensation
Programs, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 273, 276-77 (2005) [hereinafter
Feinberg, The Building Blocks]; Q & A: Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master of
the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund (C-SPAN television broadcast July 10,
2005) (stating that the 9/11 Fund was an aberration and unique); Feinberg, supra
note 7, at 475077; see also Peter T. Elikann, Book Review, 90 MASS. L. REV.
48 (2006) (reviewing FEINBERG, supra note 5); Robert L. Rabin, September 11
Through the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464 (2006)
(reviewing FEINBERG, supra note 5); James E. Rooks, Book Review, TRIAL,
Mar. 2006, at 74 (reviewing FEINBERG, supra note 5).
10. FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 178; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 84;
see also Rabin, supra note 9, at 479 (contending that the thrust of Feinberg's
argument, that the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund would be a
mistake as a precedent for future programs, is puzzling).
11. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in Compensating
Victims of September 11, 49 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 573, 588 (2001); Rabin &
Sugarman, supra note 8, at 913 ("[A]n ad hoc fund by its very nature runs a
substantial risk of being myopic in design-fixated with excessive particularity
on the event at hand. In this regard, the 9/11 Fund provides a cautionary note.");
Larry S. Stewart et al., The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Past or
Prologue?, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 153, 171 (2002) (commenting that the Fund will
not likely serve as a model for future reform of the American civil justice
system).
12. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Charles E. Lavis, Interview with Ken Feinberg, the
Independent Administrator of the BP Oil Spill Victim Compensation Fund, BP
OIL SPILL L. BLOG (June 20, 2010), http://www.bpoilspilllawblog.com/2010/06/
ken-feinbergs-interview-on-mee.html?utm-sou (Feinberg drawing on the lessons
of the Fund to guide his implementation of the GCCF).
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disavowed his own masterwork should now be relying on his work
product again, but in a different and anomalous context.
Second, almost every aspect of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
is unlike the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. Among
numerous features, the funds differ in the nature of the events
giving rise to creation of the fund: authorization, rulemaking,
review mechanisms, transparency, election of remedies, applicable
law, assistance of counsel, litigation alternatives, as well as the role
of the prospective defendants. The GCCF has raised challenging
ethical and professional responsibility issues, as well as questions
relating to the fund's transparency. Hence, any citations to the
Fund as a precedent for the GCCF-by the special master or
others-should be viewed with guarded skepticism.
Third, and perhaps most important, the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility represents an unnoticed incremental trend toward the
lawless, private resolution of mass claims. This resolution (in the
case of the GCCF) was created by a culpable defendant,
unbounded by legal norms, and administered by a heroic "special
master" with limitless unreviewable discretion, who also is in the
employ of the malefactor. Whatever else may be argued on behalf
of the GCCF, this cannot be a good development.
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund has been
widely viewed as a tremendous accomplishment in expeditiously
resolving the claims of thousands of grieving victims of an
unprecedented terrorist attack.14 On the other hand, with more
considered distance, several scholars have raised probing questions
relating to the principles underlyinq5 the Fund's compensation
scheme, as well as its implementation.
14. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 ("I am pleased to report that, in
my view, the fund was an unqualified success."); Ackerman, supra note 8, at
224-25 (praising the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund); Feinberg,
Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 29; Peck, supra
note 8; Mike Steenson & Joseph Michael Sayler, The Legacy of the 9/11 Fund
and the Minnesota 1-35W Bridge-Collapse Fund: Creating a Template for
Compensating Victims of Future Mass-Tort Catastrophes, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 524, 559 (2009) ("By almost all measures, the Fund was a success.").
15. See generally Alexander, supra note 5, at 627 (noting that future
disaster compensation systems should focus on institutional design, suggesting
several factors to ensure substantive and procedural fairness); Chamallas, supra
note 5, at 79 ("[The Fund] neither reflects a consistent social vision nor furthers
a coherent compensation philosophy. Instead, the Fund is a blended scheme that
combines features of a tort-like system of individualized justice with a no-fault
insurance system."); Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719 (2003); Jean Macchiaroli
Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 383 (2007) (proposing
management plans for future massive toxic tort exposure claims); George L.
Priest, The Problematic Structure of the September 11th Victim Compensation
2011] 823
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A number of scholars have suggested that the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund represented a hybrid, hodge-podge of
conflicting principles drawn from tort law, private and
governmental insurance models, and social welfare schemes. 6 At
least one scholar has suggested that the model for the Fund is the
class action settlement mechanism--with Feinberg in the role of
settlement negotiator and administrator-but otherwise lacking the
attributes of a settlement class.' 7 Others have questioned the
wisdom of permitting a single, powerful administrator to so
completely dominate the creation and implementation of a
compensation fund. Surveying this range of criticism, several
scholars have suggested that although the Fund commendably
compensated some 2,700 claimants in a short period of time, and
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 527, 527 (2003) ("Nevertheless, the September 11th
Fund has generated remarkable controversy."); Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate
Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. L. REV. 1831 (2002)
[hereinafter Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm]; Rabin, supra note 8; Rabin &
Sugarman, supra note 8, at 913-15; Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A
Psychological Perspective on Compensation for Harm: Examining the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 358
(2003) (September 11th Victim Compensation Fund failed to create either
distributive justice or procedural fairness amongst recipients of the Fund). But
see Brian Walker, Lessons That Wrongful Death Tort Law Can Learn from the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 28 REV. LITIG. 595 (2009) (arguing
that lessons learned from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund can
help reform state wrongful death law).
16. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 5, at 636-39 (different compensation
models); Chamallas, supra note 5, at 53-55, 58 (describing mixed features of
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, and describing the rules and
regulations adopted to govern the Fund as a "curious hybrid system"); Diller,
supra note 15, at 721, 724, 726-66 (describing the Fund as an amalgam of tort
and social welfare schemes); Priest, supra note 15, at 532-39; Rabin, supra note
11, at 576-81; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 913; see also Rabin, supra
note 8, at 770 (the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is not one model,
but three).
17. See Diller, supra note 15, at 721, 745-47, 757 ("Feinberg's conception
of his role draws on the model of the Fund as a mass tort settlement
mechanism.").
18. See Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master:
Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
24 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 3-4 (2006), which argues that Feinberg's role as
the special master in administering the Fund should not serve as a model for the
future: "Never before in modem times has Congress created a position with so
much discretion and so little oversight." See also Diller, supra note 15, at 726,
766-68 (critical of Feinberg's overweening central role in design and
implementation of the Fund).
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avoided litigation, the Fund nonetheless lacked legitimacy in a
democratic society.' 9
The serious challenges that scholars have raised with regard to
the legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
have even more powerful resonance in relation to the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility. If the Fund represented a movement toward the
embrace of fund mechanisms for resolving mass tort claims, then
the GCCF not only has expanded on this model but also advanced
the model in an even more radical, less lawful direction. In this
view, it is difficult to discern any basis for legitimacy for the
GCCF. For those concerned with the rule of law, equity, and
fundamental fairness, the GCCF ought to be a cause for concern.
The arc of Feinberg's career neatly demonstrates the evolution
of at least three different fund models, progressing from arguably
the most legitimate to arguably the least legitimate (and most
lawless). This evolution illustrates a seamless progression from (1)
a judicially approved and managed class action fund to (2) a
congressionally mandated and supervised fund to (3) a defendant-
created and directed fund. In the haste to embrace the fund
approach to mass claim resolution, little attention has focused on
how these "funds" have evolved from entities governed by the rule
of law to a model essentially unconstrained by law.
In the ensuing sections, this Article compares several
dimensions of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund to
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. By focusing on various aspects of
fund creation and implementation, the purpose of these sections is
to draw attention to the ways in which the GCCF is unlike the
Fund.
After this lengthy exploration of these two funds, this Article
concludes with a discussion of the concept of a "fund approach" to
the resolution of mass tort litigation and raises concerns about this
model. This final assessment considers the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility in the context of other fund resolutions of mass claims,
returning to the theme that the GCCF represents a radical and
troubling departure from other fund resolutions of mass claims,
about which rule-of-law advocates ought to be concerned.
19. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 206 (citing Richard C. Reuben,
Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 285-86 (2004)); Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 24-26
(suggesting that the Fund's provision for a litigation alternative was illusory and
another ground for the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act's
(ATSA's) illegitimacy); Priest, supra note 15, at 545; Elizabeth M. Schneider,
Grief Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 489 (2003) (undemocratic process in establishment of
the Fund and selection of the special master).
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II. A COMPARISON OF THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM
COMPENSATION FUND AND THE BP GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was created
nearly a decade ago, and with the passage of time, scholars have
generated an enormous body of historical, analytical,2 and critical
literature examining almost every aspect of the Fund. 0 The study
of the Fund has been aided by the fact that, as the consequence of
Congressional legislation and rulemaking, as well as the
transparency afforded by the Fund's special master, much
information about the Fund is in the public domain.21 In addition,
in numerous speeches, articles, books, and media appearances,
Feinberg has been unusually active in publicly explaining and
defending the Fund.22 In contrast, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility is
not the creature of federal legislation. Consequently, information
relating to the GCCF has been, at this point, less accessible than
information relating to the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund.23
It is not the purpose of this Article to again recite the history of
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, which has been
explained in great detail in numerous other articles. 24 Rather, the
20. See generally Ackerman, supra note 8; Alexander, supra note 5;
Berkowitz, supra note 18 (criticizing Feinberg's role as special master); Robert
A. Katz, Too Much of a Good Thing: When Charitable Gifts Augment Victim
Compensation, 53 DEPAUL L. REv. 547 (2003) (discussing collateral source
rule); Rabin, supra note 11, at 576-87; Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at
530-60.
21. See, e.g., FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4; Award Payment Statistics-
September 11th Compensation Fund of 2001, U.S. DEP'T JUST., http://www.
justice.gov/archive/victimcompensation/payments deceased.html (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011) (reporting that the mean award for death claims was
approximately $1.7 million, with a high of $7.1 million and a low of $250,000,
after offsets).
22. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 5; Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim
Compensation Fund, supra note 9; Feinberg, The Building Blocks, supra note 9
(commenting on how he designed a successful compensation system for the
September 1Ith victims).
23. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.
com (last visited Mar. 14, 2011); Frequently Asked Questions, GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq (last visited Mar.
14, 2011).
24. See, e.g., FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4; Ackerman, supra note 8, at
143-55 (establishing the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund);
Alexander, supra note 5, at 627-28, 630-33 (legislative history of ATSA);
Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 5-9 (same); George W. Conk, Will the Post 9/11
World Be a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN ST. L. REv. 175, 182-88 (2007);
Eggen, supra note 15, at 413-20; Katz, supra note 20, at 576-80 (discussing the
Fund program); Rabin, supra note 11, at 576-87.
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ensuing sections of this Article focus on various aspects of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund in comparison to the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility.
A. Events Giving Rise to Creation of the Funds
The events giving rise to the creation of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility
differ in significant ways that bear on the legitimacy of utilizing a
fund approach to compensate alleged victims of those events.
Indeed, commentators on the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund have pointed to the unique nature of the
events giving rise to creation of the Fund as a reason for not
extending the fund approach to other types of calamitous events.26
On the other hand, the GCCF was created in the context of events
that scholars have suggested are not especially suitable for a fund
approach to victim compensation.27 As will be discussed, the
events that gave rise to the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund are unlike those events that undergird the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, in significant ways for assessing the legitimacy of a fund
approach to resolving claims.
Almost every narrative of September 11, 2001 focuses on the
nearly unprecedented terrorist attack on American soil, comparable
perhaps only to the December 7, 1941 surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor.28 Thus, in numerous accounts the September 11th attacks
typically are characterized as a terrorist act of war, and central to
this narrative are descriptions of a traumatized country in the wake
25. Alexander, supra note 5, at 653; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at
913; see also Michael Cooper, Two Funds, Same Goal: Compensate, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 22, 2010, at A14 (comparing the September 11th events and the
Gulf oil spill and the consequences for evaluating compensation).
26. See, e.g., FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 83-84; Rabin & Sugarman,
supra note 8, at 913 (commenting that terrorist attacks are not a solid foundation
for creating a fund; the Fund offers no principle upon which to base a publically
funded compensation mechanism).
27. See, for example, Rabin, supra note 8, at 780-81, 798, 799-803, which
suggests that responsible defendants ought to be charged with the losses
reflecting what is required to make a deserving plaintiff whole: "I remain
unconvinced that any future special recognition of victims of terrorism outside
tort would, or should, depart from this latter norm."
28. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 653-57 (September 11th program
formulated as an ad hoc response to events of a single terrible day); Feinberg,
Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 29; Peck, supra
note 8, at 209; Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm, supra note 15, at 1843
(invoking the analogy to Pearl Harbor); Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 913
(same).
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of the attacks.29 Thus, many commentators have reiterated the
central theme of national trauma, and a resulting need for unified
healing, as a compelling rationale for the swift creation of a
compensation fund. o
The September 11th terrorist attacks also raised several
fundamental legal quandaries that became central to the September
11th narrative. For example, it quickly became evident that
identifying culpable defendants, in a traditional sense, would raise
challenging problems.31 Cleary, the terrorists who seized and
piloted the airplanes that crashed into the World Trade Center
towers, the Pentagon, and Shankesville, Pennsylvania, would not
be defendants. 32 The terrorists' countries of origin also raised
difficulties as prospective defendants, including sovereign
immunity defenses. Federal law circumscribed airline liability, and
airport screening companies were as yet untested defendants. In the
immediate aftermath of the attacks, other potential defendants such
as the Twin Tower architects and builders, the Port Authority, and
other agencies seemed remote possible defendants. In addition,
causation problems loomed large.
As has been recited in every account of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, Congress responded to this unique set
of events by enacting federal legislation within 11 days of the
attacks.33 The enabling legislation had two well-recognized goals:
29. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 140-42 (shared national tragedy); see also
Peck, supra note 8, at 209; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 913; Steenson &
Sayler, supra note 14, at 531.
30. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 222 ("But only the most jaded cynic
would not see in the Fund the heartfelt desire to aid one's neighbor in time of
need."); Alexander, supra note 5, at 639, 653. In sounding this theme, Professor
Alexander has explained:
Or the attacks might be viewed as acts directed symbolically against the
entire country and its government, making the victims emblematic
surrogates for all Americans. On this view, the expressive content of
the act might call for an expressive act of national generosity towards
the victims, who should be treated differently from other victims of
torts, crimes, or disasters as a way of showing defiance to the
perpetrators-in the words of one commentator, "to serve as a national
expression of unity in the face of a tragedy unique in American history,
as well as to help survivors."
Alexander, supra note 5, at 639 (citing Michael I. Meyerson, Losses of Equal
Value, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at D4); cf Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8,
at 913 (suggesting that the fact that the Fund emerged from the collective
conscience of the nation as a response to calamity "does not seem a solid
foundation for the future, offering nothing by way of principle").
31. Alexander, supra note 5, at 637.
32. Id.
33. See generally Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001). The Act subsequently was amended
828 [Vol. 71
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to limit the airlines' liability for the attacks, and thereby save the
airline industry,34 and to create a fund to compensate innocent
victims of the attacks.35 The second goal was intended to speedily
heal the wounds of the unprecedented attacks and to compensate
victims of the terrorist attack out of the national treasury. In this
view, the entire country responded to the attacks by communally
providing aid to innocent victims, against the background of
uncertain responsible party culpability.3
The events giving rise to creation of the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, in contrast, were not the result of a terrorist attack on
American soil but rather an explosion on a deep-water oil rig
platform in the Gulf of Mexico.37 Eleven oil rig workers were
killed, in contrast to the nearly 3,000 people who died or were
injured in the collapse of the World Trade Center Towers and the
airplane crashes into the Pentagon and Shankesville,
Pennsylvania. 38 Thus, the September 11th attacks gave rise to a
relatively limited universe of personal injury and death claims, but
the BP oil spill largely gave rise to environmental pollution,
property damage and business interruption claims from claimants
in all 50 states. In comparison to potential claims arising out of
by Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 124, 115 Stat. 631 (2001), and Pub. L. No. 107-134, §
114, 115 Stat. 2435 (2002). See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-4. For
accounts of ATSA's enactment, see, for example, Ackerman, supra note 8, at
143-48, and Eggen, supra note 15, at 413-20.
34. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 143;
Alexander, supra note 5, at 630-31; Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 1; Conk, supra
note 24, at 181.
35. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 144;
Alexander, supra note 5, at 631-32; Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim
Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 21; Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at
532.
36. See, e.g., FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 24, at 3; Ackerman, supra note 8,
at 144 ("The Fund reflected the national outpouring of grief and sympathy in the
wake of the unprecedented attacks of September 1 Ith."); Conk, supra note 24, at
181.
37. BP, DEEPWATER HORIZON ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT-
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2010), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/
bp-intemet/globalbp/globalbp ukenglish/incident response/STAGING/local_a
ssets/downloads_pdfs/DeepwaterHorizon AccidentInvestigation Report Exe
cutive summary.pdf; Cooper, supra note 25.
38. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(background events giving rise to September 11th litigation); Cooper, supra note
25.
39. Cooper, supra note 25; Jim Snyder, BP Spill Claims from 50 States
Confront Administrator Feinberg, Bus. WK. (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2010-08-16/bp-spill-claims-from-50-states-confront-ad
ministrator-feinberg.html (reporting that BP had received more than 142,400
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the September 11th attacks, the scope of potential BP claimants
and liability was enormous. Whereas the September 11th attacks
implicated problematic defendants enmeshed in complicated
causation issues, in contrast, the BP oil spill involved an
identifiable responsible party with more readily apparent
culpability.40
At least one primary justification for creation of the September
1Ith Victim Compensation Fund centered on the idea that the
claimants were innocent victims of a national traumatic event.4 ' In
light of this rationale, a number of scholars, as well as Feinberg,
have argued that the Fund experience should be cabined to the
unique terrorist events giving rise to creation of the Fund.42
Consequently, these scholars have argued that the Fund experience
should not be extended to provide relief in the wake of other
calamitous events such as naturally occurring hurricanes,
earthquakes, or the like.43 Commentators have used this theory to
rationalize the federal failure to create a relief fund in the aftermath
of Hurricane Katrina, for example." And, extending this argument,
commentators have suggested that compensation fund approaches
seem entirely unsuitable where a mass tort occurs and there is a
readily ascertainable culpable defendant.45
claims from all 50 states; most claims based on economic losses, rather than
death or injury).
40. The Coast Guard almost immediately designated BP as a "responsible
party" under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 102,
104 Stat. 484, 489. The OPA states:
[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is
discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil,
into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the
exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages
specified in subsection (b) that result from such incident.
Id. The OPA includes a $75 million cap for oil spill-related environmental
damage. Id § 1004, 104 Stat. at 492. In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon
explosion and spill, legislation was introduced in the Senate to end this cap. See
Barry Meier, Calls to Update Maritime Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2010, at BI,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/business/06seas.html.
41. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 144; Conk, supra note 24, at 181.
42. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 83-84; Feinberg, The Building
Blocks, supra note 9; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 913.
43. See Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 914.
44. Id.
45. See Rabin, supra note 8, at 780-81, 798, 799-803, which suggests that
responsible defendants ought to be charged with the losses reflecting what is
required to make a deserving plaintiff whole: "I remain unconvinced that any
future special recognition of victims of terrorism outside tort would, or should,
depart from this latter norm."
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In contrast to these limiting arguments, other scholars have
argued that there is no reasoned basis for distinguishing between
innocent victims of the September 11th attacks and the innocent
victims of other similar disasters that also have caused national
trauma. 46 If the concepts of "innocent victim" and "national
trauma" have meaning, then there is little rational basis for
choosing among types of claimants for fund relief.47 Thus, in this
view, the creation of the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund was inherently unfair to victims of the first attack on the
World Trade Center in 1993, the victims of the Oklahoma federal
office bombing (a domestic terrorist event), the victims of the
attacks on the Navy ship USS Cole in Yemen, and the victims of
the embassy bombing in Kenya.4 8 In this same vein, these critics
argue that there is no reasoned basis for not extending fund
compensation to innocent victims of natural disasters, such as the
innocent victims of Hurricane Katrina.49
Despite the debate concerning the nature of the events that
support creation of a fund approach to compensation (or not), those
commentators who have addressed this issue do seem to agree on
this point: that a mass disaster traceable to the actions of a
responsible party, which gives rise to legal liability, is not the sort
of scenario that justifies creation of a fund.50 In other words, the
events surrounding the BP Gulf oil spill rather precisely
characterize the type of disaster that most commentators agree
should not lead to creation of a fund.
B. Authorization for the Funds
Just as the events that gave rise to the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility differ, so
do the authorizations for each of these funds. Congress authorized
the creation of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund by
46. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 79 (suggesting that the status of
victims cannot be used to justify the enactment of a unique compensation
statute); Alexander, supra note 5, at 653-54; Rabin, supra note 11, at 588.
47. Alexander, supra note 5, at 653-54; Rabin, supra note 8; Rabin &
Sugarman, supra note 8, at 914.
48. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 79; Alexander, supra note 5, at
653-54; Rabin, supra note 8.
49. Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 914.
50. Rabin, supra note 8, at 798, 801 (pointing out that after a fire at a Rhode
Island nightclub killed 100 people, "[t]ort defendants were not hard to
identify").
2011] 831
LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
a federal statute enacted 11 days after the terrorist attacks.5' The
enabling statute performed several functions: it limited the liability
of the airlines, created the compensation fund,53 and authorized
the appointment of a special master to administer the fund.54
Although Congress enacted the legislation with unprecedented
speed, the relevant congressional committees nonetheless
entertained witness testimony and received le islative suggestions
from various interested groups and individuals.
In creating the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, the
theme of national tragedy was central to the legislation's purpose.5
Hence, the source of compensation funds for September 11th
victims was to come from the federal treasury and taxpayer
monies;58 the concept of a national tragedy was used to justify
calling upon all American citizens to contribute in a communal
fashion to help innocent fellow Americans in a time of calamity.59
51. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Ackerman, supra note 8;
Alexander, supra note 5, at 627-28, 630-33 (legislative history of ATSA);
Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 534-39.
52. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 143;
Alexander, supra note 5, at 636-38; Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 1. According
to the caption of the ATSA, the Act was designed "[t]o preserve the continued
viability of the United States transportation system." Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, 230 (2001).
53. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 143;
Alexander, supra note 5, at 630-31. Title IV of the ATSA, which created the
September 1Ith Victim Compensation Fund, was designed to reduce lawsuits
against the airlines for their alleged failure of due care in preventing or reducing
the harm from terrorist attacks. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 671-72.
54. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 404, 115
Stat. at 237-38; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-4. Attorney General John
Ashcroft appointed Feinberg to the post of special master. See September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,275 (Dec. 21,
2001); see also Alexander, supra note 5, at 666-67; Berkowitz, supra note 18, at
2; Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 22-23;
Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 534-35.
55. See Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 1. Berkowitz criticizes the haste with
which Congress enacted the legislation, suggesting that, "[d]espite its practical
and noble intentions, the [ATSA], and the Fund in particular, is a hastily
constructed legislative patchwork that fails on a variety of counts." Id. at 2.
56. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 146-47 (describing congressional House
and Senate hearings on the proposed legislation); Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 5
(describing the contributions and suggestions put forward by the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America to Congress).
57. Alexander, supra note 5, at 639.
58. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
59. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 406, 115
Stat. at 240. In creating the Fund, Congress stated that whatever compensation
awards the special master granted were "the obligation of the Federal
Government." Id.
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The Gulf Coast Claims Facility, in contrast, has a less clear and
more ambiguous genesis. 60 Indeed, it is difficult to pinpoint the
precise legal authorization for the GCCF, and the parties involved
and commentators have suggested different sources of authority.6'
Shortly after the oil rig explosion on April 20, 2010, the Coast
Guard designated BP as a "responsible party" under the Oil
Pollution Act (OPA).62 This designation as a "responsible party"
triggered a duty on the part of BP to pay for all costs related to the
oil spill and its clean up.63
Pursuant to this designation, BP set up numerous claims offices
throughout the Gulf Coast states, hired hundreds of claims
processors, and paid walk-in claims for approximately two
months. Little is known or publicized about the hiring and
training of these claims adjusters. The OPA does not, by its terms,
require creation of a claims facility or a fund or any other
60. See Kate Baxter-Kauf & Brett Mares, Environmental Justice
Implications of the Efforts to Provide Compensation for Victims of the BP Oil
Spill 6-7 (Nov. 1, 2010) (on file with Louisiana Law Review) (submitted to the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill and Offshore
Drilling) ("It remains unclear whether the GCCF was instituted under the
regulatory purview of the OPA. Though it shares many characteristics with the
fund structure established by federal regulations, neither BP nor the federal
government has definitively stated that the OPA controls the GCCF's
function.").
61. See, e.g., Recovery in the Gulf What the $20 Billion BP Claims Fund
Means for Small Business: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 11Ith
Cong. 4 (2010) [hereinafter Recovery in the Gulf] (statement of Kenneth R.
Feinberg) ("This is a purely private facility. It is not a facility of the Federal
Government or a subfacility of an agency. It is a private compact creating this
independent facility which I will design and administer.").
62. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY
ADVANCE PAYMENTS (2010), available at http://www.tpcg.org/emgevents/
pdflAUGUST%2023%202010%20PROTOCOL%20_2.pdf; Baxter-Kauf &
Mares, supra note 60, at 7.
63. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (The Coast Guard
"directed BP to maintain a single claims facility for all Responsible Parties to
avoid confusion among potential claimants.").
64. See BP to Appoint Independent Mediator to Ensure Timely, Fair Claims
Process, BP (May 26, 2010), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld
=2012968&contentId=7062448; Ira Teinowitz, How to Claim Money from BP's
$20 Billion Fund, WALLET POP (June 18, 2010), http://www.walletpop.com/
2010/06/18/how-to-claim-money-from-bps-20-billion-fund/ (describing BP's prior
processing of claims through the auspices of its contractor, ESIS, and that BP
made the determination whether to pay claims, and indicating that under the new
ICF facility, award decisions would be made available to hear appeals from award
determinations); BP Creates Special Team to Speed Up Claim Payments, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStoryid=
11313798 [hereinafter BP Creates Special Team] (reporting that BP was
encouraging businesses to contact their adjuster or BP to process claims).
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mechanism for victim compensation; the OPA is entirely vague
concerning how a responsible party must satisfy its duties. under
the OPA. Thus, against the backdrop of this vague statutory
mandate, various commentaries have suggested that this initial BP
claims process between May and August 23, 2010 was chaotic, ad
hoc, unsystematized, and largely unregulated.66 And, these initial
BP claims efforts ex erienced numerous complaints by frustrated
and angry applicants.
Nearly two months after BP had created an ad hoc claims
processing effort in the Gulf States, executives from BP and
President Obama agreed on June 16, 2010 that BP would
contribute $20 billion to rectify claims as a consequence of the rig
explosion and resulting oil spill.6 8 This sum was to be paid into an
escrow account to cover BP's ongoing and future liabilities.
Although the $20 billion amount was widely reported in the
media, BP did not actually place this entire amount into escrow.7 0
Instead, only $3 billion was transferred to an account.7 1
65. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 ("Under OPA,
Responsible Parties must establish a claims process to receive certain claims by
eligible claimants. USCG . . . directed BP to maintain a single claims facility
66. But see Strassel, supra note 3 (praising BP's initial compensation
efforts). Feinberg took over the GCCF from BP on August 23, 2010. See
Associated Press, BP to Stop Handling Claims Relating to Gulf Spill on
Wednesday, NOLA.COM (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-
spill/index.ssU20 10/08/bptostop handlingclaims rel.html (BP announcing it
had paid approximately $368 million to individuals and businesses, excluding
governmental entity claims).
67. BP Creates Special Team, supra note 64 (reporting that BP was
encouraging businesses to contact their adjuster or BP to process claims);
Kaufman, supra note 7 (irate criticisms of Louisiana residents to BP payouts);
see Campbell Robertson, As Claims for Oil Spill Losses Shift to Administrator,
Queries Follow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/24/us/24claims.html?r-lI&ref-us ("Dealing
with BP ... has been a nightmare.").
68. Thomas Perrelli, Associate U.S. Attorney General, purportedly led
negotiations with BP to set up the claims facility. See Jim Snyder, Feinberg to
Meet U.S. Senator as Complaints Mount over BP Claims, BUS. WK. (Sept. 28,
2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-28/feinberg-to-meet-u-s-
senator-as-complaints-mount-over-bp-claims.html.
69. See Press Release, BP, BP Establishes $20 Billion Claims Fund for
Deepwater Horizon Spill and Outlines Dividend Decisions (June 16, 2010),
available at http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=2012968&content
Id=7062966. The BP press release announced that Feinberg would administer
the Independent Claims Facility (ICF), that funds would be available to satisfy
"legitimate claims," and that the ICF would adjudicate all OPA claims and tort
claims, excluding federal and state claims. Id. BP also indicated that the fund did
not cap its liability but that money left over in the fund once all legitimate
claims were resolved would revert to BP. Id.; see also Jesse Lee, A New Process
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Through a controversial but little noticed agreement with
President Obama, BP's remaining obligations pursuant to this $20
billion commitment are to be funded, in the future, by BP's
ongoing oil drilling revenues, largely derived from its offshore
drilling efforts in the Gulf.72 This largely unnoticed arrangement
has made the federal government, in effect, future partners with BP
in assuring continued offshore oil drilling in the Gulf.73 Indeed,
when the federal government subsequently sought a moratorium on
offshore oil drilling in the Gulf,74 the government's side deal with
BP regarding funding of the escrow account placed the federal
government in conflict with the interests of future claimants in
and a New Escrow Account for All Oil Spill Claims from BP, WHITE HOuSE
BLOG (June 17, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/06/17/a-
new-process-and-a-new-escrow-account-gulf-oil-spill-claims-bp. The White
House blog indicated that the facility would develop standards for recoverable
claims that would be published and that a panel of three judges would be
available to hear appeals of the administrator's decisions. Id
70. Press Release, supra note 69.
7 1. Id.
72. See Monica Langley, BP Near Deal on Fund, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10,
2010, at Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487043
88504575418602719011146.html (discussions between Obama Administration
and BP to use future revenues from BP's Gulf of Mexico operations to
guarantee its $20 billion cleanup and compensation fund; speculation that the
deal could produce backlash in Congress).
73. See id. ("If this unusual collateral agreement is inked, it would represent
a new level of interaction between BP and the federal government. Both sides
have been tied together, for good or bad, since the Deepwater Horizon rig sank
in April."). This agreement between BP and President Obama is highly similar
to the pact that the state Attorneys General entered into with tobacco company
defendants in settling the state Attorneys General's lawsuits against tobacco
companies for reimbursement for tobacco-related health injuries as a
consequence of the sale of tobacco products to citizens. Under the terms of the
Master Settlement Agreement with the tobacco companies, the tobacco
defendants' ongoing financial liabilities to state treasuries are to be paid out of
future tobacco sales revenues. It has largely gone unnoticed that the tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement with the states has effectively made the states
stakeholders in the future well-being of the tobacco companies with regard to
the manufacture and sale of tobacco products. The state treasuries get paid their
settlement shares as long as the tobacco companies can sell cigarettes and other
tobacco products in those states. Similarly, BP has promised to fund the GCCF
from future, ongoing oil production revenues.
74. See Clifford Krauss & John M. Broder, BP Says Limits on Drilling
Imperil Spill Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, at Al, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/business/03bp.html (BP signaling its reluctance
to cooperate with fines and fund payments unless it is able to continue to operate
in the Gulf of Mexico; concern over drilling overhaul bill passed by House on
July 30, 2010).
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seeking compensation, because continued funding of those
compensation obligations are contingent on BP's ability to
continue deep-sea offshore and other drilling in the Gulf.7 5
Although there was extensive media coverage of BP's
agreement with President Obama to place $20 billion in escrow,
the precise legal basis for this agreement is unclear.76 There is no
Executive Order creating the fund, nor is there any official
governmental order authorizing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility. It
is difficult to ascertain what parties were present when President
Obama consummated this deal. Unlike the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, there is no congressional statutory enactment
undergirding the GCCF. In fact, Congress held no hearings to lay
the groundwork for creation of a fund, nor was Congress involved
at all in the creation of the GCCF. In the same vein, there is no
Executive Order or congressional legislation creating a fund
administrator or appointing a special master to oversee, manage,
and administer the GCCF.
The legal basis for the GCCF remains obscure, murky, and
uncertain. In congressional hearings after BP selected Feinberg as
the attorney to oversee the fund 7 8 Feinberg explained to a
congressional subcommittee that he was operating pursuant to a
"compact."79 Feinberg was not asked, nor did he explain, what he
meant by this "compact," and indeed, there is no evidence in any
public or private records of a "compact" authorizing the creation of
the GCCF or appointing Feinberg. And, in subsequent colloquies,
Feinberg abandoned this "compact" conceit and instead vague'
suggested that he was operating under the authority of the OPA.
But, at the time of his selection to oversee the GCCF, Feinberg
75. Id.
76. See Neil King Jr., Feinberg Ramps Up $20 Billion Compensation Fund,
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2010, at A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704256304575321072301455004.html (noting that
the fund was created as a "voluntary compact" but without any act of Congress,
executive order, or other legal anchor).
77. Id. See Strassel, supra note 3, which reports that, according to Feinberg,
"the administration and BP got together . . . and decided, both, that coming up
with a guaranteed sum to pay eligible claims was a creative alternative to years
and years of protracted litigation."
78. See Graves: Small Businesses Affected by Oil Spill Need Fast, Fair
Compensation, HOUSE SMALL BUS. COMMITTEE (June 30, 2010), http://
smallbusiness.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?Documentld=193107
(report of Feinberg's testimony before the House Small Business Committee).
79. See Recovery in the Gulf supra note 61, at 4.
80. See Brian J. Donovan, BP Oil Spill Victims: Gulf Coast Claims Facility,
Litigation or Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund?, COUNTERCURRENTS.ORG (Nov. 16,
2010), http://www.countercurrents.org/donovan161110.htm.
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seemed unaware of the OPA, and he certainly did not indicate that
his authority derived from OPA."
C. Implementing Standards and Regulations
Because the statute authorizing the creation of the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund lacked specific detail with regard
to implementing standards, one of Feinberg's first tasks after his
appointment as the special master to oversee the Fund was to
create standards and regulations to govern claimant
compensation.82 Over the course of the Fund's existence, two
different approaches to creating standards and regulations emerged
during the Fund experience. The first approach embodied legal
formalism; the second embraced a free form, ad hoc discretionary
pattern.
Thus, the initial promulgation of rules and standards to govern
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund was subject to the
federal rulemaking process, complete with a standard "Notice and
Comment" period for proposed regulations. 3 In this capacity,
Feinberg and his staff worked with congressional subcommittees
and other experts to draft proposed standards and regulations to
govern the claims process. 84  Interim proposed standards,
regulations, and governing criteria, as well as sample
compensation scales, were published for prospective claimants to
8 1. See Recovery in the Gulf supra note 61, at 4.
82. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 407, 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001); FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 4-7;
see Ackerman, supra note 8, at 148-56 (describing administrative rulemaking
process after enactment of ATSA); Alexander, supra note 5, at 661; Berkowitz,
supra note 18, at 2 ("Congress failed to set bright-line rules, enunciate
exclusionary definitions, or articulate a principled system of compensation.
There is simply no 'rationale, restraint, ethic or coherence' in the definition of
awards, leaving the Special Master unilaterally responsible for filling in nearly
every detail of the program.").
83. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (notice-and-comment procedures
under the federal Administrative Procedure Act); September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,901 (proposed Nov. 5, 2001);
FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 4-7. The Interim Final Rule was published on
December 21, 2001. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66
Fed. Reg. 66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001). The Final Rule was published on March 13,
2002. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233
(Mar. 13, 2002) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104). See Ackerman, supra note 8, at
149-55 (describing the notice-and-comment rulemaking process for
development of the interim and final rules); Dauber, supra note 8, at 342-48
(detailing numerous submissions during the notice-and-comment period); Katz,
supra note 20, at 577-78 (describing notice-and-comment procedure).
84. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 4-5.
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review. During this notice-and-comment period, the Justice
Department received more than 2,600 comments on the proposed
regulations to implement the Fund. After the comment period
expired, and all comments purportedly were reviewed by
Feinberg's staff Feinberg issued final regulations governing the
claims process.81
However, the resulting standards that were issued as a
consequence of this federal rulemaking turned out to be less firm
and "final" in comparison to other federal rulemaking.88 In
commenting on Feinberg's rules, one critic noted that "All of
Feinberg's regulations, whether restrictive or expansive, exhibited
his vast discretion. He construed his grant of authority to include
few governing standards and pointedly rejected the idea that he
was obligated to provide reasoned explanations for his
decisions.
Thus, a second discernable characteristic of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund was that the "final rules" governing
the Fund turned out to be rather elastic and changeable. Indeed, as
will be seen below, a signal characteristic of the Fund's
implementation was Feinberg's frequent modification of
announced rules and standards, often in response to angry
challenges from different aggrieved claimants.90 When confronted
with new complaints and grievances, Feinberg then arrogated to
85. Id. at 5-7; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 149-55, 210-11; see, e.g.,
Explanation of Process for Computing Presumed Economic Loss, U.S. DEP'T
JUST., http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victimcompensation/vcmatrices.pdf (last
revised Aug. 27, 2002); see also Berkowitz, supra note 18, at ll (describing the
process of generating the tables).
86. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-6; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 149,
210-11; see September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 66,275.
87. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg.
11,233; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. But see Schneider, supra note 19, at
489, which criticizes the establishment of the Fund and the appointment of a
special master as undemocratic and notes that September 11th families were
given little opportunity to shape the process and the selection of the
administrator, although there were many comments on the Interim Final Rule
posted on the website.
88. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 152, which comments on the final rule
for calculating awards: "The Special Master thereby gave himself flexibility to
depart from his formulaic methodology where he felt the circumstances
warranted."
89. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 13.
90. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 155 ("Some victims' families seemed to
fault the Special Master for failing to arrive at a[n award] figure that could
actually represent the monumental loss they had suffered . . . ."); Diller, supra
note 15, at 739-40.
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himself the rulemaking process, whose rule modifications were not
subject to the notice-and-comment procedure that had occurred at
the outset of the Fund. Hence, although the Fund was launched
with a formalism befitting a federal statutory program, it quickly
deteriorated into something resembling ad hoc, on-the-fly
rulemaking by its special master.9'
The different ways in which standards, rules, and regulations
were generated to govern the Fund have bearing on an assessment
of the Fund's ultimate legitimacy.92 At the outset, the federal
notice-and-comment rulemaking approach provided the Fund with
an aura of participatory democracy and legality.9 3 However, as
implementation of the Fund progressed, the formalistic rulemaking
processes were jettisoned in favor of ad hoc, discretionary
decisionmaking by a single all-powerful special master, subject to
weak (if non-existent) review.94
91. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 11. In commenting on regulations
promulgated pursuant to his delegated authority, Berkowitz has suggested of
Feinberg: "He can act sua sponte, devising his awards as he pleases,
disregarding the economic and emotional needs of vulnerable families, and
issuing regulations to enforce his discretion." Id.
92. Compare Ackerman, supra note 8, at 149 (contending that Feinberg's
rulemaking process reflected several values of democratic governance), with id.
at 206 (citing Reuben, supra note 19, at 285-86), and Priest, supra note 15, at
545 ("The September 11th Fund will remain controversial because the source of
the definition of its awards-however able and committed-is not in any sense
democratic. Coupled with the lack of an internal rational or constraint, the
awards granted by the Fund will continue to remain problematic."). Other
commentators have suggested that the Fund signaled the beginning of a "broad
regressive trend." See Conk, supra note 24, at 253.
93. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 149, 208; Feinberg, supra note 7, at 474-75
(outreach to victims during rulemaking process).
94. See generally Ackerman, supra note 8, at 156-79 (describing and
analyzing various criticisms of the Fund and its administration); Chamallas,
supra note 5, at 57 ("Under the broad Congressional mandate, the Special
Master of the Fund has enormous discretion, more than is usually given to a
judge or jury."). Cf Priest, supra note 15, at 545 (criticizing the standards of
Fund awards as non-democratically promulgated); Steenson & Sayler, supra
note 14, at 534 (Feinberg's "untrammeled discretion" not subject to
congressional or administrative oversight). In commenting on his sizeable
discretion, Feinberg noted: "And Congress in its infinite wisdom added a fourth
requirement: the Special Master will exercise his discretion to see that justice is
done. Congress delegated to me: 'Make sure that this works. Use your discretion
to make it work. We do not know what we are getting into, so take it from
here."' Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at
23. See also Alexander, supra note 5, at 667-68, which criticizes Feinberg's
expansive rulemaking authority in administering the Fund:
Nevertheless, this structure should not be adopted for future
compensation programs. Combining legislative and adjudicative
powers in a single person, and making that person exempt from any
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In implementing the Fund, at least four forces converged as the
impetus to abandon formal rulemaking and acquiescence in the
special master's ad hoc rulemaking. First, the special master
realized that the universe of potential Fund claimants was
relatively small and that his source of compensation funding-the
entire federal Treasury9 5 -was essentially infinite. 96 Thus, the
special master realized he would be able to satisfy any and all
claims, including expanded grounds for those claims. Against this
backdrop, Feinberg could operate as a heroic special master by
capitulating to the demands of angry claimants that he modify or
change announced standards in liberal favor of the claimants.97
Second, Feinberg also recognized that virtually none of his
actions would be subject to meaningful judicial or congressional
review.98 As such, he could modify existing promulgated rules and
standards without significant fear of challenge, repercussions, or
review. Third, with every progressive rule modification that the
administrative or judicial review, can lead to conflicts of interest, blind
spots, poor organization, and the appearance of arbitrariness or bias.
Institutional design should not depend on finding a single individual
with a unique set of talents and experience; rather, it should assist
whoever is assigned to the institution to make good decisions.
95. Chamallas, supra note 5, at 55; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at
907, 909.
96. Priest, supra note 15, at 544 ("[T]here is no constraint on awards under
the September 11th Fund. Its budget is unlimited, and its definitional principles
vague. It is, therefore, not surprising that many victim families have argued for
larger awards."); Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 907-08 ("[F]unding of the
9/11 plan was open-ended so that the Special Master was not provided with any
aggregate limit on the compensation that might be paid out to victims of the
disaster.").
97. Diller, supra note 15, at 747; Priest, supra note 15, at 544. Commenting
on this phenomenon, Professor Diller observed:
Whether due to settlement or the actual threatened bankruptcy of
defendants, administrators of mass tort settlement funds are placed in
the position of allocating a fixed amount among a large number of
claimants. The Fund does not present this problem, as it has no cap.
Ironically, the open-ended nature of the Fund makes its administration
more difficult because the Special Master cannot parry discontent about
awards with claims that he would have liked to have awarded more but
that the Fund is simply inadequate. Absent such a limit, he cannot play
claimants off against each other, but must be prepared to justify each
award as an appropriate amount of compensation on its own terms.
Diller, supra note 15, at 747.
98. Alexander, supra note 5, at 667; Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 14-16
(noting that Feinberg had the ability to oversee the review of his own awards,
both theoretically and operationally); Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 534-
35.
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special master announced that went unchallenged, the special
master became further empowered to do whatever he thought best,
expedient, or just, in his own view. With unlimited funding 9 the
special master became the dispenser of generous largesse. In
turn, Feinberg also understood that capitulation to claimant
demands, and the provision of compensatory largesse, effectively
bought-off claimant dissatisfaction.
Finally, during administration of the Fund claims process, the
universe of claimants discovered that Feinberg was willing to
acquiesce and capitulate to their demands if those demands were
pressed insistently enough in the public domain as well as other
forums.10 Thus, over time the Fund processes locked its claimants
and the special master in an interesting psychological synergy,
whereby the claimants could achieve their liberal compensation
goals and Feinberg could emerge as the empathetic, heroic special
master,102 without consequence to either party. Although scholars
have discussed the psychological ramifications of the September
11th events for victims of the disaster,103 scarce attention has been
paid to the motivations driving a much-heralded, singular justice-
provider, who possesses increasingly god-like powers.
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund experience
with the promulgation of standards and regulations governing
claim compensation provides an interesting contrast to that of the
Gulf Coast Claims Facility. Because the GCCF was not authorized
pursuant to congressional enactment or executive branch oversight,
the creation of criteria governing the GCCF claim process was
99. Feinberg, The Building Blocks, supra note 9, at 276 (noting the average
Fund award was $1.8 million: "Just give every victim $1.8 million of the
taxpayers' money, tax free. There won't be any mass torts."); Rabin &
Sugarman, supra note 8, at 907-08.
100. Feinberg, The Building Blocks, supra note 9, at 276.
101. Describing his program for the success of the Fund, Feinberg indicated:
So that, in capsulized form, is the way the program worked. The recipe
for success was pretty clear: make very generous payments; outreach to
the families; keep going after them and corral them; let them know that
there are no tricks, and that there is nothing hidden here. This is a
transparent attempt by the American people to help. Offer due process
considerations. Give everybody the opportunity to be heard. Make
yourself available. Reach out to these people. It worked.
Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 27.
102. A good deal of Feinberg's reflection on his efforts is devoted to his
descriptions of demonstrating empathy for the claimants' concerns. See id.
103. See generally Schneider, supra note 19; Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra
note 15.
104. See infra Part II.D.3 (discussion and criticisms of Feinberg as an
unfettered, unaccountable administrator).
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subject neither to formal nor informal rulemaking. 05 Simply, the
GCCF is a largely privatized enterprise not subject to public
legitimacy constraints.
As best as can be ascertained, Feinberg and his staff' made no
background study of proposed standards for the GCCF prior to the
announcement of rules, or if they did, they made scant effort to
publicize their efforts. Indeed, due to a lack of transparency, 07 it is
difficult to know who has been responsible for drafting the GCCF
protocol rules, what sources have been relied on in drafting
standards and which parties (if any) have participated in the
process.' 0 The administrator made scant effort to publish proposed
protocol rules and regulations in advance of their
implementation.109 And, although Feinberg made well-publicized
105. Strassel, supra note 3 (reporting that Feinberg expected to issue ground
rules for claims by the middle of August; still "noodling over specifics").
106. See Lee, supra note 69. The White House blog indicated that the facility
would develop standards for recoverable claims that would be published and
that a panel of three judges would be available to hear appeals of the
administrator's decisions.
Among the numerous transparency issues enmeshed in the GCCF, there is no
indication in the public domain concerning who has staffed Feinberg's offices or
facilities, and who has been involved with drafting standards, settling claims, or
reviewing internal appeals. Nor is there any documentation concerning the
credentials and experience of GCCF staff. In addition, there is no documentation
of the nature and level of training afforded persons working under Feinberg's
supervision in administering the GCCF. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 669,
which criticizes the lack of transparency in the selection of Feinberg's staffers to
administer the Fund: "There were no published criteria for the selection of
Special Master Feinberg's subordinate adjudicators. Though the individuals
selected had impressive resumes, the list was criticized for including 'too many
corporate defense lawyers and too many people plucked from Mr. Feinberg's
Rolodex of friends, former colleagues and fellow mediators."'
107. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussion of lack of transparency in implementation
of the GCCF); see also Neil King Jr., Feinberg Criticized for Spill-Compensation
Terms, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052748704340504575447802502224486.html (contending that Feinberg was
laying down rules for the claims fund with little input from the states most
affected).
108. King, supra note 107. See also Editorial, The Gulf Claims Racket,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2010, at A14, which reports that the state Attorneys
General for Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida had taken "Mr. Feinberg behind
the woodshed for a couple of hours to express our concerns about the draft
claims protocol he had circulated."
109. Kaufman, supra note 7 (Feinberg promising local Louisiana residents
that he would quickly make public a 10-page document detailing how
calculations for awards would be made); Ian Urbina, BP Settlements Likely to
Shield Top Defendants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2010, at Al, available at
http://nytimes.com/2010/08/20/us/20spill.html (reporting on proposed protocol
for emergency payments from internal documents from lawyers at the fund).
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tours of Gulf Coast towns in the weeks after the oil spill and held
several "town hall" meetings,1o he nonetheless did not provide for
a formal public notice and comment on proposed standards."'
Instead, he seemed to suggest that these "town meetings" somehow
served as a surrogate for a notice-and-comment regime. In the
absence of formal rulemaking, Feinberg's staff issued emergency
and final protocol rules governing the GCCF.112
On the other hand, following the arc of his experience with the
September 1Ith Victim Compensation Fund, Feinberg, in
administering the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, quickly segued into
the rulemaking model that evolved during his administration of the
Fund. Thus, skipping over any formal rulemaking process for the
GCCF, Feinberg resorted to the same ad hoc decisionmaking
model that characterized his supervision of the Fund in its later
stages. And, similar to the Fund experience, once a set of rules
were set forth in the public domain, Feinberg repeatedly defaulted
to a pattern of concessions, amendments, and modifications in
response to constituent challenges." 3 However, in contrast to the
Fund, Feinberg's on-the-fly rule modifications in administering the
110. Kaufman, supra note 7 (reporting on a town meeting in Houma,
Louisiana where local residents complain of fuzzy details of Feinberg's claims-
processing standards: "I've seen your little paper and stuff, but it doesn't say
what will be deducted ... . Just the same thing BP did, when it came to a claim,
no one knows how it works. And there is no paper stating how. I would like
something in my hand."); Feinberg Releases "Emergency Protocol" for BP Oil
Spill Claims, AL.COM (Aug. 20, 2010), http://blog.al.com/live/2010/08/feinberg
releases emergencypr.html (reporting Feinberg's early release of emergency
payment protocol; Feinberg stating that the guidelines were "the result of many
town hall meetings throughout the Gulf, listening to the people affected by this
disaster").
111. King, supra note 107 (noting that Feinberg's dozens of town hall
meetings had not shielded him from accusations of secrecy and coziness with
BP; criticism from Alabama Attorney General Troy King, accusing Feinberg of
acting as a "corporate shill").
112. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62; Gulf Coast Claims
Facility Now Processing Oil Spill Claims, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (Aug.
23, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press1.php; see also Angel
Gonzalez, Oil-Fund Czar Vows Ample Payouts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2010, at
A3 (criticisms from Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, arguing that
protocols fell far short of protections mandated by OPA and were even less
generous to Floridians than the prior BP process); King, supra note 107
(criticism from Alabama Attorney General Troy King, accusing Feinberg of
acting as a "corporate shill").
113. See Robertson, supra note 67 (noting shifting policies on real estate
reimbursement and lost property values; change from BP position); Campbell
Robertson & John Schwartz, Rethinking the Process for BP Spill Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
09/16/us/16feinberg.html (Feinberg rethinking parts of his process).
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GCCF have been made in response to objections and requests not
only from claimants," 4 but from BP itself.
The reasons for the administrator's decisions to act in this
fashion are speculative, but they follow the trajectory of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund experience. Once
again, Feinberg is functioning in a setting where he believes he has
unlimited financial resources to compensate the universe of
claimants. And, even more pronounced than the Fund setting,
Feinberg is accountable to no onell6 and subject to virtually no
review. In this setting, the psychological motivation to prevail as
the celebrity administrator of the Gulf Coast oil calamity presents
an enormous ego-driven temptation, which in turn is conducive to
heroic gestures of sympathy, largesse, and ad hoc justice.
As discussed above, the Fund and the GCCF provide
contrasting models of rulemaking to implement the funds'
compensation schemes. The three following examples illustrate the
ways in which Feinberg, as the special master overseeing the Fund
and as administrator of the GCCF, developed and implemented
detailed programmatic rules for each fund.
1. Eligibility
The federal legislation authorizing creation of the September
1 Ith Victim Compensation Fund provided only general guidance
concerning who would be an eligible claimant to the Fund.'1 8 The
statute provided compensation from the Fund for any person who
had suffered physical harm or death at the scene of the crashes,
aboard the planes, at the time of the crashes, or in their immediate
aftermath.' After Congress enacted the enabling statute, however,
114. Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 113 (Gulf Coast claimant suggesting:
"How they churned out these checks I don't know .... BP took care of us way
better than this man did .... ).
115. See Urbina, supra note 109 (BP influence on scope of waiver and
release, requiring GCCF fund claimants to waive right to sue not only BP, but
all other major defendants involved with the spill).
116. Feinberg has made repeated protestations of his complete independence
in administering the GCCF. See infra Part IL.D.4 (discussion of Feinberg's
independence and conflict-of-interest challenges).
117. See infra Part II.D.3-4 (discussion of Feinberg's lack of accountability
and review in administering the GCCF).
118. See generally FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 18-29; Feinberg,
Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 22; Steenson &
Sayler, supra note 14, at 540-41.
119. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 19-22; Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 405(c)(2)(A)-(C), 115 Stat.
230, 239 (2001); September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, §
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the general eligibility requirements were further refined through a
notice-and-comment rulemaking process.120 Over the months of
debate surrounding eligibility requirements, Feinberg concluded
that the Fund had to align its eligibility requirements with state law
to avoid conflicts with the administration of a decedent's estate.121
Pursuant to the rulemaking process, eligibility requirements for
making a claim in the Fund were refined to embrace definitions of
who was a legal representative 22 and what constituted the
"vicinity" of the disaster sites. 23 Regulations also refined the
statutory criteria of "immediate aftermath"-limiting claims to a
24-hour reporting period after the incidents-and "physical
harm."'24 As a consequence of various regulations, eligibility was
thus both geographically and temporally circumscribed. The types
of claims eligible for compensation also were limited to personal
injury and wrongful death causes of action.125 Future claimants for
exposure-only injuries (such as respiratory ailments) were notably
excluded.126 In addition, property damage, business interruption,
104.2(c)(l)-(2), 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,282 (Dec. 21, 2001). The ATSA
originally provided for compensable economic loss, which embraced pecuniary
loss, including the loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment,
medical expense loss, replacement services loss, burial costs, and loss of
business or employment opportunities. Compensable non-economic loss
included physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical
impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of
society and companionship, loss of consortium, hedonic damages, injury to
reputation, and all other non-pecuniary losses of any other kind or nature. See
Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, § 402(5), (7), 115 Stat.
at 237; see also Alexander, supra note 5, at 684-86; Peck, supra note 8, at 224.
The statute excluded compensation for pure mental or emotional distress. See
Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 22.
120. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 18-29; Alexander, supra note 5, at
684.
121. Alexander, supra note 5, at 684.
122. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, § 104.4, 66
Fed. Reg. at 66,282; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 24-29. The regulations
rely on state law to determine who could file as a "personal representative."
123. See September 1Ith Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg.
11,233, 11,242 (Mar. 13, 2002); FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 19-22.
124. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, § 104.2(b),
(c)(1)-(2), 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,282; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 19-22.
125. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 238 (2001); FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4,
at 18-24.
126. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 160-61; Alexander, supra note 5, at 684-85;
see also Conk, supra note 24, at 198-206 (describing the potential respiratory
claims for rescue and other workers at the Ground Zero site); Eggen, supra note
15, at 415-16; Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm, supra note 15, at 1833-34;
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other non-tortious claims were excluded,12 7 as well as claims for
emotional trauma and distress.128
The Fund quickly became enmeshed in several disputes
concerning the definition of eligible claimants, focusing on who
constituted a legal representative eligible to pursue and recover a
claim.129 Numerous disputes emerged among contending family
and non-family members.' 30 The legal status of unmarried partners,
non-resident aliens, and illegal aliens to recover under the Fund
was hotly contested.' 3 ' Furthermore, competing family members
argued over allocation of awards among family members.132 Some
people objected to the under-inclusiveness of the Fund in failing to
provide for victims of other terrorist acts.13 3 As indicated above,
despite the existence of promulgated rules that restricted claimant
eligibility, Feinberg-on his own authority and in response to
public challenges-relaxed these eligibility requirements, most
notably for unmarried partners and undocumented aliens.' 34
In contrast, eligibility for making a claim in the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility has not been subject to broad authorization by
federal statute creating the facility, nor has it received
Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 542. In the ensuing decade, the claims of
first-responders and other workers on the World Trade Center sites for
exposure-type injuries would lead to heated contention and eventually resulted
in federal enactment of an additional compensatory-relief statute in December
2010. See James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (2011).
127. Alexander, supra note 5, at 686 ("ATSA provided victim compensation
only for personal injury and death. In order to file a claim, however, claimants
had to waive all claims against anyone other than the terrorists, even property
damage claims that were not covered by the Fund."); Steenson & Sayler, supra
note 14, at 540.
128. Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 542.
129. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 24-29; Berkowitz, supra note 18, at
13; Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 24-
25.
130. Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at
24-25.
131. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 13; Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim
Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 26; see also Chamallas, supra note 5, at
63-67 (describing the disparate treatment of unmarried partners and single-sex
couples); Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 540-41.
132. Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at
24-25. Feinberg refused to become enmeshed in intra-family disputes over
allocation of Fund awards among family members, instead referring them to
state court and applicable state law to resolve such disputes.
133. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 156-57; Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14,
at 541.
134. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 29-30.
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authorization by way of an Executive Order. Eligibility is only
remotely derived from the OPA, which does not by its terms
indicate which parties or entities are eligible for compensation
after the Coast Guard designates a "responsible party" as the
consequence of an oil spill disaster.135 In this legislative vacuum,
Feinberg as the GCCF administrator has arrogated to himself and
his staff the power and authority to determine eligibility for
compensation.
From the outset, eligibility for compensation from the GCCF
has been governed by a combination of published standards' 3 6 and
shifting pronouncements from the administrator. Before the formal
opening of the GCCF in August 2010, BP handled claims on a
walk-in ad hoc basis at various locations on the Gulf Coast.'3 7 The
ad hoc nature of the BP claims processing efforts inspired
numerous complaints about the lack of standards and inconsistency1 138in claim processing.
The formal commencement of the GCCF marked an effort to
bring order to claims processing, including eligibility criteria.
From the outset, and as early as August 16, 2010, Feinberg
publicly mulled over eligibility criteria for claimants, 139 with
considerable controversy centered on the concept of
"proximity." 40 Initially, Feinberg announced that he was skeptical
135. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACELITY, supra note 62 ("Whether or not a
claim has been presented shall be governed by OPA and applicable law.").
136. See id. The protocol for emergency payments indicated:
The GCCF will only pay for harm or damage that is proximately
caused by the Spill. The GCCF's causation determinations of OPA
claims will be guided by OPA and federal law interpreting the OPA
and the proximate cause doctrine. Determination of non-OPA claims
will be guided by applicable law. The GCCF will take into account,
among other things, geographic proximity, nature of industry, and
dependence upon injured natural resources.
Id.
137. See Kaufman, supra note 7 (criticism of BP compensation program and
inconsistent awards); supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (discussion of
BP's initial handling of claims from May through August 23).
138. Kaufmnan, supra note 7; see also Mike Tolson, A Storm Brews in
Alabama over BP's Promise, Hous. CHRON. (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.chron.
com/disp/story.mpl/business/7336204.html (complaints over pace and extent of
compensation payments; inconsistent awards).
139. See John Pacenti, Plaintiffs Attorneys Knock BP Fund Administrator,
LAW.COM (July 26, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120246386
5302&slreturn=-&hbxlogin=1 (Feinberg facing tough decisions on eligibility,
claimants who worked on cash basis, and businesses miles from the coast);
Snyder, supra note 39 (Feinberg reflecting on geographic standards to govern
claim eligibility).
140. Snyder, supra note 39; see also Cooper, supra note 25 (emergency
protocols place premium on geographic proximity to spill); Urbina, supra note
2011] 847
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that remote inland claims would be eligible for compensation from
the facility.141 Indeed, Feinberg reflected that his September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund efforts had been simplified by the
geographic constraints imposed on eligibility for that fund.142
In contrast, the GCCF presented Feinberg with a large universe
of claimants spread over an extensive geographic area, including
the five Gulf states, but which also potentially extended beyond the
Gulf states to more remote quarters.143 The classic example he
summoned to explain his dilemma was whether a restaurant owner
in Boston, Massachusetts, who relied on Gulf shrimp supplies,
should be eligible for compensation from. the GCCF for the
increased costs associated with a depleted fish suply.'" Feinberg
repeatedly informed the media that he thought not.
In absence of clear guidelines the argument over eligibility
based on proximity did not abate.' Initially, the GCCF appeared
to resolve the claims of the most obvious, directly affected Gulf
persons and businesses.147 But as it became apparent that this was
not a sufficient response, Feinberg's staff attempted to address the
proximity issue with the use of charts and maps delimiting the
boundaries of alleged contamination and damage, as it related to
109 (discussing geographic proximity standards in proposed protocol for
emergency payments).
141. Urbina, supra note 109 (suggesting that ice cream parlors or golf
courses miles from the affected shore would probably not be eligible for
compensation); Snyder, supra note 39 (suggesting that hotel operators 50 miles
inland were unlikely to be compensated for tourism losses).
142. Urbina, supra note 109 (noting that a key difference between the GCCF
and the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is the matter of geographic
proximity).
143. See Cooper, supra note 25; Strassel, supra note 3 (reporting that tens of
thousands of claimants had potential claims against the fund); Snyder, supra
note 39.
144. See Anna Fifield, Mediator Puts Fairness at the Centre of BP Fund,
FiN. TIMES (June 25, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f39cf900-807-d-11-be5a-
00144feabdcO.
145. Id.
146. King, supra note 107 (proximity issue big in Florida; Florida Attorney
General criticizes proximity rules as completely unacceptable); John Schwartz,
Final Settlement Phase Starts for BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010, at All,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/24/us/24fund.html (Feinberg
attempts to resolve proximity issue in new rules).
147. Urbina, supra note 109 (proposed protocols give top priority to persons
or businesses in communities or municipalities adjacent to beach shoreline,
marsh, bay, tributary, or the Gulf where oil or oil residues came ashore or
appeared in waters).
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claim eligibility.14 8 This approach engendered further conflict and
animosit , and Feinberg and his staff eventually abandoned the
charts.' 4
As was true for the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, over the course of several weeks Feinberg changed his mind
several times about proximity eligibility, still without issuing clear
standards or the rationales for those standards. 5 0 Gulf residents,
their lawyers, and local politicians severely criticized Feinberg's
proposed eligibility criteria as based on restrictive state law
concepts of "zones of eligibility," as opposed to following the
OPA. s'
The initial draft protocols for emergency payments also listed a
number of claims that the GCCF would not reimburse.152 These
included claims for loss of property values, persons adversely
affected by the Obama Administration's moratorium on deepwater
drilling in the Gulf, mental health claims, or lost tourism revenue
because of government predictions that the oil slick was headed in
the direction of the business.' 5 Other potential claimants excluded
from eligibility included governmental entities, real estate agents
and brokers, and businesses or individuals with property damage
claims that occurred during the "Vessels of Opportunity"
program.154 In addition, certain non-OPA claims could not be
recovered through the GCCF. 5 5
148. King, supra note 107 (reporting that Feinberg and staff beginning to
sketch in rough boundary lines on maps to help guide decisions).
149. See Snyder, supra note 68 (Feinberg to ease proximity requirements).
150. See Marc Caputo, BP Claims Czar Kenneth Feinberg Drawing Fire
from Attorney General Bill McCollum, TAMPABAY.COM (July 6, 2010),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/environment/bp-claims-czar-kenneth-feinberg-
drawing-fire-from-attorney-general-bill/i 107277 (noting that Feinberg had yet
to provide details about who would receive compensation and who would not;
reporting that Feinberg promised to come up with "expansive" eligibility
definition in coming weeks); Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 113 (Feinberg
rethinking his position on proximity rule); Bryan Walsh, Oil Spill: Kenneth
Feinberg Makes the Final Rules for Spill Settlement, but Are They Fair?,
TIME.COM (Nov. 24, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/
11/24/oil-spill-kenneth-fineberg-makes-the-final-rules-for-spill-settlements-but-
are-they-fair/ (noting that Feinberg had "flip-flopped several times on the
proximity issue").
151. Urbina, supra note 109. But see Snyder, supra note 68 (Feinberg to ease
proximity requirements).
152. See generally GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (listing
among eligible claims: removal and cleanup costs, real or personal property, lost
profits and earning capacity, subsistence use of natural resources, physical injury
or death). But see Urbina, supra note 109 (listing proposed claim exclusions).
153. Urbina, supra note 109.
154. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62. The "Vessels of
Opportunity" program was the BP program that utilized fishing vessels owned
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Although eligibility exclusions were gradually layered onto the
facility's criteria, Feinberg-similar to the evolution of the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund-pursued a course of
increasing claimant appeasement by further extending eligibility,
including increasingly remote proximity claims.' 5 Moreover,
several eligibility claims had absolutely nothing to do with
proximity at all. For example, Feinberg eventually capitulated to
the interest group lobbying of the professional real estate agents,
who initially were excluded from the fund.' 5 7 After considerable
pressure, Feinberg-as the result of a political deal-carved out
special treatment for the real estate agents who had been pressing
claims based on the diminution of their business revenues as a
consequence of a downturn in the real estate market.' On the
other hand, by December 2010, Feinberg, in exasperation,
by Gulf Coast fishermen to assist in the cleanup efforts. See also Ryan
Dezember, Safety Net Eludes Some Oil Workers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2010, at
A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703466104
575530132869455658.html (reporting that shallow-water rig workers, unlike
deep-water counterparts, were ineligible to receive compensation under the
fund). Rig-workers were required to apply through a separate entity, the Rig
Worker Assistance Fund, a BP set-aside of $100 million for workers who lost
their jobs after the federal government enacted a six-month moratorium on deep-
water drilling.
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., BP Claims Czar: Proximity Has No Role in Payment, WASH.
PosT (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/10/04/AR2010100402682.html; Feinberg Announces Clarification
Regarding Geographic Proximity, GULF COAST CLAIMs FACIITY (Oct. 4,
2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press7.php ("After listening to
these concerns, I have concluded that a geographic test to determine eligibility
regarding economic harm due to the oil spill is unwarranted.").
157. See Snyder, supra note 39, which indicates that as early as August 16,
2010, Feinberg had set aside a "modest amount," which he did not disclose, to
compensate Gulf State realtors, whose trade association had met with Feinberg
the week before. "The realtors have 'suffered a great deal' in lost sales, rent, and
commissions, [Feinberg] said." See also Snyder, supra note 68 (special deal for
realtors).
158. See Urbina, supra note 109, which reports on a political deal struck with
the governors of Alabama and Mississippi, setting aside approximately $60
million from the fund in a special pool to compensate negatively affected real
estate brokers in the Gulf region who were otherwise ineligible for
compensation from the fund. This money was not to be distributed by Feinberg,
but rather by the National Association of Realtors in Washington, D.C. or local
chapters in Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. In addition, the
National Association-not Feinberg-was to set eligibility requirements,
although Feinberg would review those criteria. See also Snyder, supra note 68.
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indicated that he could not and would not find anyone and
everyone eligible. 159
Moreover, eligibility requirements were intricately intertwined
with proof of business claims and authentication of alleged
business or property losses. The GCCF lacked clearly defined
criteria relating to what different types of individuals and entities
were entitled to relief and what burden of production was needed
to establish a basis for compensation. In numerous town
meetings and media interviews, Feinberg reiterated that burdens of
production and proof on persons seeking relief were de minimis,16 1
and he repeatedly stated that in the cash economy of the Gulf
states, fishermen, shrimp haulers, and others similarly situated
159. Tolson, supra note 138 ("He said there is no strict policy on what type
of claim is being honored, only that his accountants evaluate how the loss was
connected to the spill. He did note that lawyers, doctors, dentists and
veterinarians are out of luck. 'I can't find anyone and everyone eligible,'
Feinberg said. 'I'm doing what BP and the administration have asked of me."').
160. But see GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILYTY, supra note 62 (listing what type
of information needed to be submitted as proof of claims). Criticisms of
implementation of the GCCF evaluation and award determinations have continued
even after the GCCF promulgated protocols for final settlement of claims. See
Susan Buchanan, Fishermen Dismayed over Low Payouts in Spill Claims,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 21, 2011, 11:15 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
susan-buchanan/fishermen-dismayed-over-1 b811635.html.
Kevin Dean, attorney in charge of BP litigation at Motley Rice LLC
in Charleston, South Carolina, pointed to similar problems faced by his
firm's clients, which include charter and commercial fishermen from
Louisiana and other Gulf states. "Many of them with documented and
legitimate claims have had their GCCF claims denied," he said. On
attempts by Motley Rice, which assists clients with their [claims], to
contact GCCF, "there's been no one there to explain why they were
rejected, so you are shooting in the dark as to how to correct or
supplement the claim."
Dean said "many of the claims adjusters seem to be temporary
contractors," lacking the will, experience or guidance to handle simple
claims. Feinberg changes the rules almost daily, he said. "There's no
consistency as to how claims are processed, and much of it depends on
which adjuster your claim was assigned to."
Claims can be denied because of minor omissions, Dean said. "We
did find out that one of our client's claims-which had been under
review for over eight weeks-was rejected because of a simple clerical
mistake in the Social Security number. But instead of calling my office
for verification or correction, they denied the claim," he said.
Id.
161. Kaufman, supra note 7 (Feinberg informing Louisiana town hall
participants: "I don't need reams and reams of stuff. I don't need a tax return.
Do you have something you can show me? Well, the ship captain will vouch for
me-fine. Well, my priest will-fine.").
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could establish their claims if their local priests vouched for
them.162
However, in the same fashion that the GCCF staff abandoned
their proximity charts and maps, the staff also resisted actual
claims processing based on little more than vouching-in by the
parish priest. As it turned out, proof of claims proved difficult for
many claimants, 16 and Feinberg repudiated his prior statements
about accepting letters from local pastors as sufficient proof of
claimants' losses.16
In addition, the staff gradually abandoned the ad hoc model of
claims processing on an individualized basis. In order to provide at
least some consistency across categories of claimants, 65 on
September 25, 2010, Feinberg announced that claimants would
now be "grouped" by similar businesses or professions to ensure
some constancy and reliability across awards.166 But again, no
162. John Schwartz, For Kenneth Feinberg, More Delicate Diplomacy, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2010, at Al l, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/
us/17feinberg.html (Feinberg indicating that the captain of the boat or the local
priest could vouch-in a claimant's work history); Kaufman, supra note 7.
163. See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, Louisiana Officials Urge BP to Speed Claims
Payments, WASH. POST, July 6, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/05/AR2010070502763.html
(describing difficulty of claimants in supplying proof of claims); Caputo, supra
note 150 (same); David A. Fahrenthold & Kimberly Kindly, Adrift in Oil, Then
Money, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2010, at Al, available at http://washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/19/AR2O10101907468.html (difficulties in
implementing emergency payments); Dionne Searcey, Bumpy Start to BP Fund
Puzzles Gulf WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2010, at Al, available at http://
online.wsj.com/article/SBl0001424052748703673604575549970587948384.html
(documenting many problems and frustration with claims processing); see also
Gulf Coast Claims Facility Marks One-Month Anniversary, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press5
(indicating that as of September 23, 2010, approximately 24,000 claims had been
submitted with insufficient or no documentation).
164. See Editorial, About That $20 Billion... , WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2010,
at A22, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/1l/25/AR2010ll12502704.html (reporting that 175,000 people had
submitted claims with inadequate documentation; Feinberg saying he will not
accept letters from local pastors attesting to claimants' losses as proof they
deserve payment and will not replace off-the-books income in the Gulf Coast's
unofficial cash economy).
165. See Tolson, supra note 138 (complaints over inconsistent awards).
166. Feinberg Announces Faster and More Generous Payments from GCCF,
GuLF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (Sept. 25, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaims
facility.com/press6.php (compensation program to cluster claims by industry, such
as fishing, tourism, small businesses, large businesses; uniform standard
methodologies to be applied to each industry); see also Associated Press, BP Fund
Czar Promises Bigger, Faster Claims, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.
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announcements were forthcoming concerning the structure or
administration of these groups in the claims process.
Eligibility for compensation through the GCCF entailed not
only definition of eligible claimants but also eligible claims. 167 in
this regard, the facility announced that it would handle claims
relating to removal and cleanup costs, damage to real or personal
property, lost earnings or profits, loss of subsistence use of natural
resources,168 and physical injury or death.16 9 The universe of
potentially eligible claims, then, was substantially expanded
beyond the claims resolved in the September 1Ith Victim
Compensation Fund.
Finally, the eligibility problem had resonance in the arena of
fraudulent claims. While Feinberg encouraged any and all
claimants to resolve their claims through the enticement of quick
and easy payments, he simultaneously began a rear-guard action
against the proliferation of fraudulent claims.o In administering
the Fund, Feinberg involved the Department of Justice to
investigate and prosecute fraudulent claims.' 7' Indeed, it was a
point of pride in his Final Report that only a small percentage of
attempted Fund claims were found to be fraudulent.'72 Similarly,
with the onset of thousands of GCCF claims, Feinberg initiated
outreach to the Justice Department to assist in investigating
fraudulent claims.173 However, in administering the GCCF, the
problem of liberalizing eligibility requirements expanded the
potential for fraud and as such challenged Feinberg's
administration of the GCCF in ways he had not encountered in the
Fund.174
msnbc.msn.com/id/39359569/ns/us-news-environment/ (new procedures for
claims processing by industry groups).
167. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62.
168. Id. (available for individuals only).
169. Id.
170. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 69.
171. Id. at 65-69.
172. Id. (documenting extremely small numbers of cases forwarded to the
Department of Justice for fraud investigation); see also Cooper, supra note 25
(of 7,300 claims processed, only 35 were fraudulent).
173. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (provision governing
false or fraudulent claims); Jim Snyder, BP Victims' Fund to Fight Bogus Claims,
Feinberg Says, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-06-25/bp-victim-s-fund-to-fight-fraudulent-claims-guard-privacy-feinberg-
says.html; see also Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 113 (Feinberg reporting on
proliferation of fraudulent claims in the GCCF).
174. See Fahrenthold & Kindly, supra note 163 (reporting large number of
fraudulent claims).
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2. Valuation
The standards and metrics for evaluating claims in the Fund
and the GCCF stand in marked contrast. Early in the development
of the Fund, Feinberg and his staffers created compensation grids
largely based on actuarial models used in insurance and tort
litigation.' These compensation grids were subject to the notice-
and-comment rulemaking process and published for review by
prospective claimants. Certain measures of damages, such as
pain and suffering, were universally excluded from all claims, but
the Fund subsequently determined to award a flat $250,000 non-
economic award for each deceased victim, and an additional
$100,000 non-economic award for the spouse and dependents of
deceased victims. 177 The proposed grid controversially supplied
award valuations only for persons making up to $250,000; for
persons with earnings in excess of that amount (approximately 3%
of the eligible pool of claimants), the Fund compensation chart
provided no guidance for the determination of a compensation
award but imposed a presumed income cap of $23 1,000 a year.178
The grid valuations formed the basis for an offer from the Fund
to claimants, which they either could accept or request an
individualized hearing.'7 9 In assessing the Fund standards for
award valuation, one commentator has suggested that not only did
the special master not explain the basis for the schedule but that his
definition of economic losses lacked an underlying rationale. 80
As the Fund claims process evolved, and in response to
increasing pressure, Feinberg modified the evaluation process to
permit claimants to make individualized presentations to hearing
175. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 184 ("What occurred in the frenzy of
legislative drafting and the maelstrom of post-September 11th events was a
default to familiar language. To the extent it was given any thought at all, a tort-
based damages formula was a capitulation to the routine, rather than an embrace
of something new and imaginative to address an unprecedented challenge.");
Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 11-12.
176. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5-9; Ackerman, supra note 8;
Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 11.
177. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 40-41.
178. Id. at 8; Ackerman, supra note 8, at 161-65 (describing problems
relating to calculation of awards for higher-earners and grievances and criticisms
engendered by these claimants); Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 11; Chamallas,
supra note 5, at 67-69.
179. Walker, supra note 15, at 610-12 (describing the hearing process).
180. Priest, supra note 15, at 540 ("[T]here is no coherent justification for the
Fund's definition of economic loss."); id. at 543-44 (arguing that the awards had
no defining or constraining logic, and that the definition of the awards had been
placed entirely in the hands of a special master); Rabin, supra note 9, at 474
(describing Feinberg's ultimate compromise rules).
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officers based on particular circumstances.18 1 Many Fund
claimants requested individualized hearings, and as a consequence,
Fund claims administrators frequently modified the initial grd
value to account for specific circumstances and special pleading. 8 2
This especially was true for those claimants whose deceased
relatives had high earning capacity.'8 3
In the final analysis, the Fund valuation process combined a
grid-based approach with highly individualized evaluation of
numerous particular claims and special pleading.184 Some have
suggested that this process not only yielded some very generous
awards, but also some "strikingly inconsistent" sums.In
retrospect, special master Feinberg repeatedly stated that if he had
to do the Fund experience over again, he would not have allowed
for individualized compensation valuations but would have
preferred the imposition of a uniform payment for every
claimant. 86
181. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-16; Rabin & Sugarman, supra
note 8, at 909 (indicating that Feinberg conducted nearly 1,000 individual
hearings); Feinberg, supra note 7, at 475 (stating that Feinberg personally
conducted 1,500 individual hearings).
182. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 17; Ackerman, supra note 8, at
218 ("The Fund's individual determinations lacked several of the formal
trappings that many Americans equate with due process.").
183. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 477 (commenting on complaints from
the Cantor Fitzgerald families on the unfairness of the discretionary factors that
could enter into a determination of awards).
184. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 215 (suggesting that Feinberg's ad hoc
approach "ended up crafting a compromise that had elements of distributive
justice (and perhaps practical politics) at the high and low ends, but which for
the great majority of claims employed a corrective justice model"); Rabin, supra
note 11, at 583-84 (describing the compromise the special master reached with
regard to calculating economic loss); Rabin, supra note 9, at 474 (describing
Feinberg's ultimate compromise rules).
185. Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 909 ("[T]he upshot is that
claimants received both extraordinarily large awards and at the same time
strikingly different sums: Death benefit awards averaged $2.1 million, and
ranged from $250,000 to $7.1 million."); see also Schneider, supra note 19, at
477 ("Feinberg has made the program 'his,' and the fact that there is one
decision maker with so much discretion increases perceptions of unfairness.
Making the program 'his' has all sorts of problematic dimensions. It leads to a
sense that he will make individualized 'deals,' and indeed, he does. Lawyers can
claim to trade on 'insider' access to, or contact with, him.").
186. FEINBERG, supra note 5, at 183; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 82;
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Insurance Compensation After September 11: A Dialogue
with the Special Master of the Victims Compensation Fund, at the Annual
Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 5, 2003); see also
Chamallas, supra note 5, at 79; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 910
(suggesting that by rewarding families differently when their relatives had very
different earning histories, Feinberg moved sharply away from a principle of
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Feinberg's insistence that a flat-rate compensation award to
Fund claimants would better have accorded with the dual goals of
justice and efficiency is interesting in light of his subsequent
administration of the GCCF. In essence, Feinberg has had the
opportunity to do it again. However, to date, his resolution of Gulf
claims has been a hodge-podge of individualized interim
emergency payments, combined with a final settlement program
that offers claimants three possible options.' 8 7 In addition, even
before Feinberg assumed responsibility for administering the
GCCF, there was evidence that Feinberg was giving preferential
treatment to certain groups of special pleaders, such as Gulf Coast
realtors with whom he met prior to taking over management of the
GCCF.
The emergency payment period for initial GCCF claims closed
on November 23, 2010. Although there is little information
available to assess the nature of these emergency payments, these
payments seem to have been accomplished on an individualized,
ad hoc basis.189 In this initial phase of the GCCF, the facility paid
out an a gregate $3.3 billion to approximately 251,000
claimants.' However, roughly half of the 484,000 claims filed
were denied because of ineligibility of lack or documentation.
These claimants received nothing from the GCCF.19 '
treating each life as of equal value). But see Rabin, supra note 9, at 479-82
(noting the irony in Feinberg's endorsement of this proposal, when in fact he
tailored Fund awards to individual circumstances).
187. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text (discussion of GCCF
final settlement payment option program).
188. But see Snyder, supra note 39, which indicates that as early as August
16, 2010, Feinberg had set aside a "modest amount," which he did not disclose,
to compensate Gulf State realtors, whose trade association had met with
Feinberg the week before. "The realtors have 'suffered a great deal' in lost sales,
rent, and commissions, [Feinberg] said."
189. Urbina, supra note 109 (Feinberg to determine on a case-by-case basis
what qualifies as beach-front property and how payments would be adjusted on
a sliding scale based in part on geographic proximity to spill). The emergency
protocols provided no information on how awards would be computed. See
GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62.
190. Brian Skoloff, 91,000 Gulf Oil Spill Claims, Just I Final Payment,
HOUMATODAY.COM (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.houmatoday.com/article/2011
0201/WIRE/l 10139950.
191. Id.; see also John Schwartz, Administrator of BP Fund Offers Bonuses
to Spill Victims Who Bypass Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2010, at A16, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/us/13fund.html (reporting that more
than 200,000 claims were denied because of poor or no documentation).
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Feinberg's final payment program includes three options.' 92
Thus, claimants may elect to receive a quick, one-time flat cash
payment of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses.'9 3
As of February 1, 2011, some 80,000 claimants filed and were paid
pursuant to this option.' 94 Claimants receiving the flat payments
gave up their rights to receive any additional money and also
released their rights to sue BP or any other responsible party.195
Those claimants who do not wish to elect the flat payment
option may pursue individualized evaluation of their claims.196
Based on as yet unspecified procedures and valuation methods,
claimants who receive final settlement offers also would release
their rights to sue BP and other responsible parties.19 Finally,
residents and business owners who are unwilling to accept the flat
payment offer, but who also are unready to make a final settlement
claim, may file for interim quarterly payments through August
2013, provided they show proof of continued business losses.19
Thus, notwithstanding Feinberg's endorsement of flat,
standardized payments to claimants after his experience with the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, Feinberg chiefly has
pursued a course of individualized compensation for the GCCF
settlement of claims.
Moreover, in contrast to the Fund, the valuation methods used
to determine the emergency or final settlement awards for GCCF
192. See David Hammer, New Gulf Oil Spill Claim Rules Announced by Ken
Feinberg, NOLA.COM (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/
index.ssf/2010/11/newgulf oil spill claimrules.html (Gulf Coast attorneys
criticizing Feinberg for making process more confusing with release of new
payment protocols and a two-page release form); John Schwartz, Final
Settlement Phase Starts for BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2010, at A16;
Walsh, supra note 150.
193. See Schwartz, supra note 146 (attorneys critical of general release of all
parties); Feinberg Refuses to Remove Rights Waiver from Quick Pay Option, BP
CLAIM (Jan. 18, 2011), http://bp-claim.com/feinberg-refuses-to-remove-rights-
waiver-from-quick-pay-option/; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23
(questions 15, 23-24: describing release provisions for quick payment option).
There is no appeal from quick payment awards. See Walsh, supra note 150.
194. Skoloff, supra note 190.
195. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23 (questions 16-30:
describing procedures for quick payment option).
196. See id. (questions 31-50: describing procedures for full review of final
settlement payments).
197. See Schwartz, supra note 146 (attorneys critical of general release of all
parties); Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23 (questions 44-45, 47:
describing release provisions for full settlement payment option).
198. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23 (questions 51-70:
describing procedures for full review of interim settlement payments).
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claimants are shrouded in mystery as well as uncertainty.199 No
compensation grid comparable to the Fund has been published to
guide GCCF claimants in assessment of their potential recovery for
different types of claims. 200 No valuation standards have been
published to the public. There is no publicly available information
concerning the identity, experience, or training of staff claims
administrators, or the methodology by which staff adjusters
evaluated emergency payments and will determine final settlement
offers.20 1 There has been some indication that entities or groups
with special access either to BP or Feinberg are able to cut special
deals for themselves as a consequence of this special access.2
In addition, as indicated above, Feinberg has become aware of
the problem of inconsistent awards and has now embarked on a
program of grouping claimants by similar business enterprises.203
However, there is no publicly available information concerning
how award determination based on these clusters are to be
implemented or the standards by which staff are to determine final
settlement awards in the context of these groupings.
On February 1, 2011, the media reported that the GCCF had
issued exactly one final settlement payment out of thousands of
claimants, for a $10 million award to a BP business partner.2 04 BP
acknowledged that it had intervened and lobbied for the settlement
199. Kaufman, supra note 7 (Feinberg promising at Louisiana town hall
meeting to quickly reveal basis for his award calculations); see GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (no valuation method indicated). The GCCF's
protocol for final settlement payments does include sample calculations for
individuals and businesses. See Gulf Coast Claims Facility Announcement of
Payment Options, Eligibility and Substantiation Criteria, and Final Payment
Methodology, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.
gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/METHODOLOGY.%20FEB.2.%20FINAL%20DRA
FT.pdf [hereinafter Announcement of Payment Options] (with Attachment A
(Sample Calculation for Individual Claimant) and Attachment B (Sample
Calculation for a Business Claimant)).
200. Feinberg has made a number of on-the-fly, ad hoc pronouncements. See,
e.g., BP Fund Will Be Generous, supra note 7 (Feinberg indicating that victims
could be compensated for lost health insurance or tourism revenue, not solely
for direct damage from spilled oil); see also Kaufman, supra note 7 (no
computation information indicated).
201. But see GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILYTY, supra note 62 (indicating
claims to be evaluated by an unspecified claims evaluator).
202. See, for example, Snyder, supra note 39, which indicates that as early as
August 16, 2010, Feinberg had set aside a "modest amount," which he did not
disclose, to compensate Gulf State realtors, whose trade association had met
with Feinberg the week before. "The realtors have 'suffered a great deal' in lost
sales, rent, and commissions, [Feinberg] said." See supra note 158.
203. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (discussion of Feinberg
changing valuation rules to group claimants by industry).
204. Skoloff, supra note 190.
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on behalf of the unidentified company and ordered the facility to
make the payment. 205 Feinberg reported that BP had struck an
outside deal with the business and told the GCCF to make the
payment. In addition, Feinberg stated that the GCCF had never
reviewed the business's claim for merit.206
The $10 million payment out of GCCF funds to a BP business
partner as the result of a private settlement negotiation with BP,
without the review and participation of the GCCF, precipitated
further questions about the GCCF's lack of transparency and
independence from BP, as well as of claims being short-changed
and paid too slowly, or not at all.207
3. Collateral Sources
The application of the "collateral source" rule to compensation
awards played a role in the administration of both the Fund and the
GCCF. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act, which authorized creation of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, provided for the reduction of awards by
collateral source benefits such as insurance, pension funds, and
other government payments.208 Not surprisingly, Feinberg drew on
his experience with the Fund to guide his decisions about the
applicability of the collateral source rule in administering the
GCCF.
The collateral source rule is a doctrine most commonly used in
tort law.209 Pursuant to this rule, when a person successfully
prevails on a tort claim in court, the collateral source rule mandates
that any other compensation from other sources should not be
deducted to diminish the claimant's award. Thus, insurance
proceeds and similar benefits that a claimant may receive for the
same injury are not subtracted from a prevailing party's award.210
The application of the collateral source rule played a highly
controversial and much-publicized role in the administration of the
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(b)(6), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001); FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4,
at 43-44; see Alexander, supra note 5, at 675-80; Peck, supra note 8, at 224.
209. See RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, TORTS 436 (1999); Katz, supra note 20, at
548, 563-66.
210. See supra note 209.
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Fund.2 1 1 At the outset, Feinberg determined that any monies or
benefits that claimants received from collateral sources would be
deducted from an award that was determined by the Fund staff.2 12
The fact that any collateral source funds would be deducted from
Fund awards engendered the ire of claimants, who raised an array
of fairness arguments concerning application of this rule.213 For
example, claimants protested that the deduction of collateral source
benefits penalized those claimants who had worked hard
throughout their lives and had accumulated pensions214 or taken
prudent steps to protect their family members by purchasing
insurance.
Over the course of administering the Fund, Feinberg waffled
on the application of the collateral source rule.2 16 Similar to his
decisionmaking pattern with regard to other Fund criteria, Feinberg
gradually softened his initial absolutist rule.217 Under increasing
protest and pressure, Feinberg repeatedly modified his stance on
what "collateral sources" would be deducted from Fund awards
and what collateral sources would not.218
In the end, Feinberg determined that almost all collateral
sources of benefits would be deducted from Fund awards. 2 19 On
the other hand, to appease his critics, Feinberg also determined that
collateral source benefits would not be used to reduce any
claimant's award below $250,000.220 In addition, Feinberg
ultimately determined that charitable donations claimants received
from various organizations also would not be deducted from Fund
awards.22 1
211. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 43-44; Alexander, supra note 5, at
676-77; Priest, supra note 15, at 543-45; Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 8, at
908-09; Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 557-58.
212. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 43-44.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.; Rabin, supra note 9, at 473; Rabin, supra note 11, at 582-83
(commenting on the special master's responding to criticism on the collateral
source rule and modifying his views; concluding that in the end, Feinberg
reached a compromise on what collateral source benefits to deduct and which to
allow claimants to retain).
217. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 45-52; Alexander, supra note 5, at
676 ("Though the statutory language appears quite clear, its application has been
substantially narrowed in practice.").
218. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 45-52.
219. Id. at 43-44.
220. Id. at 51.
221. Id. at 47; Alexander, supra note 5, at 676-77; Berkowitz, supra note 18,
at 13; Katz, supra note 20, at 548.
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There are two salient points about Feinberg's resolution of the
collateral source rule in the context of the Fund. First, the approach
used in administering the Fund basically rejected the traditional
tort rule: if claimants had pursued tort claims in court, they would
not have been subject to reduction of their awards by any
insurance, pension, or similar benefits. Second, Feinberg's
decisions with regard to the collateral source rule changed over
time and typically in response to heated public pressure. Thus,
Feinberg engaged in his pattern of on-the-fly rule modification
based on claimant pressure, rather than resolving this issue through
deliberative rulemaking. As a consequence, at least one critic has
suggested that there is no principled rationale for the distinctions
that the soecial master accorded to different collateral source
benefits.22
With his installment as the GCCF administrator, Feinberg was
entirely familiar with the issue of the collateral source rule in the
context of fund approaches to victim compensation. Taking a page
from the Fund playbook, Feinberg determined that GCCF awards
also would be reduced by any monies or benefits that GCCF
claimants received from other sources.223 Again, the imposition of
collateral source reduction of awards stirred controversy,224 in no
small part because BP lobbied Feinberg to include a collateral
source deduction.225
One of the most controversial applications of the collateral
source rule in administration of the GCCF was the announcement
that claimants' awards would be reduced by any monies that they
earned while participating in the Gulf cleanup.226 Hundreds of
222. Priest, supra note 15, at 542 ("Because the only reason for ignoring
collateral benefits is deterrence, there is no rationale whatsoever for the various
distinctions now effected under the Fund.").
223. Kaufman, supra note 7 (reporting that Feinberg was considering
collateral source deductions as early as August 19, prior to his assuming the
office of administrator of the GCCF).
224. Id. (quoting an irate local resident in regard to the offset: "You have no
clue as to what we did, and then you are going to act like we should just be
grateful for what we got. . . . Are you kidding me?"); King, supra note 107
(fishermen angry about decision to deduct amounts paid by BP in cleanup to
boat owners and others who aided in cleanup efforts); Urbina, supra note 109
(reporting on emergency payment protocols to deduct collateral source
payments, including any earnings or profits people received from another job or
other source of income during the period for which they were claiming lost
earnings).
225. Urbina, supra note 109 (BP's successful lobbying of Feinberg to include
collateral source deductions).
226. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (deductions of
cleanup earnings); Kaufman, supra note 7 (Feinberg stating, on August 19,
2010, that he intended to reduce awards by BP payments to those who were
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fisherman and boat owners had been hired by BP to assist in the oil
spill cleanup and were paid for these efforts. These claimants
protested that the oil spill prevented them from engaging in their
usual employment, and it was unfair to deduct cleanup earnings
from their fund awards, because this would be tantamount to
working for BP for free in the cleanup efforts. 227
In response to these criticisms, and similar to the pattern he
followed in supervising the Fund, Feinberg modified his position
on the collateral source issue. In regard to the cleanup efforts,
Feinberg back-tracked and announced that any monies earned by
locals participating in the Gulf cleanup would not be deducted
from GCCF awards. 228
In the absence of publicly available information, it is difficult
to ascertain what other collateral sources have been and will be
deducted from GCCF awards. The absence of advance notice
places claimants in an uncertain universe. Exacerbating this
problem, claimants lacking legal representation may be unaware
that their awards will be reduced by collateral sources, how those
amounts will be determined, and that if they pursued relief in court
their awards might not be reduced by collateral sources.
The modification of jury awards by collateral source funds has
long been a staple of tort reform advocates, typically corporate
defendants.229 Fund resolution of corporate legal liabilities,
therefore, embraces this dimension of tort reform, and favors
defendants. As the Fund and now the GCCF demonstrate, in order to
receive a quick resolution of the claims, participants must agree to
reduce their awards by collateral source funds. Fund resolution of
mass tort claims, then, embodies an end run around the collateral
source rule that applies in judicially adjudicated tort litigation.
hired to assist in the cleanup efforts, contending that although the claimants
could not do their regular job, they were paid: "It seems to me eminently fair,
and I think that's what any court would do."); King, supra note 107 (Feinberg
indicating that it was not unusual under state law to deduct such earnings from
final damage settlements).
227. Kaufman, supra note 7.
228. Gulf Coast Claims Facility Marks One-Month Anniversary, supra note
163 (GCCF would not deduct earnings from Vessels of Opportunity Program
from payments made to claimants); Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 113
(Feinberg reconsidering decision to deduct money that fishermen earned as
temporary employees in the cleanup operation from their claims payments);
Associated Press, BP Fund Czar: No Deduction for Spill Cleanup Wages, Hous.
CHRON. (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/
7210041.html (Feinberg announcing he will waive requirement that wages
earned by spill cleanup workers be subtracted from their claims of lost revenue).
229. See Priest, supra note 15, at 532 n.15.
862 [Vol. 71
PROMETHEUS UNBOUND
Against this backdrop, a problematic issue with the application
of the collateral source rule in the context of the GCCF-and
unlike the Fund experience-is that BP, the responsible par,
required that collateral sources be deducted from awards.
Although the GCCF website declares that the GCCF is a neutral
claims facility231 and Feinberg has repeatedl stated that he is
functioning as an independent administrator, 2 the reduction of
awards by collateral source funds is the consequence of BP's
insistence. The fact that a "responsible party" has a role in
determining a significant criterion in calculating awards is
troubling.
D. Appointment of the Special Master/Administrator
Ken Feinberg has assumed the central role in implementing
both the Fund as well as the GCCF. However, these two fund
experiences present contrasting examples with regard to the
designation of fund manager. In addition, the designation of the
fund manager in both situations has implicated important issues
regarding authorization of the manager, scope of duties,
accountability, and professional ethics.
In comparing the two, then, the GCCF experience suggests a
significant, relatively unguided expansion of the role of the fund
manager, raising troubling questions about professional ethics and
ultimately fund legitimacy. As will be discussed, until recently the
appointment of a "special master" was based on legal rules and
principles.2 33 However, with the advent of the Fund and the GCCF,
the concept of a special master has been transformed from a court-
appointed surrogate, circumscribed by delegated duties, into an all-
powerful, quasi-lawless, free-wheeling demi-god.
1. Appointment Authorization
The federal statute creating the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund authorized the appointment of a special
230. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussion of BP's role in the development of the
collateral source rule in the context of the GCCF).
231. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23 (question 1: describing
the GCCF as a neutral facility and Feinberg as a neutral administrator).
232. See infra note 288 and accompanying text (discussion of Feinberg as an
independent administrator).
233. See Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 19-22; infra note 235 and
accompanying text (discussion of special master function under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 53).
2011]) 863
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
234
master.234 The concept of a "special master" is well known in
federal courts and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53235 authorizes
federal judges to appoint special masters to assist the court in the
resolution of certain types of cases. 236 Historically, federal judges
used Rule 53 sparingly to appoint special masters to assist in
complex commercial litigation, where the special master might
assist the court in conducting an independent audit of financial
records.237
In the past 30 years, some federal judges have considerably
expanded the use of special masters, particularly in the resolution
of mass tort cases. 23 In the mass tort litigation arena, special
masters have been appointed to prepare trial plans, organize and
evaluate the universe of potential claims, create compensation
award grids, and to negotiate and implement settlements, among
many functions.239 As is widely reported, Feinberg began his
career as a professional special master assisting Judge Jack
Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation.24 0
Feinberg's appointment as the special master to oversee the
Fund was not made by a federal judge pursuant to the authority of
Rule 53. Instead, Attorney General John Ashcroft appointed
Feinberg directly pursuant to the federal statute that created the
Fund.24 From the outset, then, as an executive branch appointee,
234. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 404(a), 115 Stat. 230, 237-38 (2001); FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4,
at 3.
235. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. See generally MARGARET G. FARRELL, THE ROLE OF
SPECIAL MASTERS IN FEDERAL LITIGATION (1993), available at Westlaw, C842
ALI-ABA 931; Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending
the Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 394 (1986).
236. Alexander, supra note 5, at 663.
237. See David I. Levine, The Authority for the Appointment of Remedial
Special Masters in Federal Institutional Reform Litigation: The History
Reconsidered, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 753 (1984).
238. See generally James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and
Institutional Reform: The Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv.
800, 800 (1991); Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special
Masters: Administrative Agencies for the Courts, 2 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 235
(1996); Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Prolhferation ofAd
Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2131, 2138-42 (1989).
239. Alexander, supra note 5, at 663.
240. See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 144-45 (1986).
241. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 7; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Attorney
General Ashcroft Names Special Master to Head September 1Ith Compensation
Program (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/victim
compensation/dojpr2.pdf.
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Feinberg's appointment as "special master" was outside the
ordinary judicial understanding of a special master.242
Feinberg volunteered for the job and pursued appointment as
the special master through Washingon, D.C. contacts he acquired
while working on Capitol Hill. Attorney General Ashcroft
appointed Feinberg based on his experience as a special master in
the Agent Orange settlement, his willingness to administer the
Fund without pay,244 and his familiarity with various congressmen
and staffers. The appointment did not require congressional
approval.245 As a consequence of the unusual legal basis for his
appointment, Feinberg in his role of special master technically was
not answerable to any branch of government.246
Whereas Feinberg's appointment to oversee the Fund had an
ascertainable legal basis in a federal statute, his appointment to
administer the GCCF did not. In his supervision of the GCCF,
Feinberg is not serving as a "special master" although that label
sometimes is misapplied to his efforts. Rather, Feinberg is the
designated fund "administrator." His appointment as the fund
administrator seems to be result of closed-door negotiations
between BP and Feinberg, subsequently endorsed by President
242. Alexander, supra note 5, at 663. Commenting on this unusual
arrangement, Professor Alexander observes:
There is no point to calling an administrator within the Justice
Department a special master, other than to invoke the authority of
special masters within the federal courts in order to lend legitimacy to
the adjudicative determinations made by the administrator. If a special
master does not derive his or her authority from a court-and in fact the
decisions of a special master are not even subject to judicial
review-then the title takes on a completely different meaning from its
normal usage.
Id. In attempting to make some sense out of Feinberg's unique appointment by
Attorney General Ashcroft as a "Special Master" to administer the September
11th Victim Compensation Fund, Berkowitz has concluded: "Feinberg simply
has no analogue, leaving us once again with the question of how to characterize
the position of Special Master." Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 22. She
additionally opines: "Congress failed to define the Special Master's position."
Id.
243. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 7. Feinberg reportedly lobbied for the
position with his congressional friend, Senator Chuck Hagel.
244. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 197; Feinberg, Negotiating the Victim
Compensation Fund, supra note 9, at 29.
245. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 6.
246. Alexander, supra note 5, at 663 ("The Special Master has both
legislative and adjudicative functions but operates within no specified
procedural or institutional structure."); Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 40 ("But it
cannot be denied that Congress enacted a statute riddled with litigation
inadequacies and constructed a fund controlled by a 'Tsar."').
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Obama.247 Congress had no role in the creation of the GCCF or
Feinberg's appointment as its administrator. 248
Public records indicate that as early as May 2010, BP
summoned Feinberg to Houston for private discussions concerning
his possible appointment to take over responsibility for overseeing
resolutions of Gulf claims against BP.249 This arrangement seemed
in place by the time that BP met with President Obama in June
2010 when BP agreed to contribute $20 billion to a compensation
fund. 5o Shortly thereafter, the White House quickly agreed to and
announced Feinberg as the fund's administrator.251
Unlike his appointment to the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, there is no legal basis for Feinberg's
appointment as the GCCF administrator. The appointment was not
made by a federal judge pursuant to Rule 53 nor was the
appointment made pursuant to federal statute, although Feinberg
subsequently would claim authority remotely from the OPA.2
Feinberg's appointment as administrator was the consequence of a
private negotiation and deal with BP, the designated responsible
party for the Gulf disaster. There is no public record indicating
whether any other actor was considered to undertake the role of
fund administrator. In the heat of exponentially expanding public
outrage, President Obama quickly rubber stamped BP's preference
for Feinberg.
2. Scope of Duties
A special master who is appointed by a federal judge is subject
to duties and responsibilities set forth in Rule 53. Typically, a
judge who appoints a special master does so by court order which
sets forth a specific task the master is to accomplish, a time period
247. Schwartz, supra note 162 (appointment of Feinberg as administrator).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Press Release, supra note 69. The BP press release announced that
Feinberg would administer the ICF, that funds would be available to satisfy
"legitimate claims," and that the ICF would adjudicate all OPA claims and tort
claims, excluding federal and state claims. BP also indicated that the fund did
not cap its liability but that money left over in the fund once all legitimate
claims were resolved would revert to BP. Strassel, supra note 3.
251. Lee, supra note 69. The White House blog indicated that the facility
would develop standards for recoverable claims that would be published and
that a panel of three judges would be available to hear appeals of the
administrator's decisions. See also Strassel, supra note 3.
252. See GCCF Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/proto_4.
253. FED. R. CIv. P. 53.
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in which to complete the special master duties, and the scope of the
master's authority.
In many instances where a judge contemplates the appointment
of a special master, the judge will consult with attorneys involved
in the litigation for suggestions regarding possible candidates for
the appointment, as well as assistance in delimiting the scope of
special master's duties. Counsel may object to the appointment of
a special master, the definition of the special master's assigned
project, or the scope of the master's authority.254
As indicated above, Feinberg's appointment as the special
master to oversee the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
was not made by a federal judge pursuant to Rule 53. No judicial
order specified the tasks Feinberg was to perform, described the
scope of his authority, or limited his discretion. Consequently,
Feinberg rapidly assumed expansive supervision, control, and
discretion over all matters involved in administering the Fund. As
has been discussed above, after an initial round of formal notice-
and-comment rulemaking, Feinberg increasingly assumed vast
powers to modify and change rules and standards governing
administration of the Fund.
Similar to his experience with the Fund, Feinberg's
management of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility has not been subject
to a Rule 53 court order or any other judicially created mandate.
Basically, Feinberg's supervision and control of the GCCF has
been a relatively ungided and unbounded exercise of power by a
single administrator.
3. Accountability
Special masters who are judicially appointed pursuant to Rule
53 are accountable to the court that appointed them to undertake
some task. In essence, special masters are not free agents. Rule 53
requires that the special master, upon completion of the master's
work, submit a report to the court.256 The judge may then utilize
the special master's work product in any fashion the court deems
appropriate. Parties involved in the litigation may submit
comments or challenges to the special master's findings and
254. See DeGraw, supra note 238, at 811.
255. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 20 ("Despite the independence granted by
the expansion of the court-appointed special master's role, special masters are
always answerable to the judges who appoint them for a particular case and are
further supervised by the rigors of the adversarial process. No such checks exist
over the Fund's Special Master, making Feinberg a rare, and tenuous, judicial
creature." (footnote omitted)).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e).
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conclusions. The court may accept, modify, or reject a special
master's findings, and adopt the master's report in whole or part.25 7
Feinberg was not appointed special master pursuant to Rule 53
and therefore, in administering the Fund, he technically was not
subject to the requirements of Rule 53 nor was he answerable to a
federal judge for whom he was working. Because of his unusual
status as a congressionally authorized, executively appointed
special master, Feinberg has been criticized for being uniquely
unaccountable in the exercise of his office.258
Nonetheless, in implementing and administering the Fund,
Feinberg was loosely accountable to various constituencies. Thus,
Feinberg was remotely answerable to Attorney General
Ashcroft. 259 In addition, because Congress authorized the Fund,
Feinberg was accountable to various congressional committees, the
Fund claimants, and the public. After the Fund was closed,
Feinberg issued a report on his work to Congress.26 0
During his tenure as special master, Feinberg also developed an
interesting synergy with federal Judge Alvin Hellerstein, who was
assigned the cases of claimants who had elected not to receive
257. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, FOURTH §
11.52 (2004).
258. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 211 ("It is in this particular area where
the Fund's most serious procedural shortcoming is apparent. Were we to grade
the Fund's accountability on the upstream end, we would give it a 'C' . . . . But
with major gaps to fill, some of the most significant rule-making was left to an
appointed Special Master with no direct accountability to the electorate.... It is
on the downstream end, however, where accountability all but disappeared.");
Diller, supra note 15, at 726 (fund vested too much discretion in the special
master with little means of accountability and oversight); Schneider, supra note
19, at 477 (vesting so much discretion in one decisionmaker increases
perceptions of unfairness); Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 15, at 384 (large
amount of discretionary authority of special master raised suspicions that biases
and personal preferences would shape allocation decisions).
Highly critical of Feinberg's role, Professor Diller has concluded:
Feinberg's conduct highlights the central weakness of the Fund as an
administrative mechanism-its operation rests on the personal choices
of a single individual, with little means of accountability or oversight.
As Feinberg has construed his grant of authority, there are few
governing legal standards, no real requirement that like claims be
treated alike, no obligation to provide reasoned explanations, no limits
on the amount that may be spent, and no means ofjudicial review.
Diller, supra note 15, at 767.
259. Alexander, supra note 5, at 663 ("The only statutory officer of the Fund
is the Special Master, who reports directly to the Attorney General.").
260. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4.
868 [Vol. 71
PROMETHEUS UNBOUND
compensation through the Fund.26 1 Feinberg apparently initiated
numerous conference calls with Judge Hellerstein, in order to
coordinate their efforts and to impart information about the relative
risks of seeking compensation either through the Fund or
litigation.262 Judge Hellerstein, acting in concert with Feinberg,
required that individuals pursuing judicial relief in the tort system
to have first weighed and assessed the alternative remedy of
receiving compensation from the Fund.263 In this fashion, Judge
Hellerstein, in concert with Feinberg, pressured claimants not to
pursue tort litigation but instead to take an award from the Fund.2 6
In addition, as will be discussed below, Judge Hellerstein
otherwise did not oversee or review Feinberg's various decisions
relating to implementation and administration of the Fund.265
Although some claimants challenged the Fund's criteria in court,
Judge Hellerstein ruled that while he could review the legality of
those criteria, he would not review any individual challenges in the
application of those standards and rules. 266 And, Judge Hellerstein
upheld the legality of Feinberg's standards for administration of
the Fund267 and decided that Feinberg had not impermissibility
created a cap on awards for high-end earners 268
In contrast, in implementing and administering the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility, Feinberg appears to be accountable to no one,
261. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also
Conk, supra note 24, at 189 (array of September 11th cases assigned to Judge
Hellerstein).
262. See STEVEN BRILL, AFTER: How AMERICA CONFRONTED THE
SEPTEMBER 12 ERA 537-38 (2003), which suggests that Feinberg tried to
posture this as Judge Hellerstein's idea, "but plaintiffs lawyers immediately saw
[Feinberg's] fingerprints on it, and they were outraged. How could he and a
judge interfere this way in an attorney-client relationship?" See also Berkowitz,
supra note 18, at 27-28 (describing the relationship of Feinberg and Judge
Hellerstein in urging victims to take their relief from the Fund).
263. See Milo Geyelin, Judge Wants Victims of September 11 Who Sue to
Know the Risks ofAction, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2002, at B2.
264. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 27-28.
265. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 12-13.
266. Id.; see supra note 262 and accompanying text (Judge Hellerstein's
decisions in the September 11th litigation).
267. Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also
Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding Judge
Hellerstein's decision); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 165-74 (Hellerstein's Colaio
decision and the Second Circuit affirmation); James P. Kreindler & Brian J.
Alexander, September 11th Aftermath: A Perspective on the VCF and Litigation,
AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2004, at 1, 18-19 (commenting favorably on the
Colaio decision as sending a message to Feinberg not to cap awards).
268. Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
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except possibly BP. 269 Because Feinberg is not functioning as a
court-appointed special master under Rule 53, he is not
accountable to any federal judge or the judicial system. Feinberi's
independence from BP has been repeatedly challenged. 7o
Similarly, because his work as fund administrator is not derived
from specific congressional authorization, Feinberg is not
accountable to any legislative oversight, although he voluntarily
appeared before House subcommittees shortly after his designation
as the GCCF administrator.271' Finally, because the Attorney
General did not appoint Feinberg-as the Attorney General did for
the September 1 Ith Victim Compensation Fund-Feinberg is not
subject to executive branch oversight, either.
In the context of the GCCF, Feinberg is operating as an entirely
free agent, accountable ultimately to no one. He has complete
authority to make rules and standards, to change those rules and
standards, to issue awards, and to provide or deny whatever
procedures he deems appropriate. As will be discussed, claimants
have limited opportunities to appeal decisions of the fund
administrator.272 Thus, Feinberg is the original and ultimate arbiter
269. Feinberg's relationship with BP has raised numerous ethical issues. See
infra note 276 and accompanying text. As early as June 20th, Feinberg's
independence from BP was questioned. See Lavis, supra note 13 (noting that
Feinberg was being paid by BP); see also Robertson, supra note 67 (Gulf Coast
resident querying Feinberg: "If you're not with BP and you're not with the
government, who are you with?"); Urbina, supra note 109 (reporting BP's
successful lobbying effort with Feinberg to require deduction of collateral
benefits from GCCF awards).
270. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussion of Feinberg's
independence from BP). See also Kaufman, supra note 7, which reports on a
town hall meeting in Houma, Louisiana: "I feel that you have a serious conflict
of interest," one audience member charged. "The Bible states one man should
not serve two masters." See also Robertson, supra note 67.
271. See also Snyder, supra note 68 (reporting that Feinberg had testified
before four congressional panels on July 22, 2010; Feinberg summoned to
meeting with Senator Tom Carper to answer criticisms from Gulf Coast
residents about claims process); Jim Snyder, Carper Says Gulf Claims System
Needs Work, Vouches for Feinberg, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2010), http://
www.bloomberg.com/ news/2010-09-29/carper-says-gulf-claims-system-needs-
work-vouches-for-feinberg.html (describing the Senate Government Affairs
Subcommittee monitoring claims process); Statement by Tom Carper on
Meeting with Kenneth Feinberg (Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://carper.
senate.gov/press/record.cmf?id=328035.
272. See infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text (discussion on appellate
review of GCCF award decisions). The protocol for emergency payment
provided no means whatsoever for appeal. See GuLF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY,
supra note 62.
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of both substantive and procedural due process in administering
the GCCF.273
It remains to be seen what relationship will develop between
Feinberg's administration of the GCCF and the Gulf Coast Oil
Spill multidistrict litigation (MDL) 2179 created in the Eastern
District of Louisiana under the management of federal Judge Carl
J. Barbier.274 Plaintiffs' attorneys filed a motion in that MDL
proceeding to enjoin Feinberg from encouraging claimants to seek
their compensation solely from the GCCF, which Judge Barbier
granted in February 2011.275 In the context of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, Judge Hellerstein appeared to attempt
to coordinate his judicial efforts with Feinberg. At this writing, it is
unclear what approach the Louisiana federal court will adopt with
regard to coordination, interference, or non-interference with
Feinberg's parallel efforts.
4. Professional Ethics
Feinberg's continued role as the GCCF administrator, over
time, has raised a myriad of controversial and unresolved issues
relating to professional ethics. Although in administering the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Feinberg made a
number of contentious decisions, and angered various
constituencies, there were few reported ethical challenges to his
273. But see GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (providing for the
GCCF to institute periodic audits to evaluate the accuracy of submissions and
payments, but seemingly not to monitor the administration or determination of
awards).
274. See Ashby Jones, Big Gulf Spill Litigation Gets Sent to the Big Easy,
WSJ BLOGS (Aug. 10, 2010, 2:14 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/08/10/
big-gulf-spill-litigation-gets-sent-to-the-big-easy (creation of Oil Spill MDL and
transfer to federal court in New Orleans; assigned to Federal Judge Carl Barbier;
viewed as plaintiffs attorneys' victory); infra notes 486-88 and accompanying
text (discussion of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill MDL case).
275. Order and Reasons, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in
the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179, 2011 WL 323866 (E.D.
La. Feb. 2, 2011) (granting plaintiffs' motion to supervise ex parte
communications with putative class); see Tom Hals, Judge Finds Feinberg Not
Independent ofBP, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
02/03/us-oil-spill-feinberg-independence-idUSTRE7120EG20110203; see also
John Schwartz, Comments by Overseer ofBP Fund Irk Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
22, 2010, at A18 (reporting plaintiffs lawyers' motion to enjoin Feinberg from
communicating with putative class claimants); Brian Skoloff & Harry Weber,
Judge to Gulf Claims Czar: Don't Say You're Independent, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 2,
2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41397181/ns/us news-environment/.
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27
administration of that Fund.276 That has not been true in Feinberg's
administration of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.
The most trenchant ethical challenge asserted against
Feinberg's management of the GCCF centers on Feinberg's
perceived conflict of interest.27 7 In addition, others have questioned
BP's continued intervention and interference with various aspects
of the GCCF's operations.278 Critics repeatedly have pointed out
that BP selected Feinberg to administer the Fund and that BP is
paying Feinberg and his law firm. Furthermore, BP has influenced
a number of decisions relating to the GCCF's implementation and
administration, such as the deduction of collateral source funds and
releases for final claims awards.279
Moreover, Feinberg was appointed as administrator after
private negotiations with BP, well in advance of creation of the
GCCF, and seemingly without the consultation of any other
affected parties. 280 Feinberg has reportedly traveled around the
Gulf Coast states in BP private jets and met with BP executives.28i
In addition, for several months Feinberg resisted disclosure of BP's
compensation to him, repeatedly telling the press that this
information would be forthcoming.2 82 To date, Feinberg has not
276. But see Diller, supra note 15, at 759-61 (raising ethical issues about
Feinberg's judgment).
277. See Kaufman, supra note 7 (town hall meeting participants challenge
Feinberg's independence and note conflict of interest).
278. Skoloff, supra note 190; Daniel Fisher & Asher Hawkins, BP's Legal
Blowout, FORBES.COM (July 14, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/14/bp-
oil-spill-settlement-business-energy-lawsuits.html (reporting that Feinberg asked
BP to draft releases that exempt BP from any future liability for the spill but not
to include other defendants); see also King, supra note 107 (criticism from
Alabama Attorney General Troy King, accusing Feinberg of acting as a
"corporate shill").
279. Fisher & Hawkins, supra note 278 (reporting that Feinberg asked BP to
draft releases that exempt BP from any future liability for the spill but not to
include other defendants); Urbina, supra note 109 (reporting BP's successful
lobbying of Feinberg to include collateral source deductions from GCCF awards);
see also Dionne Searcey, In Advance ofHearing, Parties in BP Litigation Already
Feuding, WSJ BLOGS (Sept. 14, 2010, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/
09/14/in-advance-of-hearing-parties-in-bp-litigation-already-feuding/ (plaintiffs
attorneys' motions in MDL seeking all contracts and communications between BP
and Feinberg Rozen, Feinberg's firm administering the $20 million fund).
280. Schwartz, supra note 162 (appointment of Feinberg); Pacenti, supra
note 139 (Feinberg picked by BP).
281. See King, supra note 76 (Feinberg's meetings with BP executives);
Schwartz, supra note 162 (Feinberg flying around Gulf Coast states on BP jets);
Pacenti, supra note 139 (same).
282. Fisher & Hawkins, supra note 278 (Feinberg not disclosing salary from
BP); Schwartz, supra note 162 (Feinberg's refusal to disclose salary compensation
from BP to him); Pacenti, supra note 139 (same); Byron G. Stier, Feinberg to
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disclosed his BP compensation (other than information relating to
an alleged $850,000 monthly payment to Feinberg's law firm).
Further enflaming and exacerbating the conflict-of-interest
debate, on February 1, 2011, the media reported that the GCCF had
made its first final settlement award to a BP business partner in the
amount of $10 million.284 The payment of this final settlement
moved BP's business partner to the head of the queue of
approximately 91,000 other individuals and businesses that have
filed for final settlement payments.285 BP acknowledged that this
payment was privately negotiated between BP and its partner and
that BP had ordered the GCCF to make the payment. 286 In response
to questions about this arrangement, Feinberg indicated that BP
had struck an outside deal, had told the fund to make the payment,
and that the claims facility had never made its own independent
review of the merits of the claim.2 87 These events clearly belie
repeated assertions from both BP and Feinberg that BP has been
and is acting independently from the GCCF.
In response to his critics, Feinberg repeatedly has avowed that
he functions as an impartial administrator, 28 and the GCCF
website declares that the facility is a "neutral" fund and that
Feinberg is a neutral fund administrator. 289 He has repeatedly
Disclose Compensation for Administering BP Fund, MASS TORT LITIG. BLOG
(July 29, 2010), http://www.1awprofessors.typepad.com/mass-tort-litigation/
2010/07/feinberg-to-disclose-compensation-for-administering-bp-fund.html (AP
reporting Feinberg's announcement that he will disclose BP's compensation to
him, despite previously stating that such information would be confidential and
"between him and BP"); Kaufman, supra note 7 (town hall meeting participants
challenging Feinberg's independence while he is being paid by BP; Feinberg
suggesting he will reveal salary next month (September 2010)); Urbina, supra
note 109 (Feinberg's earnings from BP unknown).
283. See Lavis, supra note 13 (noting that Feinberg was being paid by BP).
284. Skoloff, supra note 190.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., King, supra note 76 (reporting that Feinberg repeatedly
indicated that he would not take orders from BP or the White House);
Robertson, supra note 67 (Feinberg vowing that his decisions were strictly his
own); Schwartz, supra note 162 (Feinberg: "I am not beholden to the Obama
administration, I am not beholden to BP-I am an independent administrator,
calling the shots as I see them.").
289. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23 (section 1).
2011] 873
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
indicated that he was romised total independence from both BP
and the White House.
As questions about Feinberg's conflict of interest and other
ethical issues have continued unabated, Feinberg retained
Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University Law School to291
render an expert opinion regarding various ethical challenges. In
late December 2010, Professor Gillers issued an expert report
concluding that Feinberg was not violating any professional
responsibility standards. 2 Professor Gillers was paid for this work
out of BP funds, at the rate of $950.00 an hour, raising further
questions about the independence of Feinberg, Gillers, and BP.293
The issues relating to Feinberg's independence and neutrality
in implementing the GCCF are intricately interwoven with
questions concerning the capacity in which Feinberg and his law
firm are serving. Professor Giller's ethical analysis is grounded in
his conclusion that Feinberg is not functioning as an attome
within the bounds of an ordinary attorney-client relationship.
Simply, Feinberg and his law firm, and the GCCF facility it is
managing, are not acting as a "lawyer for BP," and consequently
BP is not Feinberg's client.2 95 By defining the threshold capacity
question in this fashion, Professor Gillers effectively has insulated
Feinberg from all professional standards, rules, and accountability.
As indicated above, the plaintiffs' bar has sought, in the MDL
2179 proceedings, to enjoin Feinberg from various actions in
290. See Strassel, supra note 3, which reports that Feinberg was promised
total independence and which quotes Feinberg as saying that neither BP nor the
administration "want to get near this. And that's appropriate."
291. Harry R. Weber, Ken Feinberg Paying Stephen Gillers, NYU Professor,
with Money from BP Oil Spill Claims Fund for Legal Ethics Advice,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 30, 2010), http://huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/30/ken-
feinberg-paying-steph_n_802703.html.
292. Stephen Gillers, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Letter Report to Kenneth
Feinberg (Dec. 28, 2010) (on file with author); Expert on Legal Ethics: Feinberg
and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility Are Independent and Meet All Appropriate
Ethical Standards, GULF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY (Dec. 30, 2010),
http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/pressll.php.
293. Weber, supra note 291.
294. Gillers, supra note 292, at 4 ("You are not in an attorney-client
relationship with BP. You are an independent administrator and owe none of the
attributes of the attorney-client relationship (e.g., loyalty, confidentiality) to
BP.").
295. Id. ("By 'independent' I mean (and I think the context is clear) that you
are independent of BP. You are not subject to its direction or control."); see Jim
Snyder & Carol Massar, Feinberg Says Half of $20 Billion BP Fund Should Cover
Claims, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
3 1/feinberg-says-half-of-20-billion-bp-fund-may-be-enough-to-cover-claims.html
(Giller's conclusions on Feinberg's independence).
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administering the GCCF, particularly seeking judicial supervision
over communications by Feinberg with potential civil litigants.296
Professor Geoffrey Hazard submitted an expert declaration in
support of this request,297 opining that Feinberg's law firm either is298
acting as a lawyer for BP, or if not, then as an agent for BP. In
contrast to Professor Giller's conclusions, Professor Hazard
suggests the GCCF is not an entirely independent facility, because
its substantial operating expenses are being paid by BP.299
Professor Hazard points out that the attorneys hired to assist in the
GCCF claims process are not working pro bono (as they did in
administering the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund), but
are being paid by BP. As such, Professor Hazard suggests that they
are ethically bound to inform any claimant that they may assist in
the GCCF process of that compensation arrangement.300  I
addition, Professor Hazard suggests that the GCCF is not
functioning as a mediation enterprise, because it was established
unilaterally by BP and not with the agreement of opposing
claimants.
In contrast to Professor Giller's expert opinion, Professor
Hazard further concludes that Feinberg is an attorney representing
the GCCF and that his actions and statements may properly be
evaluated under the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and
the counterpart professional rules of other jurisdictions.302 Subject
to this scrutiny, Professor Hazard suggests that many of Feinberg's
actions and statements might be considered professionally
improper under the codes of professional responsibility.3 03
On February 2 J2011, Judge Barbier issued his opinion
enjoining Feinberg. Judge Barbier's order required that the
defendant BP, through its agents Ken Feinberg, Feinberg Rozen,
LLP, and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility, and any of their
296. Order and Reasons, supra note 275 (granting plaintiffs' motion to
supervise ex parte communications with putative class); see Hals, supra note
275; Skoloff& Weber, supra note 275.
297. Declaration of Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179
(E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2011).
298. Id. 11.
299. Id. T 7c.
300. Id. T 7f.
301. Id. I 7c.
302. Id. 10a; see Pacenti, supra note 139 (reporting that Feinberg may have
violated Florida Bar rules by giving legal advice to those affected by spill
without being licensed in the Gulf states).
303. Declaration of Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., supra note 297.
304. Order and Reasons, supra note 275 (granting plaintiffs' motion to
supervise ex parte communications with putative class).
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representatives, in any of their oral or written communications with
claimants, shall:
(1) Refrain from contacting directly any claimant that they
know or reasonably should know is represented by counsel,
whether or not said claimant has filed a lawsuit or formal
claim; (2) Refrain from referring to the GCCF, Ken
Feinberg, or Feinberg Rozen, LLP (or their representatives),
as "neutral" or completely "independent" from BP. It should
be clearly disclosed in all communications, whether written
or oral, that said parties are acting for and on behalf of BP in
fulfilling its statutory obligations as the "responsible party"
under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. (3) Begin any
communication with a putative class member with the
statement that the individual has a right to consult with an
attorney of his/her own choosing prior to accepting any
settlement or signing a release of legal rights. (4) Refrain
from giving or purporting to give legal advice to
unrepresented claimants, including advising that claimants
should not hire a lawyer. (5) Fully disclose to claimants their
options under OPA if they do not accept a final payment,
including filing a claim in the pending MDL 2179 litigation.
(6) Advise claimants that the "pro bono" attorneys and
"community representatives" retained to assist GCCF
claimants are being compensated directly or indirectly by
BP. 305
In addition to the conflicts-of-interest issue, Feinberg also has
come under heated attack for urging potential Gulf Coast claimants
to seek remediation through the GCCF, rather than the judicial
system.306 In this regard, Feinberg has repeated the course he
followed in administering the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund. Then, Feinberg created controversy by his
public admonitions that claimants take their relief exclusively
through his Fund, famously declaring at one point that the Fund
"was the only game in town."30  Although Fund claimants
criticized Feinberg for his often-blunt demeanor in urging them to
act quickly, Feinberg did not raise many objections from the
practicing bar. In the context of the GCCF, however, Feinberg has
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Strassel, supra note 3 (Feinberg's urging potential claimants to
sign up with the GCCF riles tort-law community; tort bar and state Attorneys
General raise very legitimate policy issues about releasing BP from liability
before all damage from the spill is known).
307. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 27; Carter, supra note 2, at 37.
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engendered the considerable ire of the plaintiffs' bar, which
attorneys have successfully enjoined Feinberg from his repeated
public urgings that claimants take their exclusive relief through the
GCCF.
In contrast to Professor Giller's over-arching conclusion,
Feinberg's critics believe that he is an attorney subject to
professional responsibility standards and that he is accountable as
an attorney for his actions.309 Hence, Feinberg's critics have
contended that Feinberg's repeated statements urging Gulf Coast
claimants to take their exclusive remedies in the GCCF constitute
providing le al advice, notwithstanding Feinberg's protestations to
the contrary. 1o In this regard some commentators have argued that
Feinberg is not authorized to practice in the Gulf Coast states, and
as a consequence Feinberg is engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. In this vein, some have questioned what code of
professional conduct governs Feinberg's actions in administering
the GCCF.312 In his declaration in support of an injunction
Professor Hazard has opined that under the Louisiana Code of
Professional Responsibility, many of Feinberg's public
pronouncements convey inaccurate and misleading statements,
constituting further breaches of professional ethics.
The swirling professional responsibility issues relating to
Feinberg's capacity and ethical duties are yet unresolved.
Nonetheless, Feinberg's unusual appointment status and his
controversial administration of the GCCF have exposed novel
ethical fault lines in the administration of such funds. If Feinberg is
deemed as acting as an attorney, then he is subject to as-yet-
determined rules of professional responsibility. However, if
Feinberg is not acting in the capacity of an attorney, then
legitimate questions exist regarding the capacity in which he
functions and what standards constrain his actions. It is worth
noting that attorneys, mediators, arbitrators, and even accountants
are all subject to professional codes of conduct.3 13 Feinberg's
308. Order and Reasons, supra note 275 (granting plaintiffs' motion to
supervise ex parte communications with putative class); see Hals, supra note
275; Skoloff & Weber, supra note 275.
309. See Pacenti, supra note 139 (Feinberg violating Florida Bar rules by
giving legal advice to those affected by the spill without being licensed in the
Gulf states).
310. Id.
311. Id.
3 12. Id.
313. See, e.g., Model Rules of Professional Conduct, A.B.A., http://
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rule
s_of rofessional conduct/model rules of professional conduct table of conte
nts.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (attorneys); Model Standards of Conduct for
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administration of the GCCF raises problematic questions whether
he is in any way bound by any professional standards.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as a matter of common sense,
Feinberg cannot be the final judge and arbiter of his own
neutrality, impartiality, and independence. His repeated self-
serving statements to this effect should be accorded little weight. It
might be added, moreover, that Feinberg's often tone-deaf
responses to ethical challenges in the context of his administration
of the GCCF have not served him well in addressing these serious
issues.
E. Reviewability of the Special Master's/Administrator's Decisions
An enterprise's legitimacy may be measured, in part, by the
degree to which its decisions are subject to independent appeal and
review. Both the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and
Gulf Coast Claims Facility have, in similar fashion, permitted
limited review of its standards and award decisions. Arguably, the
GCCF has provided even more circumscribed review of the
facility's administrative decisions than did the Fund.
As indicated above, Feinberg's management of the Fund was
accountable in several ways, including the notice-and-comment
period accompanying the development of standards at the outset of
the Fund.314 On the other hand, substantial aspects of Feinberg's
administration of the Fund were subject to only limited,
independent judicial review. For example, several claimants
brought a challenge in federal court to the Fund's promulgated
criteri.36 Judge Hellerstein held that he had jurisdiction to
entertain these legal challenges, 3 7  and he upheld the
constitutionality of the rules. 3 18 Nevertheless, Judge Hellerstein
additionally held that he did not have authority to consider judicial
Mediators, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
dispute/documents/model standardsconductapril2007.authcheckdam.pdf (last
visited Apr. 8, 2011) (mediators); Code of Professional Responsibility, NAT'L
ACAD. ARB., http://www.naarb.org/code.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011)
(arbitrators); Code of Professional Conduct, AM. INsT. CPAs, http://www.
aicpa.org/Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr.
8, 2011) (accountants).
314. See supra Part II.C (discussion of notice-and-comment rulemaking).
315. Alexander, supra note 5, at 683-84 (ATSA expressly provides that the
special master's decisions on claims to the Fund are not subject to judicial
review); Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 546-47.
316. Alexander, supra note 5, at 683-84.
317. Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
318. Id. at 286, 288, 300-01.
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challenges to Feinberg's awards made pursuant to the Fund
standards. 3 19 Thus, after the court determined the constitutionality
of the standards, claimants had no further recourse in federal court
to challenge Feinberg's administrative awards. 320
Instead, in managing the Fund, Feinberg instituted an internal
hearing process for so-called "Track B" claimants.321 Thus,
claimants who did not wish to accept the offer of a Fund award
could request an individualized hearing before a Fund staff
member and could present particularized information in support of
an increased award.322 The decision of the Fund staff was final,
and a claimant had no further recourse to any judicial or non-
judicial review.3 2 3
In developing plans for the GCCF, Feinberg considered an
appeals process early on, indicating that he intended to provide for
review by appointing three judges to oversee this process.324
During ensuing months, with an appeals process still not in place,
Feinberg modified his earlier pronouncements and indicated that
he would appoint a three-person panel, not necessarily consisting
of judges, but persons of similar professional credentials, such as
law professors or local, knowledgeable wise men.325
The entire GCCF appeals process and the mechanisms for
appellate review are unclear. The protocol for emergency
payments made no provision for appeal of awards.326 Feinberg's
publication of rules for final awards indicate the opportunity for an
327
appeal before a three-person review panel, but implementation
319. Id. at 286.
320. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(b)(3), 115 Stat. 230, 239 (2001) (stating that all decisions reached
by the special master are final and not subject to review); see Steenson & Sayler,
supra note 14, at 546-47.
321. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-17; Feinberg, The Building
Blocks, supra note 9, at 275 ("If you don't like your award that has been
computed by some green eye-shade person, you have the right to appeal
administratively within the program and see the Special Master or his
designee.").
322. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 15-17.
323. Id.
324. See infra note 327 and accompanying text (discussion of Feinberg's
early representation that GCCF claims would involve three-judge appeal
panels).
325. See Hammer, supra note 192 (Feinberg adds limited appeals process for
applicants who dispute interim or final determinations; possibility of appeal to
Coast Guard; Feinberg to select distinguished retired judge or law professor to
appoint several appeal judges).
326. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62.
327. Editorial, supra note 164 (appeal to Coast Guard or three-judge panel).
The representation that Feinberg's decisions would be subject to a three-judge
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of this process has remained vague. There has been no public
disclosure of the creation or identity of Feinberg's panels of three
wise reviewers. However, the guidelines for final settlement
awards permit dissatisfied claimants to reject offered awards and
bring suit in court or seek remediation from the National Pollution
Funds Center.328
The lack of a review mechanism for GCCF awards gained the
attention of the Department of Justice, which urged Feinberg to put
such a mechanism in place. 329 In this vacuum, Feinberg also
endorsed an appeals process through the auspices of the United
States Coast Guard, presumably operating under the authority of
the OPA. To date, the Coast Guard has processed 264 out of 507
appeals and in every case has agreed with the GCCF.
The mechanisms available for review of Fund and GCCF
decisions raise a number of legitimacy questions. To begin, the
Fund did not provide for independent judicial review of awards,
and this made the Fund the ultimate arbiter of its own
compensation decisions. In a similar vein, Coast Guard appellate
review of GCCF awards also does not constitute a judicial review,
and to date the Coast Guard has validated every GCCF decision.
Second, the provision for internal staff review of the Fund and
GCCF awards effectively makes the fund the auditor its own
decisions-a questionable source for independent review. Third,
although the GCCF's webpage indicates that claimants may seek a
panel review of awards, the reality of this avenue for appellate
panel appeared as early as June 17, 2010, on a White House blog reporting
Feinberg's appointment. Lee, supra note 69 (indicating that the facility would
develop standards for recoverable claims that would be published, and that a
panel of three judges would be available to hear appeals of the administrator's
decisions).
328. See GCCF Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 252,
which indicates (in Section V.D and V.E) that a claimant could elect or reject an
interim final payment determination and, as permitted by law, either send a
claim to the National Pollution Funds Center or commence an action in court.
Claims for physical injury or death are not claims under the OPA and therefore
cannot be presented to the National Pollution Funds Center. In addition, if an
interim or final payment is denied, the claimant may either present a claim to the
National Pollution Funds Center or institute a suit in court.
329. Letter from Thomas J. Perrelli, Office of Assoc. Attorney Gen., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, to Kenneth Feinberg (Nov. 19, 2010) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Perrelli Letter]; see also Schwartz, supra note 146; Mr. Feinberg
and the Spill, GULF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY (Nov. 25, 2010), http://www.
gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/press8.php (Feinberg agrees to set up appeals
process).
330. Skoloff, supra note 190; Editorial, supra note 164 (referencing
possibility of appeal to Coast Guard as well as to three-member appeals panel).
880 [Vol. 71
PROMETHE US UNBOUND
review may be illusory. Finally, Feinberg's sweeping declaration
of his authority to appoint judges to review GCCF awards is an
unsettling assertion of power, and Feinberg's subsequent decision
to appoint persons of various, unspecified credentials as appellate
reviewers is equally questionable.
F. Transparency
Feinberg's management of the Fund afforded a relatively high
degree of transparency in the creation and administration of the
Fund.33 1 This transparency was due, in no small measure, to the
fact that Feinberg was answerable to numerous constituencies.
Thus, the Fund was created by federal statute, subject to federal
rulemaking processes, under the jurisdiction of both the Attorney
General of the United States, the Justice Department, and several
congressional committees. Feinberg had a reporting duty to
Congress and was answerable to several influential legislators with
affected constituencies. In addition, the highly public and traumatic
nature of the events giving rise to the creation of the Fund, as well
as the heightened emotional volatility of the claimants, all
converged to impel maximum transparency in the Fund's
implementation.3 3 2
Transparency was manifested in several ways throughout the
administration of the Fund.333 Both the enabling statute authorizing
creation of the Fund and the rulemaking process it triggered were
open and publicly available to any interested person. Feinberg and
his staff read and responded to thousands of comments and
proposals during the rulemaking process 334 and continued to
respond to constituent questions and demands throughout the life
of the Fund.335
The Fund staff created an extensive website with information
and posted data concerning claims processing. 336 Famously,
Feinberg held numerous town meetings in several locations to
331. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 214 ('The Special Master did provide a
degree of transparency on a cumulative basis."); Rooks, supra note 9 ("Despite
its imperfections, the victim compensation fund was a model of economy and
transparency.").
332. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 64-65. In commenting on his
experience in administering the Fund, Feinberg noted the importance of
transparency: "Process. Openness. Sunshine. Sunlight. All very important."
Feinberg, The Building Blocks, supra note 9, at 275.
333. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 475-78.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 14-15 (describing outreach efforts).
8 8120 1 1]
LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
directly respond to prospective claimant's concerns.337 Feinberg's
staff also undertook extensive initiatives to contact every potential
claimant to the Fund, to provide advice and encouragement to
participate in the Fund. 8 Feinberg himself participated in
numerous public appearances and media interviews to explain and
defend the ongoing fund actions. 3 3 9 When the Fund effectively
closed, Feinberg prepared and presented a Final Report to
Congress, setting forth in significant detail the creation,
implementation, and closure of the Fund.340
Although the implementation of the Fund accorded a high
degree of transparency, in other respects the operation of the Fund
was opaque.34 Thus, in making award determinations, Feinberg
relied on the staff analysis and recommendations supplied by the
accounting firm Price Waterhouse. 34 2 Feinberg refused to provide
claimants with the expert reports repared by his office as part of
the claims evaluation process, and therefore claimants were
denied access to critical information concerning how their awards
were determined.34 In addition, claimants were not supplied with
written decisions or a hearing record.345
In contrast to the operation of the Fund, the administration of
the GCCF has been shadowed by multiple public charges of a lack
of transparency as well as delay. 346 The Department of Justice,
cognizant of these charges, contacted Feinberg to request that he
take immediate measures to improve transparency in the
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Diller, supra note 15, at 757-60 (describing Feinberg's outreach efforts,
comparing these to the role of mediator or arbitrator).
340. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4.
341. Id. at 64-65 (balancing transparency and confidentiality concerns).
342. Id.
343. Diller, supra note 15, at 761 (failure to provide expert reports to
claimants is "troubling"); see also id. at 767 ("Because the [award] resolution in
each case occurs in a confidential proceeding that generates no written decision
and is not subject to review, it has no means of filtering back up the system
through a process of oversight or accountability."); Schneider, supra note 19, at
477-78.
344. Diller, supra note 15, at 761, 767.
345. Id. at 761 (suggesting that these omissions may be analogized to
arbitration procedures but critically noting that Fund claimants were not engaged
in arbitration and had not waived their due process rights by electing a remedy
through the Fund).
346. See, e.g., Mui, supra note 163. But see Snyder, supra note 39, which
indicates that as early as August 16, 2010, Feinberg had set aside a "modest
amount," which he did not disclose, to compensate Gulf state realtors, whose
trade association had met with Feinberg the week before. "The realtors have
'suffered a great deal' in lost sales, rent, and commissions, [Feinberg] said."
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implementation of the GCCF.347 Feinberg responded to the Justice
Department, indicating that he would undertake such additional
measures, and defensively argun thathis administration of the
GCCF already was transparent. It is difficult to ascertain what
additional measures Feinberg has pursued, in response to the
Justice Department request, to enhance transparency in his
administration of the GCCF.
On balance, at least some events surrounding administration of
the GCCF have been transparent, similar to the Fund. For
example-and drawing on his Fund experience-Feinberg has
made a number of well-publicized trips throughout the Gulf Coast
region and held a number of "town meetings."3 49 On the other
hand, far from satisfying local potential claimants, many have
objected to the window-dressing nature of such meetings, which
locals characterized as lacking in substance to address their
questions and needs.3 so Similar to the Fund experience, Feinberg's
staff has created and posted an informational website to assist
potential claimants,35' with daily updates supplying claims data.352
Notwithstanding these outward manifestations of transparency,
much information about the creation and the operation of the
GCCF remains opaque. Feinberg's designation and appointment as
the fund's administrator was completely non-transparent. His
selection of staff to run the numerous regional claims
offices-their identities, numbers, credentials, training, and
347. See Perrelli Letter, supra note 329.
348. See Letter from Kenneth R. Feinberg, Adm'r, Gulf Coast Claims
Facility, to The Hon. Thomas J. Perrelli (Nov. 30, 2010) (on file with author);
see also Schwartz, supra note 146 (attorneys critical of general release of all
parties). Feinberg has endorsed the important value of transparency in
accomplishing his work. Feinberg, supra note 7. Thus, in discussing his
administration of the Fund, Feinberg has indicated: "Transparency-giving
people in this case due process . . .- I think was extremely valuable." Id. at 475.
349. See Brian Baxter, Feinberg Talks of Criteria for Gulf Claims, Says
Lawyers Not Needed, AMLAW DAILY (June 21, 2010, 12:38 PM), http://amlaw
daily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/06/ken-feinberg-bp-claims.html (reporting
on Feinberg's self-proclaimed representation that the GCCF process would be a
very transparent process); Snyder, supra note 173 (comparison to Fund
experience in providing transparency and privacy; discussion with House
Judiciary Chairman John Conyers with regard to release of information);
Strassel, supra note 3.
350. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text (various criticisms of
town hall meeting attendees).
351. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 23.
352. GCCF Program Statistics, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILrrY, http://www.
gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/reports (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
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experience-is unknown and unavailable. 353 The process of
developing rules, standards, and guidelines for compensation
awards was accomplished without formal contributions from
interested parties and was largely consummated in private by
Feinberg and his staff, with the selected input from some attorneys,
BP, or other lobbyists on behalf of special interests. 3 54
In addition, although the GCCF website provides data on the
numbers and types of claims processed, it fails to provide any
information specifying the value of individual awards. 355 In
contrast to the Fund and its publicly available compensation grid,
claimants to the GCCF have scant information upon which to make
a reasoned estimate concerning the amounts they might be
expected to receive as an emergency payment or final settlement
award. Information relating to the review of awards has not been
available, nor is there any publicly available information about the
nature and identity of Feinberg's review panels. If three-person
panels have been appointed, there has been no public disclosure of
these entities.
Moreover, Feinberg's interactions with BP officials and
executives have not been transparent, nor has the funding of
Feinberg's firm, the GCCF, experts, other law firms, local
officials, and entities retained by Feinberg.356 The revelation in
early February 2011 that BP had secretly negotiated a $10 million
final settlement with one of BP's business partners, without the
participation of GCCF staffers or Feinberg, raised further questions
about the facility's lack of transparency, particularly regarding
BP's intervention into GCCF decisionmaking. 357 In essence, with
the exception of his town hall meetings, virtually all of Feinberg's
actions have been non-transparent. If any BP or GCCF actions
have been disclosed, they have been so only after-the-fact and as
accomplished reality.3 58
353. See King, supra note 76 (referring to a team of nearly 1,000 clerks and
adjusters processing claims in 33 field offices from Louisiana to Florida).
354. See Urbina, supra note 109 (documenting changes in proposed
protocols for emergency payments as a consequence of lobbying by BP,
plaintiffs' attorneys, and state Attorneys General on behalf of real estate agents).
355. See GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62 (privacy provision).
356. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 477 ("The defendant does not want
transparency. The defendant wants ninety-nine percent of everybody to
participate, but, again, we're counting on the plaintiff lawyer to make sure
everybody is on board."); see also Urbina, supra note 109 (BP's lobbying for
application of the collateral source rule to GCCF payments).
357. Skoloff, supra note 190; see Urbina, supra note 109.
358. Skoloff, supra note 190; Urbina, supra note 109; see also Hammer,
supra note 192.
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A final note about transparency and fund approaches to
resolving mass tort claims: Although the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund was characterized by an unusual level of
public transparency in its creation and implementation, in the final
analysis the Fund experience failed to impart perhaps the most
useful data this experiment could have provided for future claims
resolution.359 Because the statute pushed claimants to an election
of remedies between the Fund and the tort litigation system, the
Fund accidentally created a naturally-occurring empirical
experiment concerning whether claimants would be better off
pursuing remediation through a fund or the tort system.360
As Feinberg repeatedly boasted in the aftermath of the Fund,
only 3% of eligible claimants eschewed the Fund and instead chose
to hire attorneys, file lawsuits, and pursue litigation in federal
court.361 To date, all those claims have been settled; the final
remaining lawsuit arising out of the September 11th events is
scheduled for a jury trial in June 2011.362
Against this statistical backdrop, both the Fund363 and the
federal court overseeing the independent lawsuits have refused to
disclose any information concerning individual awards to
claimants through the Fund or judicial settlement, citing privacy
concerns.364 Although the claimants' privacy concerns are well
grounded, this resulting lack of transparency has impeded the
assessment of the fundamental question whether resolving a claim
through a fund mechanism is preferable to an adjudicated claim in
the legal system. Because of the lack of transparency in disclosing
actual award and settlement amounts, commentators will never be
359. Although Feinberg purports to support the values of transparency, he
apparently believes in only limited transparency. Thus: "On the other hand,
query, can you even get the deal done if the public has a right to know? Or does
that cloud the opportunity to even get the deal done, if I know it's going to be in
the newspapers the next day?" Feinberg, supra note 7, at 478.
360. See Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons
from the World Trade Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315,
1317 (2004) (suggesting that the Fund provided such a natural empirical
experiment).
361. See FEINBERG ETAL., supra note 4, at 1.
362. Colin Moynihan, Timetable Is Set for the Only Civil Trial in a 9/11
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A32.
363. Feinberg, supra note 7, at 477 ("We announced ranges so that the New
York Times couldn't figure out who received what: 'Last week ten people
received a total of twelve million,' and we fudged it all up so that there's some
information available, total amount spent of the taxpayer's money, but not so
much transparency and sunshine so that the New York Times can knock on the
lady's door and print an article the next day.").
364. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 65 (balancing transparency and
confidentiality concerns).
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able to meaningfully evaluate the competing arguments of whether
fund approaches are superior to the litigation system. Nonetheless,
as GCCF administrator, Feinberg persists in urging claimants to
seek compensation through the GCCF as a better means for
resolving their claims.
G. Election of Remedies, Waiver, and Release
The Fund statute famously required that claimants to the Fund
relinquish their rights to pursue relief through litigation in the tort
system.36 5 In the aftermath of the Fund, commentators have
variously debated whether this election of remedies requirement
constituted a benign paternalism on the part of Congress or rather
embodied a stealthy tort reform initiative designed to protect
corporate defendants from thousands of tort claims.366 Without
addressing or resolving this debate, it is sufficient for the purpose
of comparison to simply note that claimants to the Fund had to
elect their remedies.
Several problems arose in the context of the Fund experience
regarding the election of remedies. At first, claimants became
concerned that the mere filing of a potential claim with the Fund
would effectuate election of the Fund remedy and would foreclose
a subsequent decision to pursue litigation.36 Consequently, many
potential claimants delayed filing with the Fund out of fear that the
365. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 405(c)(2)(A)(ii), (3)(B)(ii), 115 Stat. 230, 239-40 (2001). The Fund
compensated only for personal injury and death but required claimants to waive
their right to sue for all damages, including property damages. See Alexander,
supra note 5, at 671-72. In discussing the election of remedies feature of ATSA,
Professor Ackerman has suggested:
Had the Fund simply been an option that the victims and their families
could pursue, it would have been hard to complain about its legal
consequences. Instead, the Act forced victims and their families to
choose between the Fund and what appeared to be a whittled down tort
remedy, thereby adding strength to arguments that the Fund was
inadequate in substance or deficient in procedural protections.
Ackerman, supra note 8, at 183.
366. See Alexander, supra note 5, at 672 ("Waiver of tort claims was an
essential part of the statutory purpose of protecting the airlines from massive tort
liability... . [T]he necessity of shielding the airlines from tort liability in excess
of their insurance coverage was deemed more important than preserving
victims' right to sue.").
367. See In re Sept. I Ith Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2003 WL 23145579
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003) (mere filing of a preliminary application with the
Fund would not constitute an election of remedies or a defense to a claimant's
right to proceed with litigation).
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decision might preclude the ability to file a lawsuit.3 68 To deal with
this problem, Feinberg announced that the mere filing of a claim
with the Fund would not preclude a subsequent decision to
abandon the Fund claim.369
Instead, Feinberg developed a standard by which a Fund award
would have to be "substantially complete" in order to trigger the
exclusive remedy provision. In this fashion, claimants could
decide whether to elect the fund remedy, armed with particularized
information concerning the amount of their award. In accepting
and finalizing an award, claimants released any and all claims for
future compensation as a consequence of the events surrounding
the September 11th disaster.37 1
In addition, the Fund's election of remedies provision also
raised statute of limitations problems for Feinberg. Relying on
state law statutes of limitation, 372 Feinberg discovered that some
local statutes of limitations might expire before potential Fund
claimants could decide whether to file a claim with the Fund or
with relevant jurisdictions.373 To avoid the possibility that some
claimants might elect judicial remedies in the face of expiring
statutes of limitations, Feinberg sought judicial relief from such
statutes in order to encourage claimants to participate in the Fund
rather than pursue litigation.
In administering the GCCF, Feinberg from the outset made
clear that the GCCF would operate in the same fashion as the Fund
and re~quire claimants to waive their rights to litigate in the judicial
arena.375 In promoting the GCCF, Feinberg repeatedly has urged
claimants to participate in the fund and to forego filing lawsuits in
368. Id.
369. Id. at *2.
370. Id.
371. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 85 ("The Act provides that '[u]pon
submission of a claim to the Fund, a claimant waives the right to file a civil
action (or to be a party to the action) in any Federal or State court for damages
sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September I1th,
2001."'); see Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-42, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001).
372. See, e.g., In re Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2004 WL
1320897 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004) (statute of limitations decision); In re
September 11th Litig., 2003 WL 23145579 (same).
373. See supra note 372; see also Schneider, supra note 19, at 475-76, 480-
84 (discussion of problem of statutes of limitation and approaches taken in Fund
and litigation).
374. See supra note 373.
375. See Lavis, supra note 13 (Feinberg implying that claimants will be
required to give up their rights to sue to receive full compensation).
8872011]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the courts,376 much to the irritation of the plaintiffs' bar.377
However, a Gulf Coast claimant's waiver of the right to litigate
does not apply to emergency payments in the first phase of the
GCCF 3 7 8 the waiver is a requirement of a final settlement
award.
The GCCF has published a sanle of the waiver and release
form for final settlement of claims. 0 The GCCF waiver is more
far-reaching and extensive than the release used in the Fund; the
GCCF release extends to any and all claims arising out of the
Deepwater Horizon explosion, spill, and consequent
contamination. 3 8 1 Public reports have suggested that BP had a hand
in drafting and reviewing the nature and scope of the GCCF
release,382 thereby contradicting assertions that BP has played no
role in the GCCF's administration.
Although the GCCF release has not yet been subjected to
judicial scrutiny, the release would seem to apply to waive claims
under an expansive array of statutory and common law causes of
action.383 In addition, the GCCF release includes an Attachment A
listing an astonishing number of corporate entities, individuals, and
business associations who are released from liability, in addition to
BP.384 As in yet another problem relating to the lack of
transparency in implementation of the GCCF, this long list of
376. See, e.g., Strassel, supra note 3 (Feinberg's urging potential claimants to
sign up with the GCCF riles tort-law community; tort bar and state Attorneys
General raise very legitimate policy issues about releasing BP from liability
before all damage from the spill is known).
377. Id.
378. See Urbina, supra note 109 (discussion of BP's involvement with
drafting the settlement waiver and release as early as August 20, 2010).
379. See Dionne Searcey, Want Part of the BP Fund? Better Be Prepared to
Drop Claims, WSJ BLOGS (Aug. 20, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/
2010/08/20/want-part-of-the-bp-fund-better-be-prepared-to-drop-claims/ (oil
spill victims compensated from the fund will have to waive all legal claims
against not only BP but other defendants such as rig-owner Transocean; critics
howl about how other companies besides BP can be shielded from suit when
they are not contributing to the fund).
380. See GCCF Sample Release and Covenant Not to Sue, GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILYTY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/sample release.pdf
(last visited Mar. 19, 2011); see also Hammer, supra note 192 (harsh criticism
of proposed release); Walsh, supra note 150 (attorney criticisms of release).
381. See supra note 380.
382. Fisher & Hawkins, supra note 278 (reporting that Feinberg asked BP to
draft releases that exempt BP from any future liability for the spill but not to
include other defendants); see Urbina, supra note 109.
383. See Sample Release and Covenant Not to Sue, supra note 380
(Attachment A).
384. See Urbina, supra note 109 (reporting on extensive scope of defendants'
waiver and release of claims in future litigation).
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released entities raises questions concerning why non-parties to the
GCCF are included in the release, as well as how these entities
came to be included.
Feinberg has yet to address the intersection of federal and local
statutes of limitations on various causes of action with the GCCF's
final deadlines for filing a final settlement claim with the facility.
In addition, the facility's website seems to suggest that claimants
may withdraw their claims at any time from the GCCF facility and
seek a remedy in the judicial system. 385
H. The Future Claimant Problem
Both the Fund and the GCCF have implicated issues relating to
future claimants: that is, persons exposed to toxic substances who
have not yet manifested injury but may do so in the future. The
resolution of future claims has been a central problem in resolving
mass tort litigation. 3 86 Generally, defendants involved in mass tort
litigation desire "global peace" or the complete resolution of all
current and potential future claims that might be asserted against
them. 8 The estimation and valuation of future claims,
representation for future claimants, and waiver issues have
complicated the resolution of many latent injury mass torts. 388
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund made no
provision for future claimants. 389 Hence, the only claimants
eligible to pursue relief through the Fund consisted of the legal
representatives of people who died or were injured in the 24-hour
period after the Twin Towers were struck 390 or within 96 hours
after the crashes for rescue workers who assisted in efforts to
search for and recover victims,39 1 including victims at the
Pennsylvania and Pentagon sites. Moreover, for the most part, the
Fund compensated eligible claimants only for physical injury and
385. See GCCF Protocol for Interim and Final Claims, supra note 252
(Section V.D and V.E).
386. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Future Claims in Mass Tort Cases:
Deterrence, Compensation, and Necessity, 88 VA. L. REV. (2002); Rabin,
Indeterminate Future Harm, supra note 15, at 1861-65 (surveying case law on
latent injury claims).
387. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
388. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
389. Alexander, supra note 5, at 684-85; Eggen, supra note 15, at 415-16;
Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm, supra note 15, at 1850-53.
390. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg.
11,242 (Mar. 13, 2002); Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm, supra note 15, at
1850-53.
391. 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(b) (2010).
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death; the Fund did not compensate for claims of psychological
injury or trauma.392 The Fund also made no provision for the future
claims of first responders to the disasters or persons who worked at
the disaster sites during the extensive cleanup operations
afterwards.
After closure of the Fund, various individuals came forward
with classic latent injury claims, chiefly consisting of an array of
respiratory impairments alleged as a consequence of exposure to
the toxic soup of substances generated when the Twin Towers
collapsed and in the months of ensuing site cleanup. Included
among these claimants were first responders, construction workers,
and individuals who were present in lower Manhattan on
September 11th.394
Several commentators criticized the Fund for its failure to
address the future claimant problem,39 5 and the increasing public
demands of various affected constituent groups eventually caused
Congress to address these claims through legislation enacted in
December 2010.396 Similar to the stated rationale for the original
Fund, the 2010 legislation was predicated on the unique events that
gave rise to September 11th calamity, coupled with the stated need
for a national response to the claims of these affected parties. 397
The GCCF also has not addressed the issue of future claimants
and how future claimants either may be compensated for latent
injuries or precluded from seeking recovery for latent injuries
because of a waiver and release in a final settlement through the
GCCF.398 Many Gulf Coast workers-especially fisherman and
392. Alexander, supra note 5, at 685 ("There may be other types of injuries
that should be compensated as well-people who were held hostage but not
physically injured, or persons who were not physically injured but suffered
emotional trauma."); Eggen, supra note 15, at 415-16.
393. Alexander, supra note 5, at 685; Rabin, supra note 15, at 1850-53.
394. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 357,
360 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Eggen, supra note 15, at 417. See generally
Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm, supra note 15.
395. Alexander, supra note 5, at 685; Eggen, supra note 15, at 453-59
(proposing alternative options to address the concerns of victims exposed to
toxic substances and dust in similar scenarios to the September 1Ith events).
396. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (2011) (providing medical monitoring and treatment to
responders, residents, building occupants, and area workers who were directly
impacted and adversely affected by the September 11th attacks); see also Eggen,
supra note 15, at 457 (possible legislation to compensate persons exposed to
toxic substances).
397. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, 124 Stat.
3623.
398. See Cooper, supra note 25 (noting long-term effects of spill might be
much worse than anticipated, creating problems in the future); Robertson, supra
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boat owners who were idled after the oil spill---were hired by BP
to assist in various cleanup efforts in the Gulf waters and on
land.399 During the cleanup, numerous media stories documented
insufficient health and protective measures afforded many cleanup
workers. 400 Similar to the claims by September 1 Ith first
responders and construction workers, many Gulf Coast cleanup
workers complained that they were not supplied with sufficient
respirator equipment and other protective gear to insulate against
toxic fumes and substances. 40 1
Consequently, it is entirely possible that some Gulf Coast
claimants who file claims with the GCCF for property and business
loss compensation may subsequently manifest future illnesses or
disease from exposure to toxic substances because of these
claimants' participation in the cleanup efforts. In seeking a final
settlement of their claims, GCCF participants are required to sign
an all-encompassing waiver and release which presumably
embraces any future personal injury claims. 42 Hence, participation
in a final settlement with the GCCF may preclude these claimants
from subsequently seeking further recovery.
Gulf Coast claimants, then, are put to a hard choice, as is
always the problem with latent injury mass torts. Claimants must
choose between accepting current compensation and waiving
future recovery or declining immediate payment and preserving the
right to pursue relief for future manifestation of injury. Because
potential Gulf Coast claimants must file with the GCCF before
August 2013, many may not have manifested any latent injury or
know the extent of their damages before this deadline. Hence many
claimants in desperate need for immediate compensation may
note 67 (skeptical crowd at bingo hall expresses concern over August 2013
deadline for final settlement of claims; deadline may fall before true extent of
damage is known); Schwartz, supra note 162 (Feinberg indicating he plans to
work with experts to project long-term effects, but noting that most people will
accept lump-sum payment once it is offered).
399. Fisher & Hawkins, supra note 278 (commenting on potential future
claimants).
400. See Dionne Searcey, Round Two of BP Litigation: The Clean-Up Suits
Begin, WSJ BLOGS (July 20, 2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/07/20/round-
two-of-bp-litigation-the-clean-up-suits-begin/ (state suit seeking medical monitoring
for volunteers and workers).
401. Id. (noting lack of proper gear and respirators for cleanup workers).
402. See, e.g., Strassel, supra note 3 (Feinberg's urging potential claimants to
sign up with the GCCF riles tort-law community; tort bar and state Attorneys
General raise very legitimate policy issues about releasing BP from liability
before all damage from the spill is known).
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forego relief for future claims, while others may opt out of thed403process and sue.
Finally, the problem of future latent injury relief is further
complicated by notice and due process issues. 404 It is entirely
unclear the extent to which GCCF claimants are advised, either by
GCCF staffers or by independent attorneys, of the potential waiver
of their claims for future latent injury if they seek final settlement
of their current claims. The GCCF website is unclear on this
issue, 40 and to date, many Gulf Coast claimants have not received
independent counsel in seeking interim emergency relief.406 Again,
lack of transparency frustrates efforts to determine whether
adequate due process measures are in place to educate Gulf Coast
claimants to the full consequences of their election of remedies
through the GCCF and the possible forfeiture of future latent injury
claims.
I. Applicable Law
The September 11th events as well as the Deepwater Horizon
explosion and Gulf oil spill involved claimants from multiple
jurisdictions. Consequently, both incidents implicated complicated
questions relating to the law that might apply to the victims'
subsequent claims. The Fund provided one template for dealing
with choice-of-law issues. 407 And, to a somewhat similar extent, in
administering the GCCF, Feinberg has loosely followed the
choice-of-law decisions he applied in managing the Fund. On the
other hand, applicable law problems relating to the Gulf oil spill
are much more complicated than for the Fund, and to date, these
applicable law problems have not been resolved with any
consistent approach.
403. Robertson, supra note 67 (claimants may opt out and sue due to
uncertain nature of extent of damage).
404. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
405. See Information Regarding Free Legal Assistance, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILYTY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/legalassistance (last visited
Mar. 19, 2011).
406. Dionne Searcey, Oil-Spill Claims Get Fast Track, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13,
2010, at A2 (Feinberg to announce that "anyone who wants a lawyer to help them
sort through new options can have one for free"; "Feinberg plans to hire a firm to
offer free legal services"); Dominic Massa, Feinberg Hires Gulf Coast Law Firms
to Assist BP Claims Process, WWLTV (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.wwltv.
com/news/local/Feinberg-hires-Gulf-Coast-law-firms-to-assist-BP-claims-process-
112554284.html.
407. See Eggen, supra note 15, at 440-43 (citing Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230,
241 (2001)).
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The statute authorizing creation of the Fund embodied two
different approaches to the choice-of-law problems inherent in the
September 11th events, with one choice-of-law regime for persons
who elected compensation through the Fund and another for
claimants who elected to seek relief through litigation in the court
408
system. Persons who died or were injured in the World Trade
Center Towers, the Pentagon, or the United Airlines crash in
Pennsylvania came from a number of different states and
countries. 409 A large number of victims who died in the World
Trade Center building collapses came from the New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut metropolitan area.4 10 Similarly, victims of
the Pentagon attack were concentrated in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area, embracing claimants from Virginia, Maryland,
and the District of Columbia.
In administering the Fund, then, Feinberg conceivably faced
the resolution of personal injury and wrongful death claims
pursuant to the laws of many jurisdictions. 4 1 1 The Fund enabling
legislation did not mandate any choice-of-law principles to guide
Feinberg's implementation of the Fund.412 Because the overriding
purpose of the Fund was to remove victims' claims from the tort
litigation system and provide expeditious resolution, it made no
sense to complicate the administration of the Fund by the
application of different legal standards depending on where
claimants were from or the happenstance of their presence at a
particular disaster site. Therefore, Feinberg was given relatively
free rein to design a compensation model without being tethered to
any state's legal principles.
During Feinberg's administration of the Fund, commentators
and claimants frequently raised the issue of what law would apply
to resolve various issues relating to the design and implementation
of the Fund,4 13 including but not limited to eligibility criteria,
statutes of limitation, 4 14 claim valuation, collateral sources, and
award allocation among competing claimants. In response to these
various challenges, Feinberg responded that he would be guided
408. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(2),
115 Stat. at 241; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-13.
409. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-2, 54-55.
410. Id. at 55; Alexander, supra note 5, at 630 n.7; Eggen, supra note 15, at
387-89.
411. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 5, at 63-67 (describing the varying
states' laws relating to the status of unmarried and same-sex couples).
412. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(1),
115 Stat. at 240-41; FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 3-4.
413. See Schneider, supra note 19, at 480-84 (statutes of limitation issues).
414. Id.
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by, but not bound by, state law principles.415 In some
instances-for example with regard to award allocation
issues--Feinberg refused to resolve the problem at all but instead
admonished Fund recipients to litigate such disputes in state court
pursuant to state legal standards. 4 1
During the course of Fund proceedings, Feinberg never clearly
indicated which states' laws he relied on in making his various
decisions affecting the Fund's standards and administration.417 In
the end, in an exercise not unlike the creation of federal common
law, Feinberg essentially created his own common law standards to
govern implementation of the Fund, based loosely on unidentified
principles and precedents.4 18
The Fund's enabling statute more clearly resolved the
applicable law issue for those persons who chose litigation in the
court system.419 Hence, the enabling statute mandated that any
lawsuits arising out of the September 11th events were required to
be brought in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York 4 20 and further mandated that applicable law would be
the law of the state in which the crash occurred, unless it was
inconsistent with or preempted by federal law.42' Although
providing clarity to prospective claimants, the statutory limitation
of litigants' choice of venue and law also cabined conventional
litigation strategy and served as an additional deterrent to electing
415. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 9, at 22 (referring to the fact that in
calculating economic loss he vaguely would look to general principles of state
tort law: "That is simply tort law, a surrogate for what juries in St. Louis do
every day.").
416. For example, Feinberg refused to decide allocation issues among
contending family members, instead telling them that they would have to resolve
such disputes in state court. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 56-57.
417. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 5, at 75-76 (noting that the availability
of survival damages differs among states); Conk, supra note 24, at 186 ("Rather
there was a sense of rough equity, informed by tort and by legislative reference
points . . . ."); Walker, supra note 15, at 602-03 (describing how Feinberg
departed from state law in defining who was an eligible personal representative
to receive an award from the fund: "Unlike the states, the Fund combined the
roles of the Personal Representative and beneficiary.").
418. See Chamallas, supra note 5, at 59.
419. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No.
107-42, § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001); see Alexander, supra note 5, at
673-74; Eggen, supra note 15, at 440-43; Kreindler & Alexander, supra note
267.
420. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 408(b)(2), 115
Stat. at 241.
421. Id.; see also Eggen, supra note 15, at 440-43.
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the litigation option.422 Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the
lawsuits of the claimants who elected the litigation option were
consolidated in the Southern District of New York, subject to the
case management of Judge Alvin Hellerstein under New York
law. 423
In contrast, the GCCF was created pursuant to only vague and
ambiguous statutory authority under the OPA--questionably if at
all-and therefore which federal or state legal rules apply in the
administration of the GCCF fund has been equally murky.424
Relying on a page from his Fund playbook, however, Feinberg has
indicated in media interviews that the standards and criteria
governing implementation of the GCCF would be derived with
reference to state law.425 The protocol for emergency advance
payments merely stated that the GCCF would evaluate all claims
"guided by applicable law."42 6 And, similar to his administration of
the Fund, Feinberg has not yet clarified what state law, if any, he is
applying in his administration of the GCCF.
The applicable law problem in the context of the Gulf Coast
disaster, moreover, is much more complicated than the legal
landscape presented by the September 1Ith events. Unlike the
September 11th claims, no statute determines applicable law for
those Gulf Coast claimants who elect litigation remedies, and
therefore applicable law in the litigated cases will be determined
by an MDL court presiding over the consolidated lawsuits.427
Moreover, the Gulf Coast disaster implicates a broader array of
possible federal and state statutory claims, including claims under
422. See Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 24-26, 29 (analyzing how ATSA
served as a deterrent to litigation).
423. See Conk, supra note 24, at 188-89 (describing array of September 11th
cases assigned to Judge Hellerstein).
424. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62.
425. See Baxter, supra note 349 (citing his 9/11 experience, stating that he
would look to state law where a claimant lives to determine applicable law);
King, supra note 76 (indicating that Feinberg stated that he would turn to state
law for guidance on which types of claims to honor and which to dismiss);
Fifield, supra note 144 (citing September 1Ith experience; indicating that
Feinberg would look to state law to recognize claims; commenting on how he
might deal with different states' laws); Fisher & Hawkins, supra note 278
(Feinberg indicating he plans to rely on state tort principles); see, e.g., King,
supra note 107 (Feinberg suggesting that deductions for BP cleanup payments
were not unusual under state law); Strassel, supra note 3 (suggesting that payout
rules would be broadly based on federal oil-spill law and Gulf state tort law).
426. GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, supra note 62.
427. The MDL court determines applicable law for the cases transferred and
consolidated before it. See, e.g., Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.
1993); In re Lou Levy & Sons Fashions, Inc., 988 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1993).
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428 42as9h ons 3the OPA, secuities 3ws,4 the Jones Act, 430 varous federal
environmental statutes,431 general maritime law, as well as state
common law causes of action.4 3 2
The breadth of potential bases for recovery in the Gulf Coast
disaster, then, has bearing on a claimant's evaluation of the
election of remedies. Unlike the Fund, which involved only
personal injury and death claims, Gulf Coast victims conceivably
have multiple theories of recovery for an assortment of personal,
property, business, contract, tort, and environmental injuries.
Several securities lawsuits also have been filed as a consequence of
the BP disaster.433 There are compelling reasons, then, why Gulf
Coast claimants might sensibly choose to litigate their claims
rather than seek an award from the GCCF.434
428. Feinberg sought the expert advice of Professor John C.P. Goldberg
concerning limitations of recovery under the OPA and parallel state laws. See
John C.P. Goldberg, Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the
Deepwater Horizon Spill 3, 48 (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://dash.
harvard.edu/handle/1/4595438. Professor Goldberg concluded that under the
OPA and parallel state laws, only some economic losses were recoverable from
those responsible for the spill. Id. at 48. Thus, to recover under the OPA for
economic losses caused by the spill, a claimant must establish that his or her loss
was due to damage of loss of property or resources, which damage or loss
prevents the claimant from exercising the right to put that property or those
resources to commercial use. Id. But see Walsh, supra note 150 (noting that
hotel groups might attempt to "sue BP rather than go through the claims
process," but that Feinberg believed they "[would not] have much luck," relying
on the expert opinion of Professor John C.P. Goldberg of Harvard Law School
regarding applicable law).
429. See In re BP, PLC Sec. Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2010 WL 5343465
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2010); Fisher & Hawkins, supra note 278 (commenting on
securities cases).
430. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (Supp. 2009); see Christopher Bauer, Injured
Deepwater Horizon Oil Rig Workers and Widow File Jones Act Personal Injury
and Wrongful Death Lawsuit Against BP in Galveston, LEXISNEXIS COMMUNITIES
(May 6, 2010), http://www.lexisnexis.com/Community/emerging issues/blogs/
gulf oilspill/archive/2010/05/06/injured-deepwater-horizon-oil-rig-workers-and-
widow-file-jones-act-personal-injury-and-wrongful-death-lawsuit-against-bp-in-
galveston.aspx.
431. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(2006).
432. See Paul H. Rubin, A Gulf Spill Tort Primer, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2010,
at Al 1 (analyzing possibly applicable tort law; arguing little justification for
limiting economic or punitive damages).
433. In re BP, PLC Sec. Litig., 2010 WL 5343465; Fisher & Hawkins, supra
note 278 (securities cases).
434. But see Walsh, supra note 150 (noting that hotel groups might attempt
to sue BP rather than go through the claims process, but that Feinberg believed
they would not have much luck, relying on the expert opinion of Professor John
C.P. Goldberg of Harvard Law School regarding applicable law).
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Finally, the embedded applicable law problems in relation to
the GCCF raise important questions concerning the adequacy of
notice that GCCF claimants receive about applicable law in
making an informed decision about their election of remedies, as
well as implications in agreeing to a comprehensive release upon a
GCCF final settlement.
J. Assistance of Counsel
A much-noted and admired attribute of the Fund was the
reaction of the plaintiffs' bar to the September 11th events. 435 In
the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the leading organization of
the plaintiffs' bar, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America
(ATLA), notified its membership and requested that plaintiffs'
attorneys not exploit the tragic events as an opportunity to solicit
potential clients. 3 One day after the disaster, ATLA issued a call
for a moratorium on all lawsuits.437 This organizational self-
restraint by ATLA stood in marked contrast to the reaction of the
plaintiffs' bar in the aftermath of the mass toxic disaster at the
Union Carbide plant in India,438 when hundreds of American
lawyers descended on the scene in an attempt to retain as many
clients as possible-which solicitation brought considerable
worldwide disrepute on the American bar. 439
Not only did ATLA immediately counsel restraint among its
membership after September 11th, but ATLA also sponsored an
enormous effort to organize the voluntary participation of hundreds
of attorneys in providing legal assistance to claimants who wished
to pursue compensation through the Fund.440 ATLA incorporated
the "Trial Lawyers Care" (TLC) program to provide pro bono
435. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 70-73.
436. Peck, supra note 8, at 214-25.
437. Id. at 214; see also Carrie Johnson, Lawyers Group Wants Moratorium
on Attack Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2001, at E3; Abdon M. Pallasch, For
Once, Lawyers Reluctant to Sue: Victims' Relatives Seek Legal Action, but
Moratorium Urged, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 17, 2001, at 22. Robert Peck notes
that the moratorium held for a long time and was only breached by a handful of
lawsuits. See Peck, supra note 8, at 215.
438. See generally DAVID WEIR, THE BHOPAL SYNDROME: PESTICIDES,
ENVIRONMENT, AND HEALTH (1987).
439. See David T. Austern, Is Lawyer Solicitation ofBhopal Clients Ethical?,
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 21, 1985, at 16; Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 317, 322 (1986) (California trial lawyers vote to censure attorneys who
solicited clients in the wake of the Bhopal disaster).
440. Peck, supra note 8, at 225-26.
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representation to victims before the Fund."' The TLC opened
offices in New York and trained hundreds of volunteer attorneys to
*442
represent victims.
Feinberg welcomed the participation of these voluntary
attorneys, who assisted any claimant who desired an attorney to
help prepare the paperwork necessary in filing a claim.4 3 From the
outset of his efforts, Feinberg widely publicized the availability of
free counsel to any potential Fund -claimant who desired an
attorney. Feinberg stressed the fact that no potential claimant
would go without counsel if they desired an attorney.4 " Feinberg's
Final Report to Congress documented the thousands of hours of
pro bono work performed by voluntary attorneys in assisting Fund
claimants.445 In addition to the ATLA attorneys, Feinberg worked
pro bono and also contributed the assistance of the attorneys at his
firm, which recouped only its expenses in implementing the
Fund." 6
Apart from the attorneys who acted pro bono on behalf of
claimants, at least some plaintiffs' attorneys undertook
representation of claimants who rejected compensation through the
Fund and instead decided to pursue litigation. The role of the
assistance of counsel, as well as the outcomes in the litigated cases,
is discussed below. However, it is significant to note that, for the
most part, the plaintiffs' bar eschewed a campaign to discourage
victims from pursing relief through the Fund. Very few plaintiffs'
attorneys attempted to dissuade claimants from filing with the
Fund, or attempted to persuade claimants to file lawsuits in the
* * * * 447
civil justice system instead.
441. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 71; Peck, supra note 8, at 225; see
also Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 548-49.
442. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
443. But see Diller, supra note 15, at 762-65, which analyzes the role of pro
bono and non-pro bono attorneys in assisting claimants in the Fund, critically
suggesting that Feinberg's controversial role in administering the Fund created a
"market for expertise" in the operation of the Fund, which benefitted some
claimants but not others. In addition, Diller critically notes that attorneys with
personal relationships to Feinberg were able to trade on those connections
favorably for the persons they represented. See also Schneider, supra note 19, at
477 (Feinberg's unbridled discretion lead to perceptions of unfairness: "It leads
to a sense that he will make individualized 'deals,' and indeed, he does. Lawyers
can claim to trade on 'insider' access to, or contact with, him.").
444. But see Schneider, supra note 19, at 479 (suggesting that the Fund's
processes actually were very complex and intimidating, requiring not only
lawyers to assist them, but also economists in many cases).
445. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 71.
446. Id.
447. See supra notes 435-36 and accompanying text (discussion of plaintiffs'
attorneys' role in aftermath of September 11th events).
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The Deepwater Horizon explosion presents a striking contrast
regarding the role of attorneys in pursuing relief for the victims of
the Gulf Coast disaster. First, the organized plaintiffs' bar did not
issue any communiqu6 counseling restraint in the aftermath of the
oil spill events, similar to ATLA's public pronouncement after
September 11th. Second, the plaintiffs' bar did not organize to
provide voluntary, pro bono assistance to any claimant requesting
legal advice in navigating the requirements to seek emergency or
final awards in the GCCF. And third, the plaintiff's bar has, since
June 2010, publicly protested various actions by the GCCF and
Feinberg in implementing the facility.
In addition, in the early days of the GCCF, Feinberg publically
stated that claimants would not need lawyers to help them navigate
the claims process44 9 and consistently has urged potential claimants
to seek awards from the GCCF.4 o In response to Feinberg's
seeming discouragement of retaining counsel, and in contrast to the
Fund experience, many plaintiffs' attorneys have publicly
advocated that Gulf Coast victims not seek relief through the
GCCF.45 1 In addition, as discussed above, attorneys involved in the
448. See Dionne Searcey, The Gulf Oil Spill: BP Claims Pool Is Frustrating
Lawyers, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2010, at A8; Pacenti, supra note 139 (various
complaints about Feinberg); cf Editorial, Mr. Feinberg and the Gulf Settlement,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, at Al8, available at http://nytimes.com/2010/08/30/
opinion/30monl.html (critical of private attorneys' actions as against the
GCCF); Gulf Claims Pihata, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2010, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 2 74870 4 2 4 3 9 04 5 7 5 6 3 10102341554
00.html (plaintiffs' attorneys' criticism of Feinberg and his administration of the
GCCF).
449. Baxter, supra note 349 (Feinberg indicating that "this will be a very
transparent process where you will walk into one of numerous offices strewn
throughout the gulf, file a claim, even electronically online if you want, and we
will immediately be able to process that claim."); BP Fund Will Be Generous,
supra note 7 (Feinberg indicating it would not be necessary to hire an attorney
because his office will have attorneys on staff to provide free legal services).
450. Schwartz, supra note 162 (reporting Feinberg's urging claimants to sign
up: "It's my opinion you are crazy if you don't participate."; discouraging
potential claimants from litigation because of years of uncertainty in the courts
and "big cut for the lawyers"); see also BP Creates Special Team, supra note 64
(reporting that BP was encouraging businesses to contact their adjuster or BP to
process claims); Strassel, supra note 3 (Feinberg stating that the overall message
is this: "If we're not going to pay, nobody's going to pay. That's my philosophy
on this thing."); Robertson & Schwartz, supra note 113 (Feinberg announcing
that lawyers around the country can play an important role in the GCCF by
helping claimants package their claims).
451. See Amanda Bronstad, Plaintifs Lawyers Say Oil Spill Fund Unlikely to
Deter Litigation, LAW.COM (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.
jsp?id=1202471227241&Plaintiffs LawyersSayOilSpillFundUnlikelyto
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parallel Gulf Coast multidistrict litigation successfully enjoined
Feinberg from advocating that victims of the Gulf Coast oil spill
seek relief exclusively through the GCCF.452 No similar efforts
were made to enjoin Feinberg in his administration of the Fund.
Building on his experience in administering the Fund, Feinberg
has made several efforts to enlist the assistance of voluntary
attorneys to assist claimants who wish to file with the GCCF.4
Unlike the Fund experience, though, few attorneys have been
enlisted to supply pro bono legal assistance to Gulf claimants.454
Against the backdrop of this failure, Feinberg has made repeated
public announcements that the GCCF would provide counsel to
any person needing legal assistance.4 55 It is uncertain the extent to
which this promise has been fulfilled,456 and media reports indicate
that many claimants have filed for benefits without the assistance
of counsel, because many victims cannot afford to hire an attorney,
and the GCCF has not made counsel available to them.457 In late
Fall 2010, Feinberg announced that the GCCF would be retaining
the assistance of several private law firms to assist claimants,
Deter Litigation (describing plaintiffs' attorneys' views on the GCCF versus the
litigation option).
452. Order and Reasons, supra note 275 (granting plaintiffs' motion to
supervise ex parte communications with putative class); see Hals, supra note
275; Schwartz, supra note 275; Skoloff& Weber, supra note 275.
453. See Hammer, supra note 192 (Feinberg's desire for network of national
attorneys to assist claimants).
454. Id. (Feinberg stating that "national legal organizations have not stepped
up to the plate").
455. BP Fund Will Be Generous, supra note 7 (Feinberg indicating it would
not be necessary to hire an attorney because his office will have attorneys on
staff to provide free legal services); see also Schwartz, supra note 191 (reporting
that Feinberg's team would make free legal advice available and would add staff
at local centers for the fund to help people fill out their forms for final claims).
456. See Gulf Coast Claims Facility Announces Next Phase of the
Compensation Program for Victims of the BP Oil Spill, GULF COAST CLAIMS
FACILITY (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/pressB.php
[hereinafter Next Phase] (announcing program for free legal assistance would be
made available soon and made available to any claimant seeking help).
457. See David Hammer, Most BP Oil Spill Claimants Opt for One-Time
'Quick Payment,' NOLA.COM (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-
oil-spilVindex.ssf/201 1/01/mostbp oilspill claimants_op.html (fewer than 3%
of those filing claims had attorneys); Moira Herbst, BP Claims Process Enters
New, Uncertain Phase, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/02/10/us-oilspill-feinberg-idUSTRE71933X20110210 (same);
Tracy X. Miguel, Naples Business Owner Says She'll Have to Live in Truck
After BP Denies Her Claim, NAPLESNEWS.COM (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.
naplesnews.com/news/2010/dec/14/naples-business-live-truck-bp-denies-claim-
candi/.
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presumably on a paid basis. However, the details of these
arrangements with private firms to supply assistance of counsel to
claimants have not been publicly disclosed, signifying yet another
aspect of GCCF administration that is lacking in transparency. 458
One of the major factors justifying the September 1Ith Victim
Compensation Fund as a preferable means for resolving mass tort
claims was the fact that a claimant's compensation would not be
diminished by a sizeable attorney-fee award.459 This rationale
justifying the preference for a fund solution to mass disaster
remediation has been undermined by developments in the GCCF.
Thus, in late January 2011, several plaintiffs' attorneys in the Gulf
region broke ranks with the MDL plaintiffs' attorneys and changed
course, publicly urging Gulf Coast claimants to seek compensation
through the GCCF.
These attorneys have indicated their willingness to represent
residents and businesses in seeking GCCF awards based on
contingent fee arrangements for this representation.41 This has
pitted one segment of the plaintiffs' bar against the MDL
attorneys. And, in contrast to the Fund where plaintiffs' attorneys
worked pro bono and did not charge the claimants fees for
assistance with making a Fund claim, the Gulf attorneys
undertaking representation for GCCF awards will charge a
percentage of a claimants' recovery from their GCCF award.
Hence, at least one major justification for the superiority of fund
resolution of claims is not present for the GCCF claimants who
elect such representation.
K The Litigation Option
Although 97% of eligible claimants elected compensation
relief through the Fund, 3% of claimants retained private counsel
458. See Next Phase, supra note 456.
459. Diller, supra note 15, at 764; Steenson & Sayler, supra note 14, at 937-
38; see also September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274, 66,280 (Dec. 21, 2001) (indicating that contingency fee arrangements
for attorneys representing claimants before the Fund, "exceeding 5% of a
claimant's recovery from the Fund would not be in the best interest of the
claimants").
460. Dionne Searcey, Oil-Spill Lawyers Urge Clients to Settle, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870339920457
6108383134596432.html (group of lawyers redirect dozens of claimants to BP
Fund).
461. Id.; Dionne Searcey, Alliance of Lawyers to Feinberg: We'll Take It,
WSJ BLOGS (Jan. 28, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/
28/alliance-of-lawyers-to-feinberg-well-take-it/.
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462
and pursued litigation arising out of the September 1Ith events.
In all, 95 suits were filed, seeking recoveries for 96 claimants. The
suits were filed in the Southern District of New York and were
consolidated before Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein. 4 6 3 Seventy-six of
these cases ultimately settled; only one unresolved September 1Ith
lawsuit remains and is scheduled go to trial in June 2011.464
Thirteen lawsuits settled quickly,465 and the remaining 82 cases
were settled through the auspices of experienced mass tort litigator
Sheila Birnbaum, who Judge Hellerstein appointed to serve as a
mediator to resolve these remaining suits. 66 In order to spur
settlement of the lawsuits, Judge Hellerstein ordered bifurcated
bellwether trials.467
In his administration of the September 11th cases, Judge
Hellerstein kept a fairly tight rein over the advocacy efforts of the
plaintiffs' lawyers. In concert with Feinberg, and as a condition of
continuing litigation, Judge Hellerstein required that all individual
plaintiffs discuss with their attorneys the alternative remedy in the
Fund and to weigh the risks and transaction costs of proceeding in
the litigation process.468
The victims who elected the litigation option had some
advantges in comparison to pursuing relief through the Fund
option. For example, in filing their lawsuits, the plaintiffs'
attorneys were able to identify a universe of defendants not
relevant to the Fund's settlement of claims. Thus, the plaintiffs'
attorneys named as defendants the security firms at the airports
where the terrorists had boarded the aircraft, the building architects
and firms involved in the design and construction of the World
462. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
463. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding
exclusive jurisdiction of Southern District of New York as remedy for damages
arising out of September 1Ith terrorist attacks). For a description of the array of
types of cases consolidated in Judge Hellerstein's court, see Conk, supra note
24, at 189.
464. Moynihan, supra note 362.
465. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d at 553; id. at 555-63 (mediator's
report).
466. See id. at 553; id. at 555-63 (mediator's report); see also Mark
Hamblett, 9/11 Mediator Wraps Up Work; Only 3 Cases Left Unsettled,
LAW.COM (Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202428837
458&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.
467. In re Sept. 11th Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2007 WL 1965559
(S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007).
468. BRILL, supra note 262, at 537; Berkowitz supra note 18, at 27; Geyelin,
supra note 263.
469. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 186-88; Rabin, supra note 11, at 586-87
(weighing the relative risks and benefits of the litigation option, including no
collateral source offsets and the possibility of punitive damage recovery).
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Trade Center Towers, the Port Authority, the owners of the World
Trade Center Towers, and numerous other defendants.470 In an
interim MDL ruling, Judge Hellerstein upheld the designation of
these entities as legitimate defendants, thereby strengthening the
plaintiffs' litigation posture. Judge Hellerstein also issued an
interim order to enable discovery from the Transportation Security
Administration.472 Judge Hellerstein's orders also spurred the
settlement of several lawsuits on his September 11th docket.473
In addition, the collateral source rule did not apply to reduce
claimants' awards by the amount provided through these benefits.
In theory, then, victims who chose the litigation option received
both a settlement award and were able to retain their collateral
source benefits.
On the other hand, the claimants who elected civil litigation
were constrained by certain factors that had no relevance to those
who elected compensation through the Fund and that also would
not ordinarily constrain civil tort litigation.47 4 Thus, the Fund
enabling statute limited the litigation plaintiffs' choice of venue to
the federal district court in New York City and also limited the
applicable law.475 In addition, the litigation plaintiffs had to pay
attorneys' fees, and thus their settlement awards were reduced by
this transaction cost, which was not a factor for Fund claimants.
Finally, the resolution of the civil litigation plaintiffs' lawsuits took
longer to resolve by settlement than if they had elected to receive
compensation from the Fund.476
In addition, Judge Hellerstein reviewed the individual proposed
settlements, to assure consistency with previous awards. In at
least four holdout cases, Judge Hellerstein rejected agreed-upon
470. But see Ackerman, supra note 8, at 185-86 (suggesting that a finding of
negligence on the part of the airlines, security firms, airports, or aircraft
manufacturers was anything but certain in the private litigation).
471. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see
also In re Sept. 1Ith Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2004 WL 1320897 (S.D.N.Y.
June 10, 2004) (denying defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to the waiver
provision of ATSA); Ackerman, supra note 8, at 188 ("Still, by surviving the
motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs had surmounted a significant hurdle in the
[section] 408 litigation."); Conk, supra note 24, at 212.
472. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 236 F.R.D. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
473. Conk, supra note 24, at 213; see also In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F.
Supp. 2d 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
474. Ackerman, supra note 8, at 183.
475. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549 (upholding exclusive
jurisdiction of Southern District of New York as remedy for damages arising out
of September 11th terrorist attacks).
476. The last mediated case was resolved in March 2009; the remaining jury
trial case is scheduled for June 2011.
477. See In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549.
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settlements that he believed provided for excessive awards and
attorneys' fees that were inconsistent with previous awards and
settlements. 4 78 The parties involved in these rejected settlements
renegotiated and reduced the settlements terms to Judge
Hellerstein's final satisfaction.479
As indicated above, Judge Hellerstein in his court o inionS480
and mediator Birnbaum in her report to the court4 1--citing
privacy concerns-both declined to divulge any information
relating to the valuation of individual settlement awards.482 Also
citing privacy concerns, Feinberg's Final Report to Congress only
indicates aggregate settlement valuations, rather than individual
awards.48 Consequently, there is no available data to evaluate
whether claimants who elected to retain counsel and pursue
litigation in the aftermath of the September 11th disaster received a
financially more favorable outcome than claimants who elected
relief through the Fund.484
At this writing, the alternative litigation options for Gulf Coast
claimants who choose not to seek remediation through the GCCF
are relatively immature and undeveloped. The litigation landscape,
however, is much more complicated than the single litigation track
that developed after the September 1 Ith events. In turn, Feinberg
has actively discouraged potential claimants from pursuing
litigation.485
With regard to the Gulf Coast explosion and oil spill, there are
at least three simultaneous litigation tracks underway. The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation finally approved a Gulf Oil Spill
478. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 567 F. Supp. 2d 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting
$28.5 million settlement and disapproving $7,125,000 in contingent attorney
fees).
479. See In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549.
480. See id.; In re Sept. 11th Litig., 567 F. Supp. 2d 611; In re Sept. I Ith
Litig., No. 21 MC 97 (AKH), 2007 WL 1965559 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2007); In re
Sept. 11th Litig., 236 F.R.D. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Sept. 11th Litig., No.
21 MC 97 (AKH), 2004 WL 1320897 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004); In re Sept.
11th Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
481. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d at 555-63 (mediator's report).
482. See id. at 553; id. at 555-63 (mediator's report).
483. See FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 64-65.
484. In spite of the absence of comparative data, one commentator
nonetheless maintains that the option of electing the Fund remedy was
preferable to pursuing litigation in the tort system. See Ackerman, supra note 8,
at 190-91 ("Even so, measured against the likely (rather than theoretical)
outcome of a conventional tort action, even absent the constraints of [the MDL
litigation], the Fund looks like an excellent option for the overwhelming
majority of eligible claimants.").
485. Schwartz, supra note 162 (discouraging claimants from litigation
because of uncertainty, delay, and attorney's fees).
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MDL and transferred and consolidated all oil spill-related cases in
federal district court in Louisiana.486 In January 2011, presiding
Judge Barbier selected the lead counsel's committee to represent
and develop the litigation.487 The Louisiana MDL does not include
securities class actions, which have been transferred to the federal
district court in Houston, Texas, for adjudication. 4 88 In addition to
these lawsuits, the Gulf State Attorneys General anticipate filing
litigation asserting governmental claims for various damage to the
Gulf States, pursuant to an array of environmental statutes and
common law theories.489 In addition, the federal government has
under consideration its own legal actions, including the possibility
for criminal violations arising from the Deepwater Horizon
explosion and oil spill.4 90
In addition to the collection of different pending litigation, the
lawsuits relating to the Deepwater Horizon events implicate
complicated federalism issues, a significant array of federal and
state statutory and common law claims,491 multiple defendants, and
complicated choice-of-law problems. Unlike the September 11th
experience, the litigation arising out of the Gulf Coast events is not
statutorily cabined to one venue and one applicable law. Nor is it
likely that one federal judge will oversee resolution of all pieces of
Gulf Coast litigation relating to these claims, as Judge Hellerstein
486. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico,
on April 20, 2010, 731 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2010) (transfer order). BP's
choice of forum was Houston. See John Schwartz, U.S. Judge in New Orleans Will
Hear Gulf Spill Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11, 2010, at All, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/11/us/1lliability.html (creation of MDL and
transfer to New Orleans); Jones, supra note 274 (creation of Oil Spill MDL and
transfer to federal court in New Orleans; assigned to Federal Judge Carl Barbier;
viewed as plaintiffs' attorneys' victory).
487. See Dionne Searcey, Modesty Is Out as Lawyers Vie for Key Spots in
BP Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2010, at A9 (hundreds of attorneys competing
for selection for leadership posts in the MDL and its steering committees); Brian
Baxter, David Boies Seeks BP Litigation Role, AMLAw DAILY (Sept. 28, 2010,
5:57 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/09/david-boies-bp.
html.
488. In re BP PLC Sec. Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1376 (J.P.M.L. 2010)
(transfer order).
489. Evan Perez & Dionne Searcey, New Party to Suits in Gulf Spill: The
US., WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010, at A18 (commenting on state Attorneys
General's suits); see also Dionne Searcy, New Alabama AG Boots Oil-Spill
Lawyers, Will Handle on His Own, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2010.
490. Perez & Searcey, supra note 489 (Justice Department expected lawsuits
under environmental protection statutes); John Schwartz, U.S. Sues BP and
Others for Damages in Gulf Spill, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2010, at A30
(Department of Justice criminal investigation).
491. See Meier, supra note 40 (commenting on plaintiffs' attorneys turning
down compelling potential cases because of statutory limitations on recovery).
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did in managing the September 11th litigation. Indeed, Judge
Barbier has signaled his willingness to rein in Feinberg and his
staff when appropriate, as manifested in Judge Barbier's February
2, 2011 order enjoining Feinberg and his law firm. 4 9 2
Finally, at this immature stage of the litigation, it is already
clear that a fissure has developed in the plaintiffs' bar, with some
attorneys seeking resolution of claims through the MDL auspices,
others aligned to pursue securities violations through the class
action mechanism, and a third group seeking to represent clients in
the GCCF in return for percentage-based fees.493 Clearly, the MDL
attorneys seeking to enjoin Feinberg in his GCCF efforts are not
aligned with the plaintiffs' attorneys who are advocating claimant
relief through this facility.
L. Defendants
As indicated at the outset of this Article, one important
characteristic that distinguishes the Deepwater Horizon events
from the September 11th disaster is that in the Gulf Coast case, it is
readily apparent that there are likely culpable defendants. The
Coast Guard's immediate identification of BP as a responsible
party under the OPA supports this contention.494 As suggested
above, several scholars have commented that one factor that made
the Fund an attractive alternative to the tort litigation system was
the problem-especially in the early weeks following the
September 11th events-of identifying potential defendants to sue
in litigation.4 9 5
492. Order and Reasons, supra note 275 (granting plaintiffs' motion to
supervise ex parte communications with putative class).
493. See Tom Hais, Gulf Coast Attorneys to Lead U.S. Oil Spill Lawsuits,
REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/09/us-oil-spill-
lawyers-idUSTRE6980A820101009; Brian Baxter, Steering Committee Members
Selected for Gulf Coast Oil Spill Suits, AMLAW DAILY (Oct. 11, 2010, 12:24 PM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/10/gulfsuitssteering.html; Searcey,
supra note 460.
494. The Coast Guard almost immediately designated BP as a "responsible
party" under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 102, 104
Stat. 484, 489 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006)).
495. Alexander, supra note 5, at 637 ("Although all the victims of September
11th appeared as 'deserving' of large recoveries as anyone could possibly be,
they could not recover damages from the real culprits, the hijackers and their
accomplices, who were either dead or out of reach."). As it turned out, the
plaintiffs who pursued litigation in federal court were able to identify and name
numerous defendants, and Judge Hellerstein upheld their potential liability in the
litigation. See supra notes 470-71 and accompanying text.
906 [Vol. 71
PROMETHEUS UNBOUND
Hence, the problematic nature of identifying culpable
defendants, coupled with the difficulty of establishing legal
liability for tort claims as against any of these potential defendants,
was used to persuade victims that their better remedy was through
the Fund. Although this argument proved persuasive for many in
the context of the Fund, several commentators subsequently have
argued that the Fund was unique in this regard, and the fund
approach should not be replicated in situations where there are
known, identifiable defendants allegedly responsible for a mass
tort disaster.496
In addition, as the subsequent parallel September 11th
litigation demonstrated, the plaintiffs who chose to litigate their
claims were able to identify an array of defendants in their
lawsuits, including the private airport security firms (denominated
the "Aviation defendants"), building architects and construction
firms, the Port Authority, and other entities. 49 7 In a challenge
brought by the Aviation defendants, Judge Hellerstein denied their
motions to dismiss on the grounds that they owed no duties to the
plaintiffs and that the defendants could not reasonably have
anticipated that several terrorists would hijack and then crash
jumbo t aircraft killing passengers, crew, and others on the
ground.
In contrast to the September 11th events, an array of potentially
culpable defendants exist for the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
including but certainly not limited to BP. Indeed, the GCCF final
waiver form includes an Appendix listing several dozen entities
seeking release from litigation as a consequence of settling with
the GCCF.499 Moreover, not only is there a substantial list of
potentially liable parties, but the legal theories that might support
such claims are less attenuated than in the September 11th
litigation. Hence, the "problematic defendant" argument, in
support of a fund resolution of mass tort claims, has scant
relevance in the context of the GCCF.
496. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 8, at 780-81, 798-803 (suggesting that
responsible defendants ought to be charged with the losses reflecting what is
required to make a deserving plaintiff whole).
497. See Eggen, supra note 15, at 411, 432.
498. In re Sept. 11th Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279, 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
see Ackerman, supra note 8, at 188 ("Still, by surviving the motions to dismiss,
the plaintiffs had surmounted a significant hurdle in the 408 litigation.");
Kreindler & Alexander, supra note 267 (commenting on defendants in the
September 1 Ith litigated cases).
499. See GCCF Sample Release and Covenant Not to Sue, supra note 380
(Attachment A: listing all potential defendants released from liability and
lawsuit under the settlement agreement).
9072011]
LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
III. THE EVOLUTION OF MODELS OF FuND APPROACHES TO THE
RESOLUTION OF MASS CLAIMS
Historically, European and other Western, industrialized
countries have relied on fund resolutions of claims in resolving
mass tort events.5 o Thus, for example, Germany, Japan, and the
United Kingdom quickly resolved the claims of the so-called
"thalidomide babies" in the 1960s by providing compensation and
lifetime support for children born with severe birth defects as a
result of their mother's ingestion of the pharmaceutical
thalidomide in this era.sol These various funds were the product of
the combined efforts of the respective governments and the
culpable drug manufacturer, who jointly contributed to
compensation funds to provide relief for these claimants. 502 In this
fashion, government and industry combined to provide claimants
with expeditious relief without the necessity for litigation, findings
of causation, liability, and damages.
In the United States, by contrast, the use of funds to resolve
mass tort litigation has never gained comparable traction. There are
many reasons for this, not the least of which is the embedded
American legal culture of adversarial justice and right to trial by
jury. Nevertheless, a few historical examples of American
experiments with compensation funds include the Black Lung
Program pursuant to the Black Lung Benefits Act;503 the National
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program; 504 and the Price-Anderson
Act, which provides for strict statutory liability in the case of
nuclear plant disaster.o5 In addition, Congress enacted the
National Swine Flu Act in 1976, creating a fund to compensate
victims who died or were injured from inoculations administered
by a government-mandated program. 50 6
500. See Rabin, supra note 8, at 793-96 (foreign compensation models for
mass tort and terrorist events).
501. See Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a False
Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2153, 2158 (1997).
502. Id.
503. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (2006); see also Peck, supra note 8, at 217-18
(discussing the Black Lung program).
504. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a). The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of
1986 established a program to compensate children injured by exposure to
vaccines; it is internally funded by a tax imposed on the sale of each dose of
vaccine sold. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 30 (describing the implementation of
this program).
505. 42 U.S.C. § 2210; see Peck, supra note 8, at 218 (commenting that
ATLA considered the Price-Anderson Act as a promising model for creation of
a fund for September 1Ith victims).
506. 42 U.S.C. § 247(j)-(); Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 31.
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Of the American historical funds, the Black Lung program
often has been cited as an ineffectual mechanism for compensating
coal miner claimants.5 0 7 Notably, all these funds are authorized by
federal statute; moreover, the childhood vaccine program and the
Price-Anderson Act authorize funds that financially are supported
by the industries engaged in the potentially hazardous activity that
might give rise to liability. 08
Specifically, the Price-Anderson Act requires that entities
engaged in the production of nuclear energy contribute to a fund in
case of a prospective disaster that might require remediation to
victims of a nuclear plant disaster.50 The Price-Anderson Act
limits plants' liability to $560 million for all claims arising from a
single nuclear accident.5 ' To be eligible to participate in this fund
mechanism, nuclear licensees must maintain at least $160 million
in private insurance and contribute up to $10 million annually to a
pool of funds designed to total $47 billion dollars.51' In the case of
disaster, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission declares an
extraordinary nuclear occurrence, and the Price-Anderson Act sets
up a system of strict liability in which all defenses are waived. In
order to receive compensation, claimants must only show that their
injuries result from a nuclear power plant accident. 12
The September 11th events and the creation of the Fund
marked the first significant American experiment with a fund
approach to compensating large numbers of claimants for tortious
injury, and the GCCF represents the second such large-scale
compensation effort outside the judicial system. As indicated
above, because the Fund and the GCCF share a common
administrator, the GCCF has mimicked the Fund in many aspects
of its creation and implementation. On the other hand, the GCCF
represents a radical departure from the Fund, and the ways in
which the GCCF differ from the Fund are cause for great concern.
The arc of Feinberg's career neatly demonstrates the evolution
of at least three different fund models, progressing from arguably
the most legitimate to arguably the least legitimate (and most
lawless). This evolution illustrates a seamless progression from (1)
507. See Peck, supra note 8, at 218 (describing paltry compensation benefits
paid pursuant to the program); William S. Mattingly, Black Lung Update: The
Evolution of the Current Regulations and the Proposed Revolution, 100 W. VA.
L. REV. 601, 601 (1998); Brian C. Murchison, Due Process, Black Lung, and the
Shaping ofAdministrative Justice, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1025 (2002).
508. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 30.
509. See id. at 32-34; see also Peck, supra note 8, at 218.
510. Peck, supra note 8, at 219.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 218.
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a judicially approved and managed class action fund to (2) a
congressionally mandated and supervised fund to (3) a defendant-
created and directed fund. In the haste to embrace the fund
approach to mass claim resolution, little attention has focused on
how these "funds" have evolved from entities governed by the rule
of law to a model essentially unconstrained by law.
Feinberg's initial experience with the use of a fund to resolve
mass claims involved his participation as a special master in the
Agent Orange litigation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 5 13
Feinberg himself frequently refers to this formative experience as
the basis for techniques he engrafted onto his management of the
Fund and the GCCF, such as the use of town hall meetings to
address the victims' concerns and to make the claims process more
personal for its participants.5 1 4
However, the Agent Orange fund model is, jurisprudentially,
light years removed from the GCCF. The Agent Orange fund was
created to implement a negotiated class action settlement.15 The
Agent Orange litigation be an with hundreds of lawsuits filed in
state and federal courts.si Many years of contested litigation
preceded the adversaries' ultimate agreement to settle a class
action and create the Agent Orange fund.517
The Agent Orange litigation was managed under the close
supervision of Judge Jack Weinstein,5 1 8 and the Agent Orange fund
was a creature of a Rule 23 class action settlement. 519 Whatever
role Feinberg may have played in the resolution of the Agent
Orange litigation, he was appointed as a special master in that
litigation under the authority of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53. o Feinberg's authority and powers in the Agent Orange fund
were limited and circumscribed by law, and he was answerable to
the federal court. 52 1
513. See SCHUCK, supra note 240, at 144-45.
514. For a discussion of Feinberg's town hall meetings to address claimants'
concerns in his implementation of the GCCF facility, see supra notes 106-12
and accompanying text.
515. SCHUCK, supra note 240, at 149-65.
516. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
517. Id.
518. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The
Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986).
519. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (upholding
class action settlement).
520. See supra notes 253-72 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 53);
see also SCHUCK, supra note 240, at 144-45.
521. ScHucK, supra note 240, at 144-45.
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Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the Agnt Orange
fund was the creature of a class action settlement. As such,
before this fund mechanism could begin operation to provide
compensation to Vietnam veterans, the Agent Orange settlement
had to be judicially reviewed and approved by Judfe Weinstein
pursuant to Federal Rule Civil Procedure 23(e).52 The Agent
Orange fund, then, was subject to an array of substantive and
procedural due process constraints, not the least of which was the
requirement that Judge Weinstein find that class claimants had
been accorded adequate representation in settlement of their claims
through the fund.52
Hence, the Agent Orange fund was created subject to an array
of legal constraints, and Feinberg, in his role as special master, did
not function as a freewheeling, unbounded law-giver. Moreover, in
the larely uncritical commentary lauding the Agent Orange
fund,2 it is frequently overlooked that the Agent Orange
settlement was successfully challenged nearly 25 years after Judge
Weinstein's approval of the Agent Orange fund. 26 If the Agent
Orange fund is the best example of a fund resolution of mass
claims, then it is important to note that the binding effect of the
Agent Orange settlement was successfully challenged on due
process grounds for the failure to provide future claimants with
adequate representation.527
Feinberg's second experience with a fund approach to
resolving mass claims was his administration of the September
1Ith Victim Compensation Fund. The Fund represented an
innovative approach to resolving mass tort claims against the
backdrop of national tragedy. In terms of both substance and
procedure, the Fund drew loosely from its class action cousins.
But, as has been described at length above, the Fund was not the
result of class litigation or the close judicial supervision entailed in
settling class litigation.
Thus, the Fund represents a fund archetype that is once
removed from the class action model, although not without legal
constraints. Hence, the Fund was a creature of federal statute, was
subject to congressional oversight, and had a "special master"
522. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (upholding
class action settlement).
523. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
524. Id.
525. See, e.g., Martha L. Minow, The Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack
Weinstein, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 2010 (1997).
526. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
527. Id.
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appointed by the executive branch who remotely was accountable
to Congress and the Department of Justice. In addition, the Fund
incorporated several features of the rule of law, including public
notice-and-comment rulemaking and significant transparency.
Although the Fund was undergirded with legal authorization, it
signaled an expansive progression from the class action fund
model. The Fund was not created within the scope of authority of
the federal judiciary, nor was the Fund subject to judicial oversight
and management by a federal judge. Unlike the class action
context, decisions relating to the Fund were not subject to review
for substantive or procedural due process. Moreover, as indicated
above, the Fund special master had liberal rulemaking and other
authority, which he increasingly exercised in an ad hoc fashion
during the course of the Fund's history. And the special master's
award determinations were subjected to limited appellate review.
The GCCF represents the third fund model and illustrates an
extreme and seemingly lawless expansion of the fund approach to
resolving mass claims. To begin, it is difficult to discern the legal
authorization for the fund, other than vague references to the OPA.
The GCCF was not created as a mechanism to implement a
contested class action settlement, nor did Congress authorize
creation of this fund. Thus, the GCCF has not been subject to the
scrutiny that would have accompanied a class action settlement or
congressional oversight.
Moreover, it is difficult to characterize exactly what the GCCF
is and what legal status this entity has if any. Feinberg has
described the GCCF as a "compact,"5 while federal Judge
Barbier has described the GCCF as a "hybrid."5 29 The GCCF is a
largely private claims-adjusting facility acting in ad hoc fashion,
run by a culpable party's retained autocrat. It is not functioning as
a mediation or arbitration center, with claims resolution through
the auspices of professional mediators or arbitrators. The persons
administering claims have not been designated or selected through
adversarial processes, and the GCCF is functioning outside judicial
scrutiny and seemingly not subject to any professional rules of
conduct.
Instead, the GCCF was the result of private, behind-closed-
door negotiations with unidentified participants. The fund was
created and funded by the primary malefactor, who picked the
fund's administrator. The relationship between BP and Feinberg
528. See, e.g., Recovery in the Gulf, supra note 61, at 4 (statement of
Kenneth Feinberg).
529. Order and Reasons, supra note 275 (granting plaintiffs' motion to
supervise ex parte communications with putative class).
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has raised numerous significant ethical issues, centrally relating to
the administrator's independence. The administrator and his law
firm are financially profiting from their administration of the fund.
There are numerous indicia that BP has not been operating
independently of the fund, but rather has intervened in several
crucial decisions relating to the fund's implementation that favor
BP's interests.
The GCCF has engaged in no public rulemaking and virtually
all its decisions have been cloaked in secrecy, including its criteria
and personnel. The fund has operated largely in a non-transparent
fashion, with limited avenues for independent appellate review.
There has been a significant lack of information upon which Gulf
Coast victims might determine the possible valuation of their
claims, and whether it makes sense to seek remediation through the
GCCF. In spite of promises to provide legal assistance to Gulf
Coast claimants, such provision of counsel has been non-existent
or slow in being provided. Claims administration has been
exceedingly protracted and multiple claims have been delayed or
denied. Claimants have complained about inconsistent awards. The
waiver required as a condition for the final settlement of claims
releases a very large array of potential claims, as well as dozens of
potential defendants in addition to BP. Against this chaotic
background, the GCCF's administrator has repeatedly urged Gulf
Coast residents and businesses to seek compensation in the GCCF
as the best means for receiving compensation, for which actions
the federal court in Louisiana finally enjoined Feinberg.530
Hence, almost every hallmark supporting the legitimacy of an
alternative dispute resolution facility, including important due
process protections for claimants, have been lacking in
implementation of the GCCF.ssi
IV. CONCLUSION: THE GCCF-A FUND Too FAR
Not all fund approaches to resolving mass claims are the same,
and not all funds are fungible. Nonetheless, "funds" are now
invoked with almost talismanic approval, as a preferred means for
providinE compensation to disaster victims outside the litigation
system. Moreover, the Gulf Coast Claims Facility provides a
530. Id.
531. Ironically, Feinberg himself has stated that an excellent alternative
dispute resolution facility must satisfy three design variables: substantive
criteria, due process protections, and mechanics. Feinberg, The Building Blocks,
supra note 9, at 275; see also supra note 460.
532. One critic perceives the trend towards fund solutions to mass tort claims
as eroding fundamental justice:
2011] 913
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
stellar example of the unseemly pressure exerted on disaster
victims to quickly seek relief through a fund mechanism, rather
than retaining counsel and filing a lawsuit. With the advent of the
GCCF, commentators ought to ask probing questions concerning
who benefits from these mechanisms and whether the GCCF
model in particular serves the interests of justice and for whom. 533
The greatest justifications for fund resolution of mass claims
are grounded in values of efficiency and economy.534 The theory
underlying fund resolution of claims is that by avoiding the
litigation system, claimants receive quick, easy payment of claims
and eliminate the risks, transaction costs, and delays inherent in
litigation. These themes have pervaded Feinberg's repeated
appeals to claimants to settle with both the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility.
However, one may legitimately question whether efficiency
and economy ought to be the bellwether metrics of a successful
compensation program. In contrast, other commentators have
suggested that compensation programs ought to be evaluated by
the core substantive values of democratic governance, which
include the values of participation, accountability, transparency,
rationality, personal autonomy, equality, due process, and other
social capital values necessary to promote civil society.535 Other
commentators have suggested that four elements of procedural
justice include: (1) whether procedures allow people an
opportunity to state their case; (2) whether authorities are viewed
as neutral, unbiased, honest, and principled in their
Yet, tort law will continue to be eroded by attrition, by lopping off
remedies-especially by limiting damages and expanding immunities
-unless we are able to grab hold of the public's conscience and
consciousness to bring home the point that liability in tort is not some
form of punishment, erratically inflicted.
Conk, supra note 24, at 177.
533. See generally Alexander, supra note 5 (enumerating factors to consider
in the future design of compensation funds for victims of disaster and terrorist
attacks).
534. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 220 ("Efficiency was a major reason for
the Fund, and because of both the manner in which it was tailored and the
laudable, professional efforts of the Special Master and his staff, the efficiency
goal was met.").
535. See id. at 206 (citing Reuben, supra note 19, at 285-86); see also Priest,
supra note 15, at 545 ("The September 11th Fund will remain controversial
because the source of the definition of its awards-however able and
committed-is not in any sense democratic. Coupled with the lack of an internal
rationale or constraint, the awards granted by the Fund will continue to remain
problematic."). Other commentators have suggested that the Fund signaled the
beginning of a "broad regressive trend." See Conk, supra note 24, at 253.
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decisionmaking; (3) whether the authorities are seen as benevolent,
caring, and trustworthy; and (4 whether the people involved are
treated with dignity and respect.536
Against the backdrop of tragic events, Ken Feinberg has
emerged as the heroic figure in bringing expeditious and
uncomplicated justice to thousands of disaster victims. In this
repeated narrative, Feinberg is portrayed as the selfless, self-
sacrificing benefactor bringing compassionate relief to thousands
of claimants. 537 Because Feinberg's heroic narrative has so
pervasively dominated discussions of both the Fund and the
GCCF, less critical attention has been directed to evaluating
whether these funds have achieved justice for their recipients or
what justice entails. 538 And, because of Feinberg's media-created
persona, many commentators tactfully have refrained from
questioning Feinberg's actions, lest his critics seem ungracious.
It is impossible to evaluate the Fund and the GCCF without
discussion of Feinberg, because Feinberg has made himself
synonymous with these funds. 539 In his defensive response to his
critics, Feinberg typically defaults to the retort that "no good deed
536. Tyler & Thorisdottir, supra note 15, at 380, 384 (concluding that "none
of the aforementioned ways of creating perceptions of procedural fairness were
utilized when the Fund was initially established").
537. Diller, supra note 15, at 755.
The issue of procedural fairness centers on whether Feinberg has
structured an adjudicatory system that bolsters rather than undermines
confidence in the fairness of the results it produces. One way or
another, the question returns to Feinberg himself because the
procedures are all focused on his decision-making process. On this
score, Feinberg has handled himself in a manner that is not likely to
promote a perception of the Fund as a fair administrative mechanism.
Feinberg has adopted a high profile approach with the media and the
public. His tendencies to philosophize, argue, console, and offer
predictions and advice about the Fund all emphasize his own personal
role in making decisions. As a result, awards appear as the product of
Feinberg's personal choices and preferences rather than as the product
of dispassionate principled application of legal standards to facts.
Id.
538. One critic has opined: "While the Fund creates the Special Master, the
Special Master commands the fund. If the role of Special Master lacks
legitimacy, then the Fund lacks credibility." Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 40.
539. See Ackerman, supra note 8, at 197 ("In large part due to his public
availability, Feinberg came to personify the Fund, and some of the responses to
the Fund reflected people's reactions to him."); Diller, supra note 15, at 726,
755 ("In both the substantive standards and the procedural model, the spotlight
remains focused on the personal choices and values of Special Master Feinberg
himself Regardless of how capable and well-intentioned the Special Master, the
Fund vests too much discretion in a single individual with little means of
accountability and oversight.").
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goes unpunished"-a self-serving response that deflects
approbation onto his critics. Although it may be true that no good
deed goes unpunished, it is perhaps relevant to question whether
Feinberg-especially in his administration of the GCCF-has been
performing good deeds for thousands of grieving and often
desperate people.
We conclude by noting that in the myth of Prometheus, things
turned out very well for both Prometheus and Hercules, but not
necessarily so for mankind. While Prometheus and Hercules went
on to greater glory, the gods continued to punish mankind for
receiving the gift of fire.
As other mass torts have taught us, BP will survive and prosper
in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, as will Ken
Feinberg. Feinberg will continue, in the future, to administer new
disaster funds as the need arises and be lauded for his heroic efforts
in administering these massive funds. However, with the GCCF,
the precedent has now been set for corporate malefactors who are
caught up in the maelstrom of massive liability to discharge their
legal responsibilities on their own terms and favorable to their own
interests.
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